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Tuhinga Whakarāpopoto | Abstract 
In recent decades, the consideration of Māori law in Aotearoa New Zealand state law has taken 
on a new momentum. Law schools are improving their teaching of tikanga and Māori law in 
compulsory and specialist law papers. The judiciary more often cites Māori law as relevant to 
legal decisions. The Māori Land Court has normalised the use of tikanga and Māori law in its 
deliberations, and the District Court has new expectations for the use of tikanga Māori in its 
processes. This is not to say that the way Māori law is incorporated in or recognised by these 
institutions of the state, and state law itself, is a settled matter. A conversation on this is taking 
place in Aotearoa New Zealand, and this thesis is intended to contribute to that conversation. 
This thesis explores the questions of what Māori law is and what some of the objects of Māori 
law are. It reviews what the non-written visual means of documenting Māori law might be and 
how these means help to communicate Māori law. This thesis draws on legal theory and 
education and art theories of visual literacy and encoded objects to investigate whether Māori 
law is documented in whakairo Māori – specifically in the Māori art forms of tā moko, pou 
whenua, and raranga. Tā moko is the art of tattooing marks into the body, particularly the face 
but also the legs, body and arms. Pou whenua are tall upright wooden carvings placed in or on 
the ground and used to identify whakapapa to and mana whenua over lands and waters. Raranga 
is the art of weaving, which is extensively used in the making of garments and domestic tools.  
Māori law is documented in objects and visual markings just as objects (such as law books) 
and visual markings (such as writing) document state law in Aotearoa New Zealand. This thesis 
considers the evidence for that documentation of Māori law. Seven core principles of Māori 
law are explored and applied to three chosen forms of whakairo Māori.  
This thesis acknowledges how Indigenous jurists have critiqued Western attitudes about 
Indigenous laws, confirming the resilience of both Māori law in Aotearoa New Zealand and 
contemporary Indigenous jurisprudence. The thesis demonstrates that Indigenous peoples, 
including Māori, can be said to have documented their law in creative art forms. There are 
examples of whakairo Māori that can be read as encoded with the principles of Māori law. As 
such, this thesis establishes that Māori were a literate culture pre-colonisation. It suggests that 
any failure to understand whakairo Māori as documenting legal information is a failure of 
literacy by the reader – not a failure of literacy of te ao Māori itself.   
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Glossary of Māori Terms 
For more comprehensive interpretations, consult the online version of Te Aka Māori-English, English-
Māori Dictionary and Index, https://maoridictionary.co.nz/ 
 
ahikā rights to occupy by descent 
ahikāroa title to land by occupation  
Aotearoa Māori name for New Zealand 
atua deity, deities  
awa river  
ea resolution, to be satisfied, gratified 
hara harm, wrong, hurt 
He Kupu Arataki Introduction 
He Kupu Whakamutunga Concluding Remarks 
He Mutunga Summary 
hui gatherings, meetings, assemblies  
Hine-Ahu-One first woman shaped from red soil by Tāne nui a Rangi   
Hine Nui te Po goddess of the underworld, she was Hine Titama but transformed after a trauma 
Hine te Iwaiwa goddess of the moon, weaving and childbirth 
Hine Titama first human child, child of Hine-Ahu-One-ahu-one and Tāne Mahuta, 
transformed into Hine Nui te Po 
ihi psychic force, charm   
iwi Māori tribes 
kai indicates a person or role 
kaitaka highly prized cloak 
kaitiaki trustee  
kaitiakitanga trusteeship, guardianship 
kakahu clothing 
karakia ritual chant, prayer  
ka tika tō mate symbolic violence 
kawa customs, protocols 
kete bags  
kinikini woven kilt  
koha gift, contribution  
kōrero speak, talk  
korowai woven cloak 
kupu word, vocabulary  
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nō belonging to, indicates achieved possession 
mana status  
manaaki hospitality, show respect for, support 
mana atua spiritual realm of responsibility 
mana motuhake independence, sovereignty  
mana tangata human realm of responsibility 
mana whenua territorial authority over lands and waters 
manuhiri guests  
mātanga expert 
mataora full face moko 
mātauranga Māori Māori knowledge 
maunga mountains 
mauri life principle, vitality  
mere short weapon 
moana ocean  
mokemoke lonely  
moko kauae female chin moko  
muru compensation, form of social control, restorative justice  
ohākī a performed will 
pana banish, exclude as punishment 
Papatūānuku earth mother, the earth 
pepeha formalised recitation 
Pitopito Kōrero Notes 
piupiu flax kilt-like garment that swings  
pou whenua land marker posts  
pounamu greenstone  
pūrākau story  
rāhui ritual prohibition 
rangatira chiefly, high rank, esteemed  
rangatiratanga sovereignty, political responsibilities  
ranginui the sky 
raranga weaving 
rarohenga underworld  
raupatu conquest 
rongo-a-whare women as emissaries 
Rongomatane god of cultivated food 
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rūnanga council, to discuss in an assemble  
tahuaroa large wooden frames for displaying taonga 
take moe whenua marriage confirmation  
take tūpuna ancestral rights and connections  
takiwā district, territory, region 
tā moko tattooing  
Tāne Mahuta god of forests and birds 
tanga suffix to make verbs into nouns, indicates time or circumstance 
Tangaroa god of seas, sea creatures 
tangihanga funeral  
taniko embroidery  
taonga sacred objects, treasures  
taonga tuku iho ancestral treasure  
tapu sacred, prohibited, set apart 
tatai links  
tautohetohe debate  
Tāwhirimātea god of winds, rain, hail, snow 
te Ao Mārama the dawn of time 
te Ao Tūroa world of light  
te Kore the void of space and time  
te Pō the long darkness  
te taiao environment, landscape  
Te Tiriti O Waitangi the Treaty of Waitangi 
te wāhanga chapter 
tekoteko carved figure on the gable of a meeting house 
tiaki to care for, guard, look after 
tika correct, true, lawful 
tikanga 
tīwaiwaka 
correct procedure, customary system of Māori values and practices 
fantail 
Tuhinga Whakarāpopoto Abstract 
tuku to relinquish, cede, grant or gift 
tūpuna ancestors, grandparents 
turangawaewae one’s place to stand and belong through kinship 
ture law, rule 
tūrehu fairy  
upoko leader  
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utu balance, response, consequence  
waiata songs  
waiata kākahu protective song  
waka  origin canoe, canoe 
whaikōrero Oration, to address  
whakairo carvings, to ornament with a pattern  
whakairo Māori Māori visual art 
whakamā shame 
whakamana empower, legitimise  
whakapapa genealogy  
whakawā adjudication, determination 
whānau family  
whanaunga relations, kin 
whanaungatanga relationship, kinship, sense of family connection 
whariki mat 
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Pitopito Kōrero | Notes 
 
Use and Translation of te reo Māori 
Te reo Māori kupu | words are used frequently in this thesis. I do not translate very 
commonly used kupu such as reo, Māori, or tikanga. Where uncommon kupu are translated 
from te reo Māori into English in the text I use the vertical line to indicate the translation 
(e.g., pana | banish). I use this translation technique frequently to facilitate understanding and 
ease of reading. The definitions are from https://maoridictionary.co.nz/, the online version of 
Te Aka Māori-English, English-Māori Dictionary and Index, unless otherwise described in 
the text. 
When describing cultural concepts and activities of an Indigenous nation, I use that nation’s 
language where possible. Where I do not know that language, I will use the term that would be 
used if it were a Māori context. I translate Indigenous concepts into te reo Māori where possible 
because I feel that te reo Māori kupu provide a better translation of Indigenous concepts than 
English words. This expresses my personal preference for how Indigenous concepts and 
relationships can be best described in an English-language thesis. For example, when I describe 
the Saltwater Collection of bark paintings, presented as evidence in Gawirrin Gumana v 
Northern Territory of Australia (No1) [2005] FCA 50, I use the kupu ‘kaitiaki’ for guardian, 
‘tapu’ for sacred, ‘atua’ for ‘deity’, and ‘whakapapa’ for ‘related’, as in the following example: 
In 1996 a kaitiaki, Waka Munungurr, found an illegal barramundi fishing camp in 
a tapu area called Garranali. Garranali is the home of Bäru, an atua in human and 








Te Wāhanga Tuatahi – He Kupu Arataki | Introduction  
 
In this chapter, I introduce the question that is the focus of this thesis: Is Māori law documented 
in whakairo Māori | Māori visual art? This question is best answered by dividing it into two 
parts. First, what are the non-written visual means of communicating Māori law? Second, how 
can these non-written visual means help to communicate Māori law? The thesis, then, considers 
whether there is a visual language in whakairo Māori that can communicate legal information. 
Whakairo Māori includes several creative art forms. The ones that I will look at in this thesis 
are tā moko | tattooing, pou whenua | land marker posts, and raranga | weaving. 
I first describe the context to this thesis. I then set out my claim that Māori law exists as an 
authoritative and enforceable source of rights and obligations in Aotearoa New Zealand and 
provide a brief situation update of the current role of Māori law in Aotearoa New Zealand’s 
legal system. This flows into a description of my research aims. I then discuss Kaupapa Māori 
research theory and how I am applying it in this thesis. I conclude this Introduction with an 
outline of how each subsequent chapter seeks to address my research aims.  
 
I. Navigating Research: Thesis Context 
  
I currently work as a Research Fellow in the Faculty of Law at the University of Otago. In this 
role, my research contributes to a national research project on how to indigenise the New 
Zealand LLB law degree; that is, how to create a bijural legal education where Māori law is 
taught alongside New Zealand state law to all law students.1 At a law faculty staff retreat a year 
or so ago, the law academics were talking about why they did, or more accurately, why they 
wanted to do research. They discussed what made research compelling for them. 
I did not offer my thoughts; I was too new to the institution. But I did think that, for me, it is 
such a thrill making connections from seemingly unconnected ideas and, in the process, 
creating new ideas to be challenged and interrogated. I am a textile artist, and this is what I 
 
1 Jacinta Ruru and others Inspiring National Indigenous Legal Education for Aotearoa New Zealand’s Bachelor 
of Laws Degree (Michael and Suzanne Borrin Foundation, Wellington, 2020). 
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naturally do in my textile and photography art practice in Indigenous Futurism.2 It seems 
natural to do the same in my academic legal research. Research is like art, in my view. It is a 
navigation across choppy unpredictable seas between islands of knowledge, during which I can 
map out a new idea, a new connection.  
The connection that I am focused on in this thesis is that between art and law. Tracing a new 
theoretical connection between art and law might seem like a tricky journey, at least when 
approached from my traditional Western legal and Western art education. Western law is dense, 
logical, and strict.3 Western art is the opposite – emotive, ambiguous, and ephemeral.4 Often 
they are only considered together through intellectual property law and contract law.5 However, 
this thesis evolved from making a new connection, one that is apparent whether considered 
from a Western or Indigenous point of view: both art and law are human tools for 
communication. I see art and law as both being drawn from the human mind and our desire to 
connect with others, to share and explore relationships. Both are drawn from stories we tell 
ourselves and others about the world and how we inhabit it. Both provoke strong feelings and 
challenge our thinking. These commonalities form my waka | canoe for tracing the map of a 
new connection between Māori law and Māori art, which is the work of this thesis.  
This thesis aims to show that there are non-written visual means of communicating the legal 
stories of te ao Māori. I propose that Māori law can be encoded within Māori art, specifically 
whakairo Māori. The kupu | word ‘whakairo’ means to carve or to ornament with a pattern. 
‘Whakairo’ can also mean carving or refer to other ornamented art forms. For example, ‘toi 
whakairo’ means the art of carving, and ‘kete whakairo’ refers to the art of finely woven baskets 
or textiles. ‘Whakairo Māori,’ therefore, is a broad term that refers to Māori visual art such as 
 
2 Indigenous Futurism is a creative theory that utilises the science, technology, history and colonising experience 
of Indigenous peoples in imaging a speculative, technologically advanced future in which Indigenous peoples are 
centred. See generally Grace L Dillon Walking the Clouds: An Anthology of Indigenous Science Fiction 
(University of Arizona Press, Tucson, 2012); Lillia McEnaney “Indigenous Futurisms: Transcending 
Past/Present/Future” (2020) 36 Visual Anthropology Review 417; and Blaire Topash-Caldwell “Sovereign 
Futures in Neshnabe Speculative Fiction” (2020) 19 Borderlands 29. 
3 See HLA Hart The Concept of Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1961); John Austin The Province of Jurisprudence 
Determined (John Murray, London, 1832). 
4 Claudia Muth, Vera Hesslinger and Claus-Christian Carbon “The Appeal of Challenge in the Perception of Art: 
How Ambiguity, Solvability of Ambiguity, and the Opportunity for Insight Affect Appreciation” (2015) 9(3) 
Psychology of Aesthetics, Creativity, and the Arts 206 at 208. See for example Richard K Sherwin Visualizing 
Law in the Age of the Digital Baroque: Arabesques and Entanglements (Routledge, London, 2011) 




tā moko | tattooing, pou whenua | land marker posts, and raranga | weaving.6 I suggest that 
Māori used these visual literacy modes to encode a visual language into whakairo Māori, and 
that that visual language can be read, understood, and communicated to others. 
There is a long and rich history of visual communication to draw on when we consider how we 
have shared ideas with each other through visual markings in visual art during our long 
maturation as humans. The written kupu is only one form of communication; there are others. 
And while the written kupu is an utter delight, before its conception human civilisations 
communicated complex ideas about themselves and their relationships in visual forms. 
Therefore, I explore in this thesis how Indigenous contemporary and historical visual art can 
be used to help communicate Indigenous legal traditions in a way that is useful and maintains 
the integrity of Indigenous law. I focus on Aotearoa and, to a lesser degree, Canada and 
Australia because in these three colonised countries there is a strong resurgence of legal and 
creative Indigenous self-determination.  
I accept that I am hindered in my research by my lack of expert fluent knowledge of te reo 
Māori, particularly in understanding and relating historical examples. There is much of my 
inherited Māori knowledge that I cannot access, and this is a common experience of Indigenous 
peoples in colonised nations. I hope that this thesis becomes its own waka for me and others 
and that, in the future, more skilled navigators can traverse deeper waters and make new maps 
of mātauranga Māori | Māori knowledge, whakairo Māori and Māori law.  
 
II. Māori Law Is the First Law 
 
This thesis is grounded in the acceptance that Māori law is the first law of Aotearoa New 
Zealand. As Chapter 5 will demonstrate, Māori law is a taonga tuku iho | ancestral treasure and 
continues to inform and influence Māori today. Māori law has had a place in Aotearoa New 
Zealand state law since the signing of te Tiriti o Waitangi | the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840.7 
The New Zealand Law Commission notes that in the early years of colonisation, Māori law 
 
6 Hirini Moko Mead Te Maori: Maori Art from New Zealand Collections (Heinemann Publishers (NZ), Auckland, 
1984) at 21. 
7 For a full discussion of the history of Māori custom law in New Zealand, see New Zealand Law Commission 
Māori Custom and Values in New Zealand Law (SP9, NZLC, 2001). 
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was recognised by British state officials as valid, and used by Māori to manage their affairs.8 
The British Minister is said to have instructed Governor Hobson with the following:9  
[The Maori people have] established by their own customs a division and 
appropriation of the soil… with usages having the character and authority of law … 
it will of course be the duty of the protectors to make themselves conversant with 
these native customs. 
Legislation such as the now repealed Native Exemption Ordinance 1844, the Resident 
Magistrates Courts Ordinance 1846 and Resident Magistrates Act 1867 and, somewhat 
notoriously, section 71 of the New Zealand Constitution Act 1852 all recognised the validity 
of Māori customary law. For example, section 71 of the latter Act provided for autonomous 
Māori territorial districts where: 10 
the Laws, Customs, and Usages of the aboriginal or native inhabitants of New 
Zealand, so far as they are not repugnant to the general Principles of Humanity, 
should for the present be maintained for the Government of themselves, in all their 
Relations to and Dealings with each other. 
However, it was only a decade or so later that the legislature began to pass legislation that 
was designed to extinguish Māori law, such as the Native Titles Act 1865, the preamble of 
which reads:11 
WHEREAS it is expedient to amend and consolidate the laws, relating to lands in 
the Colony which are still subject to Maori proprietary customs and to provide for 
the ascertainment of the persons who according to such customs are the owners 
thereof and to encourage the extinction of such proprietary customs and to provide 
for the conversion of such modes of ownership into titles derived from the Crown 
and to provide for the regulation of the descent of such lands when the title thereto 
is converted as aforesaid and to make further provisions in reference to the matters 
aforesaid. 
 
8 At 8. 
9 At 82. 
10 At 84. See also Robert Joseph The Government of Themselves: Case Law Policy and Section 71 of the New 
Zealand Constitution Act 1852 (Te Mātāhauariki Institute, Waikato, 2002) for a comprehensive discussion on 
section 71. 
11 Preamble, Native Titles Act 1865. 
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Māori law had been recognised as extant and operable in the very early years of the colonial 
government, but was undermined by later settler law, at least in part because Māori law was an 
impediment to the alienation of land for settler use.12 At times Māori law has been recognised 
by the state legal system as enforceable and relevant13 and other times it has been dismissed,14 
but it has always occupied a place both separate from and within the state legal system. In 
recent decades, however, the consideration of Māori law in state law has taken on a new 
momentum. Law schools have improved both their teaching of tikanga and Māori law in 
compulsory and specialist law papers. The judiciary more often cites Māori law as relevant to 
legal decisions.15 The Māori Land Court has normalised the use of tikanga and Māori law in 
its deliberations,16 and the District Court is to utilise te reo Māori and tikanga Māori in its 
processes.17 With the increase in the number of Māori judges at all levels of the court,18 a Māori 
Chief Judge of the District Court, and a Māori Supreme Court justice, there is more and more 
 
12 New Zealand Law Commission, above n 7, at 22. 
13 See Nireaha Tamaki v Baker (1901) NZPCC 371; Te Weehi v Regional Fisheries Officer [1986] NZLR 680; 
and Huakina Development Trust v Waikato Valley Authority [1987] 2 NZLR 188. 
14 See Wi Parata v Bishop of Wellington [1877] 3 Jur (NS) 72. 
15 See Re Edwards (Te Whakatōhea) (No 2) [2021] NZHC 1025; Ngawaka v Ngāti Rehua-Ngātiwai Ki Aotea 
Trust Board [2021] NZHC 291; Trans-Tasman Resources Ltd v Taranaki-Whanganui Conservation Board [2020] 
NZCA 86; Takamore v Clarke [2012] NZSC 116; and Peter Hugh McGregor Ellis v The Queen SC 49/2019 
NZSC Trans 31. For a discussion on the implications of judicial decisions citing tikanga Māori, see also Natalie 
Coates “The Recognition of Tikanga in the Common Law of New Zealand” (2015) 1 NZLR 1; Jacinta Ruru “First 
Laws: Tikanga Māori in/and the Law” [2018] VUWLR 279; and Annette Sykes “The Myth of Tikanga in the 
Pākehā Law” (5 December 2020) 
<https://cdn.auckland.ac.nz/assets/law/Documents/centres/indigenouscentre/Final%20Nin%20Tomas%20Memo
rial%20Lecture%205%20December%202020.pdf>. 
16 Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993. Section 7(2)(a) requires judges to have experience of tikanga Māori and te 
reo Māori before they are appointed to the Māori Land Court. 
17 For the most recent example, see the announcement of the Te Ao Mārama model for New Zealand’s District 
Courts in Heemi Taumaunu “Norris Ward McKinnon Annual Lecture 2020” The District Court of New Zealand 
(11 November 2020) <https://www.districtcourts.govt.nz/reports-publications-and-statistics/publications/norris-
ward-mckinnon-annual-lecture-2020/ >. The model includes innovations such as infusing te reo and tikanga Māori 
into the court processes; making more information about the offender, such as cultural background, available to 
judges; solution-focused judging; minimising formalities; improved community involvement; and interagency 
coordination. 
18 In January 2020, the Attorney General announced the appointment of 21 new District Court judges, 11 of whom 
were Māori. See “Māori Dominate in New Appointment of District Court Judges” RNZ (22 January 2020) 
<https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/te-manu-korihi/407875/maori-dominate-in-new-appointment-of-district-court-
judges>. In February 2021, the Attorney General announced the further appointments of 3 new District Court 
judges, including Judge Ophir Cassidy (Ngāti Porou, Ngāti Whātua ki Kaipara), the first judge to be appointed 
with a moko kauae | female chin tattoo. See David Parker “Three District Court Judges Appointed” 




judicial and extra-judicial writing on the incorporation of tikanga Māori into New Zealand 
law.19 
During the research and writing of this thesis, I have seen an increasing reference to Māori 
law in caselaw, even in just the last year. In 2021, Churchman J in the High Court, in Re 
Edwards (Te Whakatōhea) (No 2),20 summarised the recent judgments that restate the validity 
of tikanga Māori in New Zealand’s legal system. He refers to the comment from Palmer J in 
Ngawaka v Ngāti Rehua-Ngātiwai ki Aotea Trust Board that “[t]ikanga Māori was the first 
law in Aotearoa. It is recognised by Acts of Parliament. It is also recognised by the common 
law of New Zealand.”21 Churchman J also refers to Trans-Tasman Resources Limited, where 
the Court held that the consideration of tikanga requires understanding of key concepts as 
understood by Māori because it is:22  
axiomatic that the tikanga Māori that defines and governs the interests of tangata 
whenua in the taonga protected by the Treaty is an integral strand of the common 
law of New Zealand. 
Churchman J is clear from the recent decisions from the higher courts that the issues of tikanga 
are being debated and discussed regularly and with recognition that Māori are the experts on 
tikanga Māori and Māori law:23 
I reiterate here that it is not the role of the Court to define the tikanga of the 
applicants. As I discuss at [308] below, the proper authorities on tikanga are those 
who have been tasked or honoured with the mātauranga of their tīpuna – the 
knowledge and wisdom passed down to them by their ancestors.  
That is not to say that the way Māori law is incorporated in or recognised by state law is a 
settled matter. There remain important questions related to the approach of the courts to the 
incorporation of tikanga Māori into state law. One question relevant to this thesis is whether 
the courts are prepared to recognise tikanga Māori as an authoritative legal tradition in its own 
right, with a clear and separate set of legal principles, or whether it will treat tikanga Māori and 
 
19 See Joseph Williams “Lex Aotearoa: An Heroic Attempt to Map the Māori Dimension in Modern New Zealand 
Law” (2013) 21 Wai L Rev 94. 
20 Re Edwards (Te Whakatōhea) (No 2), above n 15, at [272]. 
21 Ngawaka v Ngāti Rehua-Ngātiwai ki Aotea Trust Board, above n 15, at [2]. 
22 Trans-Tasman Resources Ltd v Taranaki-Whanganui Conservation Board, above n 15 at [177], discussed in Re 
Edwards (Te Whakatōhea) (No 2), above n 15, at [277] as per Churchman J. 
23 Re Edwards (Te Whakatōhea) (No 2), above n 15, at [272]. 
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Māori ‘custom’ law as evidence to be weighed against other matters within the state legal 
system’s provisions. For example, while Elias CJ in Takamore v Clarke does say, in obiter, 
“Māori custom according to tikanga is therefore part of the values of the New Zealand’s 
common law”,24 the Court nonetheless goes on to determine that, in this case, tikanga Māori 
burial laws are only a relevant consideration among many:25 
The common law is not displaced when the deceased is of Māori descent and the 
whanau invokes the tikanga concerning burial practices, as has happened in this 
case. Rather the common law of New Zealand requires reference to the tikanga, 
along with other important cultural, spiritual and religious values, and all other 
circumstances of the case as matters that must form part of the evaluation.  
As such, the Court accepted that tikanga Māori is relevant, but as evidence within the common 
law, not as a law against which evidence can be weighed.26 This is an important distinction to 
keep in mind when considering how the non-written documentation of Māori law may or may 
not be recognised as authoritative in its own right, within its own legal tradition. 
A conversation on this is currently taking place in Aotearoa New Zealand, and this thesis is 
intended to contribute to that conversation. I am currently involved in ongoing research with 
Māori law academics, in consultation with Māori and the legal community, to determine 
whether advanced teaching of Māori law should occur in law schools and what the boundaries 
of that teaching should be. Some Māori commentators caution that incorporating tikanga into 
state law may be an ongoing colonisation or sublimation of tikanga.27 Those risks are very real, 
and more conversation is needed to determine whether and how they can be managed. The 
kinds of questions that need to be asked include: 
• How can we make clear the contemporary relevance of Māori cultural ideas and 
concepts, beliefs and connections to people who have been largely taught that such 
things are relics of either a romanticised or obliterated past?  
 
24 Takamore v Clarke, above n 15, at [94]. 
25 At [164], per McGrath J. 
26 For a detailed discussion of this issue from Takamore, see Coates, above n 15.  
27 Ani Mikaere “The Treaty of Waitangi and Recognition of Tikanga Māori” in Michael Belgrave, Merata 
Kawharu and David Williams (eds) Waitangi Revisited: Perspectives on the Treaty of Waitangi (2nd ed, Oxford 
University Press, Auckland, 2005) 330 at 344. See also Robert Joseph “Re-creating Space for the First Law of 
Aotearoa-New Zealand” (2009) Wai L Rev 17 at 74. 
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• How can we use English legalese to communicate multicultural concepts when those 
very English words are designed to place elitist boundaries around legal knowledge to 
the exclusion of Māori cultural legal concepts?  
• How can we whakamana | empower mātauranga Māori | Māori knowledge in a Pākehā 
law school? 
 
This thesis rests on the claim that Māori law exists as an authoritative and enforceable source 
of rights and obligations in Aotearoa New Zealand.28 I explore and justify this claim in 
Chapters 2, 5 and 6. In this introductory chapter I want to be clear from the outset that when I 
apply legal concepts to art forms, I am applying the Māori legal tradition to whakairo Māori. I 
privilege Indigenous and Māori perspectives in this thesis as part of my Kaupapa Māori 
research practice. This thesis is not concerned with how state law recognises the documentation 
of Māori law in whakairo Māori. However, I do discuss state law in detail in three ways.  
First, I discuss the impacts of coloniality on Māori law in Chapter 2 because it is necessary to 
provide context for the analysis of Māori law later in the thesis. Māori law has been undermined 
by the process of coloniality. Māori have often been wrongly described as having ‘lore’ rather 
than ‘law’ as a consequence of coloniality. The current reassertion of Māori jurisprudence is 
occurring within that context and therefore that context needs to be described. 
Second, I refer to four examples (three of which are from overseas) where state law has 
responded to non-written visual documentation of Indigenous law. Those examples are the 
Saltwater Collection and the Ngurrara Canvas II in Chapter 3, wampum belts in Chapter 4, 
and pou whenua in Chapter 6. These four examples demonstrate how Indigenous peoples have 
encoded their law into non-written visual works. The state legal system’s response to those 
works provides context for Indigenous resilience in utilising their cultural literacy forms for 
documenting their law. Finally, in the concluding chapter to this thesis, I offer some remarks 




28 Ruru and others, above n 1, at 38. 
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III. Research Aims 
 
When thinking about the documentation of Indigenous laws and how Indigenous laws are 
communicated, it seems obvious to me that objects and visual markings would be used for that 
purpose, just as objects (such as law books) and visual markings (such as writing) are used in 
Aotearoa New Zealand to communicate state law. So, in this thesis I explore what I call the 
visual literacy of Māori law. My central research question, which is addressed in two parts, 
considers: 
1) Is Māori law documented in whakairo Māori? 
a. What are the non-written visual means of communicating Māori law? 
b. Can these non-written visual means help to communicate Māori law?  
In order to explore these questions, I utilise a Kaupapa Māori and interdisciplinary law and 
visual art approach. I bring together the educational theory of visual literacy, the art theory of 
encoded objects, and the jurisprudence of Māori law and apply them to whakairo Māori to see 
if whakairo Māori can be said to document law. Following the practice of Tā Hirini Moko 
Mead, I use the term ‘whakairo Māori’ throughout the thesis as a general term for Māori art or 
creative works.29 This term can include carving, ceramics, weaving and painting. It can also 
include song, dance and poetry. There are Māori creative works that are designed for a specific 
function or for primarily decorative purposes. And there are also creative works that can be 
understood as ‘encoded objects’. Encoded objects are art or creative works that have been 
encoded by the maker for a more complex communication purpose than merely decoration. Tā 
Mead describes such art and creative works as ‘taonga tuku iho’30 because, regardless of their 
age, they represent a “gift from the ancestors to their descendants born and yet unborn”.31  
I will focus my consideration of whakairo Māori on tā moko | tattooing, pou whenua | land 
marker posts, and raranga | weaving. Tā moko is the practice of tattooing of marks into the 
body, particularly the face but also the legs, body and arms. Pou whenua are tall upright wooden 
whakairo | carvings placed in or on the ground and used to identify whakapapa | genealogy and 
mana whenua | territorial authority over lands and waters. Raranga is the practice of weaving 
 
29 See Mead, above n 6. 
30 At 21. 
31 At 23. 
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and has extensive use in the making of garments and domestic tools such as kete | bags and 
nets. I use specific examples of each to argue that Māori were a literate culture pre-colonisation, 
with an extensive visual literacy cultural practice expressed through whakairo Māori. I propose 
that any failure to understand whakairo Māori as holding legal information is a failure of 
literacy on the part of the reader – not a failure of literacy on the part of te ao Māori itself.  
 
IV. Kaupapa Māori Methodology  
 
This thesis applies a Kaupapa Māori methodology with an emphasis on mātauranga Māori | 
Māori knowledge and Indigenous scholarship. I understand that Kaupapa Māori research 
methodology centres the Māori world view in research work.32 Dr Leonie Pihama describes 
Kaupapa Māori theory as neither dualistic nor binary in that it is not concerned to assert the 
superiority of any one world view, set of traditions or culture. Rather, it is “an assertion of the 
right for Māori to be Māori on our own terms and to draw from our own base to provide 
understandings and explanations of the world”.33 Critical Indigenous pedagogy recognises that 
“all inquiry is both political and moral”34 and that Indigenous methodologies and research 
practices “privilege Indigenous knowledge, voices and experiences”.35  
Therefore, wherever possible I privilege Indigenous knowledge, Indigenous sources and 
Indigenous scholarship in this thesis. One practical means by which I can assert Indigeneity in 
my research process is to make sure that I seek out Indigenous scholars and, where appropriate, 
review, critique and cite their research. My citation practice is designed to achieve two goals 
in the writing of this thesis. First it means that Indigenous perspectives on what words and 
concepts mean, how they can best be used, and what ought to be priorities, dominate the 
 
32 Linda Tuhiwai Smith Decolonizing Methodologies (2nd ed, Otago University Press, Dunedin, 2012). 
33 Leonie Pihama, Sarah-Jane Tiakiwai and Kim Southey Kaupapa Rangahau (2nd ed, Te Kotahi Research 
Institute, Hamilton, 2015) at 12. 
34 Norman K Denzin, Yvonna S Lincoln and Linda Tuhiwai Smith (eds) Handbook of Critical and Indigenous 
Methodologies (SAGE, London, 2008) at 2. 
35 Linda Tuhiwai Smith “On Tricky Ground: Researching the Native in the Age of Uncertainty” in Norman K 
Denzin and Yvonna S Lincoln (eds) The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research (3rd ed, SAGE, Thousand 
Oaks, CA, 2005) 85 at 116. 
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discourse. Linda Tuhiwai Smith encourages scholars to “reorient our reference points for 
knowledge” to make positive contributions to Indigenous ideas:36 
It is still desirable to read a wide literature by a range of Indigenous and non-
Indigenous authors but the Western academy should no longer occupy the principal 
position or point of reference and authority on Indigenous subject matters. 
Citation, therefore, is an exercise of power within the academy and can have real-world impacts 
on those who use research, in terms of whose voices are heard and whose voices are treated as 
authoritative:37 
Power, as always contested and negotiated, can be turned against itself to produce 
alternative modalities, histories, and narratives (Butler 2002). What citation does 
(and what we do when we cite) calls into being a particular idea of academic 
authority. Conceptualizing citation as a performative act means paying attention to 
why and how authority congeals around certain bodies and voices, and thinking 
through how this authority might be dismantled.  
In my general research and in this thesis, I want to focus on the Indigenous perspective of law, 
art and jurisprudence as part of my contribution to the Indigenous intellectual tradition. This is 
my second goal of privileging Indigenous scholarship. In Aotearoa New Zealand, we have a 
more than 1,000-year-old tradition of rigorous Māori intellectual tautohetohe | debate. Too 
much of the content of that mātauranga Māori | knowledge has been lost through the 
colonisation process, but not the tradition, nor the skill or the joy of it. This approach to 
Indigenous scholarship has been used by many of my most important sources in this thesis. 
They include Tā Edward Taihākurei Durie, Carwyn Jones, Tā Hirini Moko Mead, Paul 
Meredith and Val Napoleon. I follow their example in continuing to place the Indigenous 
intellectual perspective at the forefront.  
This thesis is also interdisciplinary in that I use theories from law, education and art to explore 
my thesis question of whether Māori law is documented in whakairo Māori. My own art 
practice is premised in Indigenous Futurism, an art theory that centres Indigenous peoples, 
strengths, technologies and views in the creative process and the creative works. Indigenous 
perspectives in art theory have been advancing in the last few decades, with the demise of 
 
36 Smith, above n 32, at 201. 
37 Carrie Mott and Daniel Cockayne “Citation Matters: Mobilizing the Politics of Citation toward a Practice of 
‘Conscientious Engagement’” (2017) 24 Gender, Place & Culture 954 at 964. 
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notions of Primitivism in art38 and the rise of scholarship about contemporary Indigenous art 
as a tool for decolonisation.39 There remains a conceptual ‘hangover’ from Primitivism, 
however. Much of the analysis of ‘authenticity’ in Indigenous creative works is connected to 
how those works or the artists frame their art as sourced from, or representative of, nature or 
cultural tradition.40 In response, Indigenous artists are more directly using their art for 
decolonising purposes, and writing about it. In Indigeneity and Decolonial Seeing, Kency 
Cornejo analyses Guatemalan artists using the Indigenous body as the primary creative site for 
the decolonising conversation:41 
[T]he Indigenous body remains the object of violence, historical discourse, and 
sociopolitical analysis and is rarely acknowledged as a voice or enunciation of 
visual epistemologies ... It appears that unless an artwork figuratively depicts village 
life, customs or landscapes (subject matter that fits within an already accepted 
folkloric style), Indigenous artists are disqualified from art narratives as creators of 
contemporary or experimental art, much less as contributors to an intellectual or 
philosophical artistic debate.  
Indigenous artists make a powerful contribution to the Indigenous intellectual tradition by their 
‘visual epistemologies’, creating new ways to see the world – both the colonised world and a 
decolonised future. By adding Indigenous creative contributors to the debate on how our future 
might be envisioned, the Indigenous intellectual tradition can theorise even better strategies for 
the decolonisation of our minds and creation of a decolonised nation, helping us to assert, in 
Aotearoa New Zealand, “the right for Māori to be Māori on our own terms”. 
 
 
38 Nelson HH Graburn “Authentic Inuit Art: Creation and Exclusion in the Canadian North” (2004) 9 Journal of 
Material Culture 141 at 143.  
39 See generally Morgan Perkins “Continuity and Creativity in Iroquois Beadwork” (2004) 106 American 
Anthropologist 595; Lillia McEnaney “Indigenous Futurisms: Transcending Past/Present/Future” (2020) 36 
Visual Anthropology Review 417; and Phoebe Farris “Visual Power: 21 st Century Native American 
Artists/Intellectuals” (2005) 46 American Studies 251. For some general Māori perspectives see “Whatu Kākahu 
| Māori Cloaks (2nd ed, Museum of New Zealand Te Papa Tongarewa, Wellington, 2019); Christopher Braddock 
“Layne Waerea’s Public Laughter” (2016) 69 Australasian Drama Studies 60; Deidre Brown and Ngarino Ellis 
Te Puna Māori Art from Te Tai Tokerau Northland (Reed Publishing (NZ) Ltd, Auckland, 2007); and Tryphena 
Cracknell Momo kauae (Hastings City Art Gallery, Hastings, 2014). 
40 Nelson HH Graburn, above n 38, at 143.  
41 Kency Cornejo “Indigeneity and Decolonial Seeing in Contemporary Art of Guatemala” (2013) 36–4 Fuse 
Magazine at 25. 
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V. Thesis Structure 
 
After this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 presents Indigenous intellectual critique of 
coloniality and its impact on Indigenous law. Indigenous legal theorists have had to reassert 
the validity of Indigenous law in the face of centuries of coloniality that has undermined 
Indigenous legal traditions. The chapter makes some brief comments on the effect of 
colonisation on tikanga Māori in the 18th and 19th centuries before discussing the Indigenous 
critique of Western legal theory as it has been applied to Indigenous law. I then discuss the 
definitions of ‘legal order’ and ‘legal tradition’ drawing on the work of Val Napoleon and 
Carwyn Jones, and detail how the terms ‘Māori legal order’ and ‘Māori legal tradition’ will be 
used in Chapter 5 of this thesis.  
Chapters 3 and 4 set out the art and education theories for this thesis, describing how 
multimodal literacy, visual literacy, and encoded objects will be used to understand how non-
written visual means can document law. In Chapter 3, I discuss the education theory of visual 
literacy. Visual literacy is a communication tool that uses the ability to read, write and create 
visual images to communicate between people.42  
In Chapter 4, I describe the art theory concept of the encoded object. Encoded objects are 
creative works those made for the purpose of holding and communicating cultural information 
as opposed to objects which are solely decorative or functional in purpose.43 I argue that by 
understanding how Indigenous objects are encoded as documentation of Indigenous law we 
can develop the visual literacy to read these objects for the complexity of that information.  
In Chapter 5, I use the definitions of ‘legal tradition’ from Val Napoleon and Carwyn Jones 
discussed in Chapter 2 to identify the core legal principles of the Māori legal tradition. I 
describe the five commonly agreed principles of the Māori legal tradition, which Jones 
describes as “foundational by leading scholars in the field”,44 and add kaitiakitanga and 
rangatiratanga to the list. I detail these seven legal principles of the Māori legal tradition, their 
 
42 Maria Avgerinou and John Ericson “A Review of the Concept of Visual Literacy” (1997) 28 British Journal of 
Educational Technology 280 at 284. 
43 Howard Morphy “Encoding the Dreaming – A Theoretical Framework for the Analysis of Representational 
Processes in Australian Aboriginal Art” (1999) 49 Australian Archaeology 13 at 13. 
44 Carwyn Jones New Treaty, New Tradition: Reconciling New Zealand and Māori Law (University of British 
Columbia Pres, Vancouver, 2016) at 38. Jones cites Mead, above n 6 at 28–32; Joe Williams “He Aha te Tikanga 
Māori” (paper presented to the Mai I Te Ata Hāpara Hui, Te Wānanga o Raukawa, Otaki, 2000) at 8; and New 
Zealand Law Commission, above n 7 at 28–40. 
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core function, and some of the legal practices that arise from the application of the principles. 
This chapter helps to clarify the legal application of the principles when analysing how encoded 
objects, such as pou whenua, can hold legal information and be a form of legal documentation 
within the Māori legal tradition.  
In Chapter 6, I consider how the principles of the Māori legal tradition may be encoded into 
whakairo Māori. This is the crux of my thesis inquiry. Having set out the theoretical basis for 
my analysis in the previous chapters, I now provide a detailed description of whakairo Māori, 
its whakapapa, and how Māori law might be read into tā moko | tattooing, pou whenua | land 
marker posts, and raranga | weaving. Finally, in He Kupu Whakamutunga, I make some 
remarks where I outline my conclusions on what the non-written visual means of 
communicating Māori law might be, and how these non-written visual means may help to 
communicate Māori law. My hope is that this thesis will contribute to the growing 





Te Wāhanga Tuarua – An Indigenous View of Law  
From the well spring of that wisdom came the authority which rangatira could 
exercise in the interests of their Iwi. It was an authority which had both temporal 
and spiritual aspects; an authority to wage war and maintain peace; an authority to 
protect and to destroy.  
It was an absolute authority over life and death; the power to make and be the law.1 
 
In this chapter I set out my conception of Māori jurisprudence. This chapter is important 
because it provides the historical context for considering the non-written visual means of 
documenting Māori law. One impact of colonisation is that Māori law is not the dominant legal 
tradition in Aotearoa New Zealand today. Colonial thinking has undermined the legal authority 
of de-centralised kinship-based legal traditions, such as that found in te ao Māori. 
Consequently, Indigenous communities have often been wrongly described as having ‘lore’ 
rather than ‘law’.2 This question has been asked in Aotearoa, where there has been a decades-
long debate on whether tikanga Māori had sufficient characteristics to be considered a legal 
tradition. 
I begin by describing how colonisation undermined tikanga Māori and, in doing so, undermined 
it as a source of law. I then make reference to the work of two contemporary Indigenous legal 
theorists, Val Napoleon and Carwyn Jones, to demonstrate the rich jurisprudence that 
surrounds and supports Indigenous law and Māori law. I argue from this survey that Māori do 
have law and that the character of that law is capable of description and analysis.  
This chapter sets the groundwork for Chapter 5, where I detail the content of the Māori legal 
tradition, and also for Chapter 6, where I argue that Māori law can be identified in three forms 
of whakairo Māori: tā moko | tattooing, pou whenua | land marker posts, and raranga | weaving. 
This chapter is important for this thesis because it will confirm the resilience and relevance of 
both contemporary Indigenous jurisprudence and Māori law in Aotearoa New Zealand, and 
therefore establishes the foundation on which the thesis is built. 
 
 
1 Moana Jackson “Changing Realities: Unchanging Truths” (1994) 10 Aust JL & Soc 115 at 120. 
2 Edward Taihākurei Durie and others “Ngā Wai o te Māori: Ngā Tikanga me Ngā Ture Roia” (paper prepared 
for New Zealand Māori Council 2017) at 6. 
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I. Tikanga Māori: Values, Principles, Law  
 
Law is a human social construction.3 Social interactions require systems to help to manage the 
complex relationships that people create with each other through those interactions.4 These 
systems are dynamic and change and adapt to meet the new needs, values and technologies of 
the cultures to which they belong.5 Tikanga Māori is just such a body of values and principles. 
Tikanga Māori is the system that Māori people use to manage the relationships they have with 
each other, with their atua | deities, and with the natural world.6  
Tikanga Māori has been described as a values-based legal tradition, where the “adherence to 
principles, not rules”7 enables the application of principles to a circumstance without the need 
for a centralised authority to “enact amendments”.8 Aotearoa New Zealand’s state legal system 
might be characterised as rules-based system, which is favoured by positivists, where a 
centralised agency creates legal rules against which one can apply a set of facts to determine 
whether the rules apply or not. There has been significant Western jurisprudence arguing that 
law can only derive from a centralised or institutionalised system.9 There is significant Māori 
jurisprudence, however, showing how a de-centralised, values-based legal tradition is 
sufficiently certain that it can be said to create law.10 Māori jurisprudence confirms that tikanga 
 
3 Frederick Schauer “The Social Construction of the Concept of Law: A Reply to Julie Dickson” (2005) 25 Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 493 at 496. 
4  Moana Jackson “Justice and Political Power: Reasserting Māori Legal Processes” in Kayleen M Hazlehurst (ed) 
Legal Pluralism and the Colonial Legacy: Indigenous Experiences of Justice in Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand (Ashgate Publishing, England, 1995) 243 at 245. 
5 Carwyn Jones New Treaty, New Tradition: Reconciling New Zealand and Māori Law (University of British 
Columbia Pres, Vancouver, 2016) at 5. 
6 ET Durie “Will the Settlers Settle? Cultural Conciliation and Law” (1996) 8 OLR 449 at 452. 
7 New Zealand Law Commission Māori Custom and Values in New Zealand Law (SP9 New Zealand Law 
Commission 2001) at 3. 
8 At 3. 
9 See John Austin The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (John Murray, London, 1832); HLA Hart The 
Concept of Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1961); A V Dicey An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the 
Constitution (10th ed, Macmillan, London, 1960); and Jeffrey Goldsworthy The Sovereignty of Parliament: 
History and Philosophy (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1999). For a New Zealand critique of these views, see also 
Karen Grau “Parliamentary Sovereignty: New Zealand – New Millennium” [2002] VUWLR 12; John Dawson 
“The Resistance of the New Zealand Legal System to Recognition of Māori Customary Law” (2008) 12 J S Pac 
Law 56; and Jackson, above n 4. 
10 See Claire Charters “Recognition of Tikanga Māori and the Constitutional Myth of Monolegalism” (SSRN 
Electronic Journal, 2019 <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3316400, 2019>; Natalie Coates “The Recognition of 
Tikanga in the Common Law of New Zealand” (2015) 1 NZLR 1; Jones, above n 5; Durie, above n 6; Jackson, 
above n 1; Hirini Moko Mead Tikanga Māori: Living by Māori Values (Huia Publishers, Wellington, 2016). 
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Māori, a de-centralised values-based system, has the necessary characteristics to be considered 
a legal tradition. This debate over whether tikanga Māori has the necessary characteristics to 
be considered a legal tradition only exists as a consequence of the colonisation of Aotearoa. I 
will now provide an overview of the origins of that debate and how Indigenous jurisprudence 
has critiqued Western legal theory on this matter. 
 
II. Some Historical Observations  
 
This thesis is premised on the existence and relevance of Māori law in contemporary Aotearoa 
New Zealand. This assertion is only necessary because of historical and contemporary denial 
of the legitimacy of Māori political sovereignty and legal authority resulting from the 
colonisation of Aotearoa by the British in the early 19th century. But for the colonisation of 
Aotearoa (by any potential colonising power), Māori law would still be the dominant legal 
tradition of a modern independent Māori state. It is necessary then to briefly return to the 
origins of the colonisation process and how colonisation impacted tikanga Māori and therefore 
Māori law. 
 
A. Doctrine of Discovery 
Indigenous legal scholars have undertaken robust critiques of the origin of the Western colonial 
view of Indigenous law. Moana Jackson has described how the early Western view of 
Indigenous peoples, derived from Greek and Christian doctrines, was that they were of “lesser 
human status”.11 The 15th-century paternal view of native peoples as “infants”12 was used to 
justify the colonisation of Indigenous lands, the destruction of Indigenous cultures, and the 
often genocidal policies directed at Indigenous peoples.13 In the 18th and 19th centuries, this 
view led to the development of legal instruments that recognised limited Indigenous political 
and legal rights as part of the colonial political and military annexation of Indigenous lands.  
 
11 Moana Jackson "The Face behind the Law: The United Nations and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples" (2005) 
82 Yearbook of New Zealand Jurisprudence 10 at 12.  
12 At 12. 
13 Margaret Mutu “‘To Honour the Treaty, We Must First Settle Colonisation’ (Moana Jackson 2015): The Long 
Road from Colonial Devastation to Balance, Peace and Harmony” (2019) 49 Journal of the Royal Society of New 
Zealand 4 at 6. 
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The doctrine of Discovery was the primary legal instrument developed for this purpose. The 
doctrine of Discovery, utilised in English colonial law and confirmed in 1823 in the United 
States in Johnson v M’Intosh,14 is an instrument of international law that holds that a Christian, 
European nation would automatically acquire sovereignty and property rights over a newly 
‘discovered’ land that was occupied by non-Christian, non-European Indigenous peoples.15 
The doctrine was asserted against the claims of other European countries seeking the same and 
without either the knowledge or consent of the Indigenous owners.16 The European property 
right inherent in the doctrine was technically contingent on the rights of the Indigenous owners 
to use and occupy the land for as long as they choose, known as the principle of continuity, and 
subject only to the European colonial rights of pre-emption.17 Pre-emption rights meant that 
the doctrine-claiming European government had the sole right to purchase land from the 
Indigenous owners.  
The doctrine of aboriginal or native title was a practical application of the principle of 
continuity, derived from the doctrine of Discovery. Native title is a lesser form of ownership 
exclusively applied to colonised Indigenous peoples, where:18  
the colonisers’ law placed an obligation on colonising states to protect Aboriginal 
title in the land that they [Indigenous peoples] had held since time immemorial, the 
title itself was subject to the newly assumed and naturally superior power of the 
colonisers. They [the colonisers] could extinguish it (through the proper channels), 
they could determine what it was, and they could demand that the aboriginals 
proved that they had in fact had it since time immemorial. 
Native title was, and remains, an intentional degradation of Indigenous legal and political 
authority, as it enables the colonising states to define how Indigenous rights over natural 
resources and societal controls will be recognised by the state. At the same time, the process 
of determining native title means that the ultimate authority to determine the legitimacy and 
scope of the rights, and the power to remove those rights, remains with the state.19 
 
14 Johnson v M’Intosh 21 US (8Wheat) 543 (1823). 
15 Robert J Miller and others Discovering Indigenous Lands (Oxford University Press, New York, 2010) at 3. 
16 At 4. 
17 At 11. 
18 Jackson, above n 11, at 13. 
19  For a full discussion of the application of native title in contemporary New Zealand law, see Richard Boast 
Foreshore and Seabed (LexisNexis, Wellington, 2005). 
31 
 
Contemporary critique of these legal tools continues from Māori legal scholars.20 Jacinta Ruru 
writes that “components of Discovery continue to haunt legal and political reasoning” despite 
improvements in reconciliation initiatives by successive New Zealand governments and the 
courts.21 While the courts have recognised the validity of native title, that recognition remains 
predicated on the doctrine of Discovery to legitimise Crown sovereignty over Aotearoa New 
Zealand. Ruru affirms that the Doctrine remains alive and well in Aotearoa New Zealand.22 
The assumption of Western political and legal superiority through both the doctrine of 
Discovery and the application of native title is the background for the historical and 
contemporary denial of Indigenous political sovereignty and, therefore, Indigenous legal 
authority.  
 
B. Colonial Understandings of Māori Law 
The denial of Indigenous political sovereignty necessitates a denial of Indigenous legal 
structures. If, as the doctrine of Discovery asserts, Indigenous peoples have no authoritative 
political structures (whether centralised or de-centralised), then they can have no system for 
determining, applying or enforcing law. The early colonial government conceptions of Māori 
law in Aotearoa New Zealand were premised on this assumption with, as discussed above, 
some concessions made to native title. This created a period of dispute about whether, as 
defined by English law, Māori had sufficient standing to be said to have a native or customary 
law that could be recognised by the state and the courts.  
The New Zealand Law Commission has set out this history in detail in their seminal work from 
2001 Māori Custom and Values in New Zealand.23 At the time of the signing of Te Tiriti o 
Waitangi in 1840, Governor Hobson said that Māori have “customs … with usages having the 
 
20 See Jackson, above n 11; Mutu, above n 13; Ani Mikaere “Cultural Invasion Continued: The Ongoing 
Colonisation of Tikanga Maori” (2005) 8.2 Yearbook of New Zealand Jurisprudence 134; and Tina Ngata Kia 
Mau – Resisting Colonial Fictions (Rebel Press, Wellington, 2019). For a contemporary Pākehā analysis, see 
George Fitzgerald and Stephen Young “Agony, Exclusion and Colonial Reproduction: A Critical Examination of 
the Doctrine of Difference in Aotearoa New Zealand” (2020) 29 NZULR 313. 
21 Jacinta Ruru “Asserting the Doctrine of Discovery in Aotearoa New Zealand: 1840–1960s” in Miller and others, 
above n 15, at 228. 
22 At 246. 
23 New Zealand Law Commission, above n 7. 
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character and authority of law.24 Within a decade or so the concept of Māori custom law was 
included in legislation by section 71 of the Constitution Act 1852,25 which read in part:26  
[T]he Laws, Customs, and Usages of the aboriginal or native Inhabitants of New 
Zealand, so far as they are not repugnant to the general Principles of Humanity, 
should for the present be maintained for the Government of themselves, in all their 
Relations to and Dealings with each other. 
But despite the presumption of continuity in English common law and legislative recognition 
of Māori customary rights, in later years the New Zealand judiciary was mostly loath to uphold 
the existence of Māori custom law, choosing instead to argue that the common law could not 
recognise ‘savage’ or ‘uncivilised’ people.27 This attitude was most infamously restated by 
Prendergast CJ in Wi Parata v Bishop of Wellington,28 where the court held that there is no 
Māori customary law that can be recognised by the courts. That judgment has since been 
overturned and discredited as poor law.29 Times have changed. In the 21st century we can see 
the courts restating that tikanga Māori was the first law of Aotearoa30 and the judiciary is 
actively looking for new ways to consider tikanga Māori and Māori law within the state legal 
system.31  
Still, it is fair to say that Māori law has taken a battering by the English common law and New 
Zealand state law. Prior to colonisation, Māori law was the only law applicable in this country 
– the first law of Aotearoa. The process of colonisation caused significant harm to the operation 
of Māori law and undermined the intellectual and cultural tradition that built and maintained 
that law. I will now consider contemporary understanding of Māori law and how the Māori 
 
24 Jacinta Ruru and others Inspiring National Indigenous Legal Education for Aotearoa New Zealand’s Bachelor 
of Laws Degree (Michael and Suzanne Borrin Foundation, Wellington, 2020) at 28. 
25 For a fuller discussion, see Joseph The Government of Themselves: Case Law Policy and Section 71 of the New 
Zealand Constitution Act 1852 (Te Mātāhauariki Institute, Waikato, 2002). 
26 New Zealand Law Commission, above n 7, at 11. 
27 At 11. 
28 Wi Parata v Bishop of Wellington [1877] 3 Jur (NS) 72. 
29 See New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General CA 54/87 [1987] NZCA 60; [1987] 1 NZLR 641; Ngāti 
Apa v Attorney-General [2003] NZCA 117; [2003] 3 NZLR 643; and New Zealand Law Commission, above n 7, 
at 13. 
30 Ngawaka v Ngāti Rehua-Ngātiwai ki Aotea Trust Board [2021] NZHC 291 at [2]. 




legal intellectual and cultural tradition is re-establishing the authority of Māori law in Aotearoa 
New Zealand.  
 
III. Contemporary Understanding of Māori Law 
 
Māori law has been termed “Māori custom law” in Western legal writings as a description of 
customs that are not derived from a central law-making authority, such as a parliament or court. 
Māori custom law, in its narrow sense therefore, has meant those Indigenous laws that have 
met specific tests of validity according to the English common law.32 In the broader sense it 
means the “body of rules” that Indigenous peoples use to govern themselves.33 Ani Mikaere,34 
Jackson35 and Linda Te Aho36 remind us that kupu | words like ‘custom’ are Western legal 
theorists’ kupu, so have at best limited utility in describing tikanga Māori and its full legal 
implications. But until the time comes when we no longer have to justify the legitimacy, let 
alone the existence of Māori law, we do need to engage with Western language attribution and 
legal philosophy to some degree, if only to put it to bed. Indigenous legal scholars have engaged 
directly with Western language attribution and critiqued those Western legal theories that 
undermine the legitimacy of Indigenous law. 
 
A. An Indigenous Critique of Positivism 
The possibility that a de-centralised legal tradition can create fully functional law runs contrary 
to the popular positivist legal theory that has dominated Aotearoa New Zealand’s legal 
jurisprudence.37 The legal positivist38 holds that centralised state institutions are the sole 
creators and determiners of law. Law is considered as a “product of authoritative state 
 
32 New Zealand Law Commission, above n 7, at 1. 
33 At 1. 
34 Ani Mikaere “The Treaty of Waitangi and Recognition of Tikanga Māori” in Michael Belgrave, Merata 
Kawharu and David Williams (eds) Waitangi Revisited: Perspectives on the Treaty of Waitangi (2nd ed, Oxford 
University Press, Auckland, 2005) 330 at 344. 
35 Jackson, above n 1. 
36 Linda Te Aho “Tikanga Māori, Historical Context and the Interface with Pākehā Law in Aotearoa/New 
Zealand” (2007) 10 Yearbook of New Zealand Jurisprudence 10 at 10. 
37 Dawson, above n 9, at 60. 
38 See HLA Hart and A V Dicey, above n 9 for further discussion. 
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institutions: e.g., the legislation of Parliament and the rulings of the courts, in New Zealand’s 
case”.39 These institutions are believed to be certain and authoritative and to create clear and 
accessible rules. This is a theory of law adopted by other colonising states, and it has given the 
holders of political and legal power in those states the licence to deny the legitimacy of 
Indigenous law because of its de-centralised origin.40  
Indigenous legal scholars have directly challenged this culturally bound perspective of 
Indigenous law. Val Napoleon is a leading Indigenous jurist who writes, teaches and researches 
extensively on Indigenous legal traditions and Indigenous law. She is Saulteau First Nation and 
an adopted member of the Gitanyow (Gitksan) House of Luuxhon, Ganada (Frog) Clan. She is 
the Law Foundation Chair of Indigenous Justice and Governance and Director of the Joint 
Degree Program in Canadian Common Law and Indigenous Legal Orders (JD/JID). Napoleon 
has specialised in Indigenous legal research methodologies, self-determination and governance 
and works in research partnerships with Indigenous communities across Canada. Her doctoral 
thesis detailed Gitksan conflict management processes “within a substantive and critical 
articulation of Gitksan laws and legal practices, legal order, and legal theory”41 and is a 
comprehensive study of a “complex, decentralised, non-state” society.42 She upholds the mana 
of Indigenous peoples and their intellectual traditions while also engaging rigorously in 
Western jurisprudence debates.  
Napoleon has been careful to treat Western legal theory, such as positivism, seriously but 
critically in her writing on Gitxsan law.43 Her doctoral thesis essentially mapped the 
jurisprudence of Gitxsan legal theory, legal traditions and law both historically and in 
contemporary times. The Gitxsan are Pacific Northwest Coast peoples from the Tsimshian 
heritage and from the area now named British Columbia. In her analysis of the way in which 
Western legal theory, particularly that of HLA Hart, has characterised Indigenous law, 
Napoleon deliberately sets aside Hart’s more culturally bound and “alleged imperialist”44 
notions of state-centred legislative ultimate authority in her attempt to open the analysis of 
 
39 Dawson, above n 9, at 60. 
40 New Zealand Law Commission, above n 7, at 18. 
41 Val Napoleon “Ayook: Gitsan Legal Order, Law and Legal Theory” (PhD Thesis, University of Victoria, 2001 
at iv. 
42 At iii. 
43 At 245. 
44 At 253. 
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Gitxsan law to western legal theoretical assessment. Despite some concerns from Indigenous 
jurists that Western legal theory is fundamentally ethnocentric and inadequate to analyse 
Indigenous law,45 she justifies her use of, for example, Hart’s rules on the grounds that, valid 
or not, positivist thinking is a central and pervasive tool in Western law to assess legal validity.  
In brief, Hart advocated for a positivist, state-based concept of law where law is authoritative 
only where it is sourced from authoritative, centralised institutions, such as courts and a 
parliament.46 His concept of law did not rely on law being moral for its legitimacy. He argued 
instead that the validity of law could be tested by the application of primary rules which forbid 
or permit actions or create obligations or responsibilities, and secondary rules which concern 
the process for making primary rules.47 There are three secondary rules. The rule of recognition 
provides the structure or hierarchy for determining whether a pronouncement is a valid law or 
not. The rule of change concerns the legal process for changing law, and the rule of adjudication 
concerns the legal process for determining whether a rule is broken or not.  
Napoleon, despite demonstrating Hart’s “narrow”48 understanding of law, nevertheless applies 
his rules to Gitxsan law, which she assesses as falling within Hart’s legitimacy criteria of 
primary and secondary rules. She finds that Gitxsan law does meet Hart’s criteria for primary 
rules of obligation and secondary rules of recognition, change, and adjudication. Gitxsan law 
has rules and processes to deal with those rules.49 Napoleon’s analysis of Gitxsan law, and 
Indigenous legal traditions more generally, is built from a confident view of the legitimacy of 
Indigenous law. She demonstrates that Indigenous legal traditions stand up well to any 
intellectual analysis of the concept of law, once prejudiced assumptions are removed from the 
more fundamental intellectual argument on what might constitute law. 
 
B. Tikanga Māori and Hart’s Rules 
Mamari Stephens takes a similar approach in her assessment of tikanga Māori against Hart’s 
criteria for primitive pre-legal systems.50 The values of tikanga Māori are articulated at a high 
 
45 At 248. 
46 Dawson, above n 9, at 60. 
47 Hart, above n 9, at 96. 
48 Napoleon, above n 41, at 253. 
49 At 253–254. 
50 Mamari Stephens “Māori Law and Hart: A Brief Analysis” (2001) 32 VUWLR 853. 
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level, but flow down into principles and practices that can indeed be called law. In contrast to 
positivist law, however, tikanga emerges from the community, not from a central body 
responsible for issuing authoritative determinations. 
One of Hart’s propositions is that if a society only uses primary rules – rules that forbid or 
permit actions or those that create obligations or responsibilities – but does not have 
secondary rules for making, changing and adjudicating primary rules, then that society can be 
described as “prelegal” or “primitive”.51 Like Napoleon in her analysis of Hart and Gitxsan 
law, Stephens suggests that Hart’s notion of primitive law is a straw man or a mirage, 
secondary to Hart’s more substantive theoretical contribution to Western jurisprudence. She 
argues that Hart’s description of primitive, prelegal societies as uncertain, static and 
inefficient is unnecessary and unjustified. She contrasts Hart’s critique of prelegal societies as 
uncertain against his critique of those same societies as suffering from stasis. She finds an 
inherent inconsistency in that such societies are deemed by his theory to be primitive because 
they are at once static, traditional and rigid while also being open to change and flexible as 
circumstances require.52  
Again like Napoleon in her study of Gitxsan law, Stephens finds that tikanga Māori does meet 
Hart’s criteria for primary and secondary rules.53 For example, in relation to the rule of 
recognition which specifies “the characteristics needed by a particular rule to be generally 
obeyed”.54 Stephens argues that tikanga Māori provides those characteristics because actions 
or rules are “judged by their compatibility with tikanga”.55 Tikanga provides both the principles 
for the assessment of an action as well as the content of the action itself. In Chapter 5 I will 
provide more detail as to how the principles of tikanga create binding legal responsibilities 
against which specific actions can be judged and adjudicated. Needless to say, I agree with 
Stephens’ assessment that tikanga Māori generally, and its principles specifically, meet Hart’s 
rule of recognition. 
Hart’s rule of change is also discussed by Stephens. In describing prelegal societies, Hart 
assumes that such societies have no system for introducing new rules and changing existing 
 
51 At 854. 
52 At 860. 
53 At 862–863. 
54 At 856. 
55 At 858. 
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rules. In my view this is critique by Hart is a necessary consequence of his monotheistic view 
that law can only be derived from an authoritative central source. That assumption would, in 
most cases, rule out any society or culture structured in a de-centralised way. Stephens 
addresses this with her analysis of the role of hui:56  
If legislation is merely the collective enactment of laws, then Māori in hui enact 
legislation and change and adapt those laws as necessary, providing such laws are 
valid according to tikanga. Certainly, Māori did not consider themselves bound by 
a static set of customs; they were fully able to change the rules by which they were 
bound, with only the condition that tikanga be maintained.  
Similarly, Stephen’s says that Hart’s rule of adjudication is easily met. She refers to the 
recorded resolution of breaches of tikanga through the recognition of tapu | sacred and the 
expertise of tohunga in adjudicating those breaches. Stephens, citing Tā Apirana Ngata, says 
“[t]he law that governed the tribe practically emanated from the priest, from the tohunga”57 and 
that the function of tohunga and other rangatira | chiefs was to identify when a breach of tapu 
had occurred and the consequences of that breach.58 
While some people might still ask whether a Māori jurist is talking about ‘lore’ or ‘law’, 
Indigenous legal theorists seem to be increasingly of the view that this question is a product of 
a time when there was less advocacy of the legitimacy of Indigenous law and too few 
Indigenous legal scholars to set out the arguments. Thankfully that time is passing.  
 
C. An Inclusive Definition of Law 
Richard Benton, Alex Frame and Paul Meredith consider the question of whether Māori custom 
is law or not in their introduction of definitions in Te Mātāpunenga: A Compendium of 
References to the Concepts and Institutions of Māori Customary Law.59 Their starting point is 
Western legal theorists’ views of customary law, which distinguishes between those customs 
that act as a habit or fashion and those customs that give rise to an obligation or a right that is 
 
56 At 861. 
57 Tā Apirana Ngata Debate on the Tohunga Suppression Bill [1907] 139 NZPD 518, as cited in Stephens at 862, 
n 50. 
58 At 863. 
59 Richard Benton, Alex Frame and Paul Meredith Te Mātāpunenga: A Compendium of References to the Concepts 
and Institutions of Māori Customary Law (Victoria University Press, Wellington, 2013) at 13. 
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generally accepted and recognised by the community.60 Benton, Frame and Meredith favour E 
Adamson Hoebel’s definition of law:61 
[A] social norm is legal if its neglect or infraction is regularly met, in threat or in 
fact, by the application of physical force by an individual, group, or agency 
possessing the socially recognised privilege of so acting. 
Hoebel’s definition provides a wide interpretation that avoids the culturally bound notion that 
law is only sourced from a centralised agency, for example a parliament, as suggested by 
positivists.62 Benton, Frame and Meredith’s discussion of Hoebel’s definition centres on the 
extent to which physical force or coercion is a necessary precondition for law and, if so, what 
the nature of that force or coercion would be within te ao Māori. Utilising the legal expertise 
of some of the intellectual giants of te ao Māori,63 they develop a definition of Māori customary 
law that modifies Hoebel’s definition.64 They determine that use of the kupu | word ‘force’ by 
Hoebel could include ‘social pressure’ created by the reciprocal nature of Māori social 
relationships within te ao Māori. The authors also suggest that the “recognition and 
reinforcement of ‘supernatural’ consequences” creates a social pressure equivalent to that of 
physical force.65 Presumably by ‘supernatural’ they are referring to the principle of tapu | sacred 
and the range of impacts a breach of tapu might have on a person’s or group’s mauri | life 
principle and ihi | psychic force. Regardless, by rightly sourcing the notion of force within te 
ao Māori, Benton, Frame and Meredith dispense with the centrist restrictions of many Western 
legal theorists. They therefore resolve the question of whether Māori customary law is law with 
the following definition:66 
A social norm is legal if its neglect or infraction is regularly met, in threat or in fact, 
by the application of force or the construction of serious social disadvantage by an 
 
60 At 13. 
61 E Adamson Hoebel The Law of Primitive Man: A Study of Comparative Legal Dynamics (Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge, MA, 1954) as cited in Benton, Frame and Meredith at 14, n 59. 
62 See Hart, above n 9. 
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65 At 14. 
66 At 16. My emphasis. 
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individual, group, or agency possessing the socially recognised privilege of so 
acting. 
This definition provides a useful way to discuss the legitimacy of Māori law within a Western 
jurisprudence context. This definition does not concede to narrow interpretations of the nature 
of law or of its source. Neither does it lean on easy and prejudiced views about the use of 
violence by Indigenous peoples to enforce rules. The definition enables Western and Māori 
legal theorists to engage in a more principled discussion about the nature of two different but 
equitable legal systems/traditions and how those legal systems/traditions might operate 
together and differently within a pluralist legal society. 
The revised Hoebel’s definition is not a Māori or Indigenous definition of law, however. It is 
a more inclusive Western legal definition of law. It must be remembered that the Māori 
perspective of Māori law ought to take precedence when undertaking scholarship within a 
Kaupapa Māori research process. I have provided this background on the historical and 
contemporary understanding of Māori law by Western legal theorists to provide some context 
for this thesis. I have shown how Indigenous legal theory is developing within its own 
frameworks despite historically exclusionary Western legal theories. I have described in brief 
how Stephens has assessed Māori law as meeting Hart’s rules and how Indigenous legal 
theorists are framing Indigenous law in Indigenous jurisprudence, utilising both Indigenous 
and Western legal theories as they deem appropriate. I will now use both Val Napoleon’s and 
Carwyn Jones’ categorisations of Indigenous law to define the Māori legal order, the Māori 
legal tradition, and Māori legal systems.  
  
IV. Defining Māori Law 
 
Indigenous legal theorists are utilising traditional and contemporary Indigenous intellectual 
traditions to identify, define, and frame new scholarship on Indigenous legal traditions and law. 
I have chosen to focus on the work of Indigenous legal scholars, such as Val Napoleon, Carwyn 
Jones, Tā Hirini Moko Mead and Paul Meredith, for their expertise in applying the Indigenous 
and the Western intellectual traditions to an understanding of Indigenous law. By privileging 
Indigenous theorists in this thesis, even where I might disagree with them, I hope to continue 





A.  Val Napoleon’s ‘Legal Tradition’ and ‘Legal Order’ 
 Val Napoleon deploys the idea of a ‘legal tradition’ to help distinguish between de-centralised 
Indigenous law and state law. Certain legal traditions are based on a centralised state legal 
system, such as those of Aotearoa New Zealand or Canada. Napoleon describes these as ‘legal 
systems’. Other legal traditions are based on a kin-based, de-centralised concept of law. 
Napoleon calls on John Henry Merryman’s broad definition of legal tradition to set the 
parameters for understanding what an Indigenous legal tradition is. Merryman defines a legal 
tradition as:67 
 a set of deeply rooted, historically conditioned attitudes about the nature of law, 
about the role of law in the society and the polity, about the proper organization and 
operation of a legal system, and about the ways law is or should be made, applied, 
studied, perfected, and taught.  
Napoleon says a legal tradition includes implicit and explicit law, the collective legal reasoning 
process, legal relationships, institutions, and venues of law and legal practice.68 Further, 
Napoleon describes law as not just a set of predetermined rules but as the intellectual process 
of ‘deliberating and reasoning’69 on how any rules should be applied in any given context. This 
is the exercise of the law in a practical and principled form.  
I would argue that a legal tradition also includes performative legal acts, and encoded objects 
used by those people to store and transmit legal information. If, as Napoleon says, “law is 
something that people actually do”,70 then the process of law and legal reasoning requires both 
intellectual consideration and physical engagements that are activated by the body. These 
engagements include speaking, singing, moving, writing, carving, and object-making as 
performative legal acts utilising mnemonic objects to aid memory and encoded objects as 
documentation.  
 
67 John Henry Merryman The Civil Law Tradition: An Introduction to the Legal Systems of Europe and Latin 
America (3rd ed, Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA, 2007) at 1.  
68 Val Napoleon “Thinking about Indigenous Legal Orders” (paper prepared for the National Centre for First 
Nations Governance, 2007) at 2. 
69 At 4. 
70 Napoleon, above n 68, at 4. 
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In Aotearoa New Zealand’s state legal system we can identify affectations of the court as 
performative legal acts, such as standing for the judge when they enter or leave the courtroom, 
verbalising a promise or oath to speak truthfully, and the wearing of gowns and wigs to denote 
status and legal authority. We can identify encoded objects such as stamps and specified paper 
forms which are used to document and legitimise legal statements made in a court room. New 
Zealand lawyers can only legally practise law if they are ‘admitted to the bar’. That ‘bar’ is 
conceptualised as physical division of the courtroom space which only a selected few may 
cross. In fact, that ‘bar’ is at best a small indoor gate, and most often in modern courtrooms it 
is a simple handrail. The physical bar itself is an encoded object as a legal sign or notional 
barrier creating a ‘sacred’ or ‘taboo’ space into which only specially legally anointed 
individuals are entitled to enter. The New Zealand state legal system uses performative acts 
and encoded objects to enable the legal system to be understood and applied within the cultural 
context in which its laws are made. The Māori legal tradition might also include performative 
acts, as suggested by Frame and Meredith,71 mnemonic devices, and encoded objects to ensure 
the legal tradition can be understood and applied within the cultural context in which its laws 
are made. 
Napoleon uses the term ‘legal order’ to describe how Indigenous law is understood within the 
“social, political, economic, and spiritual institutions”72 of the culture that creates it. She argues 
that law is culturally bound to the specific institutions of the culture in question, by which she 
means institutions in the broader sense of organisations, conventional knowledge, 
regularised practices, customary rules, and practices of an Indigenous culture. This means 
that different societies can derive from the same legal tradition, but they may have different 
legal orders arising from how they have chosen to regulate their legal relationships in their 
world.73 Napoleon uses the example of the different legal orders of Gitksan, Cree and 
Dunnezah peoples, which could be considered to belong to the same legal tradition.74 One 
could argue the same for the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand, whose legal 
systems have their origin in the Westminster parliamentary system but which nonetheless differ 
in material ways. 
 
71 Alex Frame and Paul Meredith “Performance and Maori Customary Legal Process” (2005) 114(2) Journal of 
the Polynesian Society 135 at 135. 
72 Napoleon, above n 68, at 2. 
73 At 2. 
74 At 2. 
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To clarify, as described by Napoleon, a legal system refers to a centralised state legal system. 
A legal tradition, by contrast, refers to de-centralised, kin-based non-state Indigenous law. The 
legal tradition includes implicit and explicit law, the collective legal reasoning process, legal 
relationships, institutions, and venues of law and legal practice. A legal order describes the law 
that is created by the distinct social, political, economic and spiritual institutions of the society. 
 
B.  Carwyn Jones’s ‘Māori Legal Tradition’ and ‘Māori Legal Order’  
Carwyn Jones, Ngāti Kahungunu ki Wairoa and Te Aitanga-a-Māhaki, is an Associate 
Professor at the School of Law, Victoria University of Wellington. He has worked at the 
Waitangi Tribunal, Māori Land Court, and with the Office of Treaty Settlements. His research 
specialties include Te Tiriti o Waitangi, Treaty settlement law, Māori law and constitutional 
law. In his book New Treaty, New Tradition75 on the interaction of New Zealand state law and 
Māori law, Jones used pūrākau | story as a narrative tool to describe and “reinforce the social, 
cultural and political contexts of law”.76 Storytelling is a core means by which Indigenous 
peoples transmit legal information across place and time. Jones’s research looked at the ways 
in which the dynamic legal culture of tikanga Māori has flexed in response to the government-
led process for the settlement of historical claims against the state.77 
Jones examines the nature of Māori legal traditions and takes a slightly different approach 
from Napoleon in applying the definitions of legal tradition and legal order to te ao Māori.78 
Whereas Napoleon looks to Merryman as the basis for her definition of legal tradition, Jones 
looks to Harold Berman’s Law and Revolution79 to consider legal traditions within a 
pluralistic society.80 Berman argues that coexistence and competition with other legal systems 
and traditions is a feature of the Western legal tradition. Jones also refers to Patrick Glenn’s 
view of legal traditions as “a means of capturing information from the past in a way that is 
meaningful for the present”.81 For Jones, Berman and Glenn’s terminology enables Jones to 
 
75 Jones, above n 5. 
76 At ix. 
77 At 5. 
78 At 23–24. 
79 Harold J Berman Law and Revolution (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1983). 
80 Jones, above n 5, at 24. 
81 Patrick Glenn Legal Traditions of the World: Sustainable Diversity in Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 
2007) at 24, in Jones, above n 5, at 24.  
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use the kupu ‘tradition’ to describe Māori legal traditions as both sourced in historical 
practices but also as dynamic and capable of change to meet new circumstances. Jones 
describes this as using the kupu ‘tradition’ to unite ancestral understandings of law with 
contemporary understandings of law.82  
Jones considers whether tikanga Māori could be described as a legal tradition and concludes 
that tikanga Māori is in fact more than a legal tradition. He says that tikanga encompasses 
Māori law but that it also includes ritual, custom, and spiritual and socio-political dimensions 
that go well beyond the legal domain.83 He then describes the Māori legal tradition as the 
aspect of tikanga that has a legal quality, including Māori legal practice, principles, 
processes, procedures, and Māori legal knowledge. Jones considers that a legal tradition is 
underpinned by a set of values that reinforces the “interconnectedness of all living things” 
where whakapapa | genealogy is the “organising principle” of te ao Māori.84 A Māori legal 
order then is the fundamental values, institutions and philosophical perspectives that underlie 
all Māori legal systems. I have summarised how Jones and Napoleon respectively define 




Jones also defines Māori legal systems. He uses the plural “systems” to describe those iwi 
legal systems that derive from the Māori legal tradition and how those systems of law are 
 
82 At 24. 
83 At 23. 
84 At 38. 
 Napoleon Jones 
Legal tradition A de-centralised non-state Indigenous 
law that includes implicit and explicit 
law, the collective legal reasoning 
process, legal relationships, institutions 
and venues of law and legal practice. 
The aspect of tikanga that has a legal 
quality, including Māori legal practice, 
principles, processes, procedures, and 
Māori legal knowledge. 
Legal order  The distinct social, political, economic 
and spiritual institutions of the society 
that create law. 
The fundamental values, institutions and 
philosophical perspectives that underlie 
all Māori legal systems. 
Figure 1 Napoleon’s and Jones’s definitions of ‘legal tradition and ‘legal order’ 
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exercised differently by iwi according to their own kawa | customs.85 These iwi differences 
are important and could be explored more. However, for the purposes of this thesis, I will 
take a broad te ao Māori approach, in deference to the comment of Tā Durie that “there is as 
much a Māori law as there is a Māori language”.86 I understand Tā Durie to mean that there is 
a broad understanding across te ao Māori of the general principles of Māori law, even where 
there are some ‘dialectal’ differences among iwi.  
I do not need to choose between the analyses of Napoleon and Jones for this thesis. Both 
analyses are useful for different parts of my argument. First, I will apply Napoleon’s use of the 
broad definition of ‘legal tradition’ to describe de-centralised Indigenous law in general. It is a 
definition that privileges the culture in which the particular law is developed and recognises 
that different societies will have law even where the structure and content of that law may be 
opaque to outsiders. That approach follows a kaupapa Māori research practice. Then, I will use 
Jones’s definition of Māori legal tradition to describe the body of principle, derived from 
tikanga Māori that have a legal quality. I use ‘Māori law’ to describe the practices and tools 
that give effect to the principles of the Māori legal tradition.  
Jones’s definition enables me to allocate appropriate language to the structure of tikanga Māori 
and Māori law. This makes it possible to unpick how a set of values in a de-centralised culture 
can also be understood as the principles of law within that culture. These principles of law are 
the basis for “social, political, economic, and spiritual institutions”87 that create the law and 
govern how it is exercised. How the law is exercised is an essential character of a legal tradition, 
as both Napoleon and Jones have described in their research. 
To conclude this analysis of law as understood by Western and Indigenous jurists, I will now 
review an important piece of work entitled “Performance and Māori Customary Legal 
Process”88 by Alex Frame and Paul Meredith. This article argues that Māori law was largely 
performative in nature because Māori society has an oral rather than written tradition. As such, 
it provided great impetus for this thesis and demonstrates a deepening of the scholarship inquiry 
into what Māori law is and, importantly, how it operates. I do not agree with the authors’ 
 
85 At 24. 
86 Durie, above n 6, at 451. 
87 Napoleon, above n 68, at 2. 
88 Frame and Meredith, above n 71.  
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conclusions, but the article does provide a new way to consider essential aspects of the Māori 
legal tradition and opens a discussion on the documentation of Māori law. 
 
C. Oral Culture, Performative Culture  
When the authors of Te Mātāpunenga89 were undertaking the research for their seminal book, 
they sought out the ‘instruments’ of Māori law – the physical embodiments of Māori law. A 
written alphabet was not a technology used by te ao Māori prior to colonisation, and therefore 
Frame and Meredith were looking for the equivalent and appropriate comparison between the 
written instruments of English law and the performative instruments of Māori law. They relied 
heavily on Bernard J Hibbitts’s analysis of law in what he calls “performative cultures” in an 
effort to describe the media by which law is communicated in non-written cultures, but in a 
way that dispenses with the “conceptual inadequacy” of the phrase “oral culture”.90 
Frame and Meredith, in accepting Hibbitts’s framing and categorisation of performative culture 
posit that Māori legal concepts will not be written so therefore its instruments must be 
performative. There are four characteristics of performed law in oral cultures according to 
Hibbitts, which Frame and Meredith reiterate:91 
It is personal: Without the performer, there is no performance. Information cannot 
exist independent of the status or reputation of the human individual presenting it. 
It is social: Communicative success depends on the live performer actually 
appearing before a live audience … Individuals in performance-based societies 
become so accustomed to and dependent upon contact with one another that they 
tend to conceive of the very idea of “self” in social terms, identifying themselves 
primarily by their social relationships and the opinion that others have of them.  
It is dynamic: The dynamism of performance is arguably reflected in the 
performative inclination to think of law not as things but as acts, not as rules or 
agreements, but as processes constituting rule or agreement. A performative 
contract, for instance, is not an object but a routine of words and gestures … 
 
89 Benton, Frame and Meredith, above n 59. 
90 Bernard J Hibbitts “‘Coming to Our Senses’: Communication and Legal Expression in Performance Cultures” 
(1992) 41 Emory Law J 873 at 879. 
91 Frame and Meredith, above n 71, at 136. 
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Likewise, members of performance cultures tend to think of justice not as something 
that simply is, but rather as something that is done. 
It is ephemeral: … the ephemerality of performance encourages members of 
performance cultures to organise and orchestrate performance to maximise 
memorability and minimise the likelihood of change.”  
These performative characteristics could also be applied to state legal systems, and this is 
acknowledged by Hibbitts’s,92 but for the purposes of understanding how law is documented, 
state legal systems also use writing. Almost all the examples Frame and Meredith use in their 
article to demonstrate Māori law as performative law relate specifically to the use of the spoken 
kupu | word and physical gestures. Those examples include kawa | customs, waiata kākahu | 
protective song, ka tika tō mate | symbolic violence, ohākī | a performed will, and rongo-a-
whare | women as emissaries. The authors clearly identify the legal content of those 
performative legal acts, providing a model for understanding these legal activities within the 
legal framework of te ao Māori. This aspect of the article was instructive for developing my 
approach in this thesis, and I am grateful for their analysis of Māori law. But while Frame and 
Meredith do also note the use of objects in the process of the performance of legal acts, it is 
here where my analysis diverges from theirs.  
I suggest that they have underestimated the legal value of encoded objects in their search for 
evidence of the performative instruments of Māori law. By focusing on performance as the 
primary component of the “customary repertoire as the instrument of legal transactions and as 
analogous to the written documents of legal systems reliant upon the written word”,93 they tend 
to relegate objects to ‘props’ of the performance rather than as documentation in their own 
right. 
One example where they tend towards a ‘props’ analysis is in their discussion on “tapae 
toto”.94 Tapae toto are blood gifts,95 very highly valued taonga gifted to confirm permanent 
arrangements such as the permanent transfer of land. By the naming of the koha | gift as 
‘tapae toto’ the taonga becomes a binding contract between the parties. Frame and Meredith 
note this, heading this section of their article as “Taonga as Contracts”. They give three 
 
92 Hibbitts, above n 90, at 895. 
93 Frame and Meredith, above n 71, at 137. 
94 At 148. 
95 Benton, Frame and Meredith, above n 59, at 148. 
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examples of tapae toto: one with a kaitaka | mat and korowai | cloak as a commitment of 
loyalty to the government, one with a mere | short weapon and korowai recording a transfer 
of land at Kennedy Bay, and a third example of an heirloom pounamu | greenstone recording 
a long-term relationship with Governor Grey. In recognising the taonga as contracts, Frame 
and Meredith recognise objects as holding some legal authority, saying that the “presentation, 
and the taonga itself, thus become evidence of the relationships and rights confirmed and 
granted.”96 
I suggest Frame and Meredith could have expanded on this and considered more closely the 
physical, as well as the performative, documentation of Māori law in whakairo Māori. In the 
examples they describe above, the objects operate within Māori law as binding commitments 
and agreements – a ‘contract’, as Frame and Meredith say. That gives the objects themselves a 
status as a legal document, understood by both the parties as affirming an agreement. These 
objects could be said to be encoded objects, containing legal literacy and acting as visual 
records of Māori law. It is this argument that I advance and support in this thesis. 
 
V. He Mutunga 
 
The historical denial of the legitimacy of Māori political sovereignty and legal authority was a 
terrible but nonetheless intended consequence of the colonisation of Aotearoa by the British in 
the early 19th century. The assumption of Western legal and political superiority, the 
imposition of the doctrine of Discovery, and the use of legal tools like native title all interfered 
with Māori political and legal authority. However, the Māori polity was operating before 
colonisation occurred and continues, albeit in an abridged form, despite ongoing coloniality.  
Indigenous legal scholars have presented and continue to present robust critiques of the 
Western colonial view of Indigenous law. They have critiqued Western legal theories that 
undermine the legitimacy of Indigenous law, using both Western and Indigenous legal theories 
to do so. In the process they are creating new scholarship on Indigenous legal traditions and 
law. The effectiveness of that robust intellectual tradition is evident in the resurgence of tikanga 
Māori and Māori law as a growing part of Aotearoa New Zealand’s jurisprudence.  
 
96 Frame and Meredith, above n 71, at 149. 
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This chapter is important for this thesis because it has demonstrated the depth and relevance of 
Māori law as an extant body of law in Aotearoa New Zealand. By clarifying that Māori law 
continues to operate in Aotearoa New Zealand, I can now demonstrate the different ways that 




Te Wāhanga Tuatoru – Visual Literacy  
“It is through the visual images and other artistic expressions created by Indigenous 
peoples that law and history are ‘written’ – fundamentally challenging the 
colonialist construction of Indigenous people as living in non-literature and merely 
customary societies.”1 
 
This chapter demonstrates that there are forms of visual literacy that do not use an alphabet. 
Sometimes referred to as a visual language, these forms of visual literacy can communicate 
social, political and legal information to the reader. I show how Indigenous law can therefore 
be documented in different visual forms. These forms are culturally determined and connected 
to the way that Indigenous peoples view the world and their relationship to it, including their 
legal relationships to each other, with their atua | deities and with the natural world. I describe 
how it is necessary to understand the cultural context in which the visual mark-making is done 
in order to understand the legal concepts written by that visual language. This chapter provides 
a theoretical insight into how Māori law might be written into whakairo Māori as a visual 
language. 
 
I. A Visual Culture of Mark-Making 
 
Describing Indigenous peoples as being from ‘oral cultures’ is an unnecessarily simplistic 
description of the literary skill of Indigenous peoples.2 The term ‘oral culture’ is used to 
distinguish between cultures with a tradition of alphabetic or pictographic writing and those 
without, but is often used as a shorthand to imply that oral cultures are more primitive because 
they do not use writing.3 This implication significantly undervalues Indigenous peoples’ visual 
culture of mark-making and object-making as a means of documentation and communication 
of social, political, and legal information. All cultures use a variety of forms of communication 
 
1 Chris Cunneen “Visual Power and Sovereignty: Indigenous Art and Colonialism” in Michelle Brown and 
Eamonn Carrabine (eds) The Routledge International Handbook of Visual Criminology (Routledge, New York, 
2017) 376 at 382.  
2 Bernard J Hibbitts “‘Coming to Our Senses’: Communication and Legal Expression in Performance Cultures” 
(1992) 41 Emory Law Journal 873 at 879. 




to express themselves, and each culture determines for itself the communication purpose and 
value of each of those forms.4 I argue that literacy is a skill set identifiable in the legal tradition 
of te ao Māori. 
I first use the education theory of multimodal literacy to explain how a culture can use different 
kinds of literacy to communicate information. Multimodal literacy details how cultures use 
multiple forms of communication in complex ways to communicate meaning, status and 
authority. I then explain how visual literacy, which is one aspect of multimodal literacy, is used 
by Indigenous peoples to document their social, political, and legal activities. To demonstrate 
both these theories, I draw on two contemporary examples from Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Island communities which demonstrate the documentation of Indigenous law in visual art.  
 
II. Multimodal Literacy 
 
Multimodal literacy is where two or more modes of meaning are used in a communication.5 
Modes can include performative communication such as the spoken kupu | word or ceremonial 
acts of posture, gesture, or sound.6 Modes can include visual images and any number of forms 
of mark-making, including writing, carving, painting and weaving. Modes can be used in any 
combination in the effort to communicate meaning. How a maker or culture chooses to combine 
modes can also communicate the status, authority and context of the communication.7 The 
reading of the modes also requires knowledge of “the historical, political, commercial, or 
ideological position of the text producers in relation to the reader or consumer”8 in order to 
fully understand the communication purpose and its authority.  
Kathy Mills and Katherine Doyle describe how culture and context drive preferences for the 
use of different modes of literacy for different purposes.9 Each of those modes have modal 
 
4 Kathy Mills and Les Unsworth “Multimodal Literacy” in George W Noblit (ed) Oxford Research Encyclopedia 
of Education (online ed, 19 December 2017) <https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190264093.013.232> at 6. 
5 At 6. 
6 Kathy A Mills and Katherine Doyle “Visual arts: a multimodal language for Indigenous education” (2019) 33 
Language and Education 521 at 522. 
7 Mills and Unsworth, above n 4, at 6. 
8 At 6. 




grammars, which themselves communicate shared meanings in communities or cultures.10 
Whether or not a person can derive meaning from that communication depends on whether that 
person is literate in that mode of communication.  
Jeffery G Hewitt is a Cree lawyer and Associate Professor at Osgoode Hall Law School, 
University of Windsor. He specialises in interdisciplinary Indigenous legal theory and the 
visuals of law. He provides a simple illustration of how a person literate in one particular visual 
mode may not be literate in another. Using the act of writing the kupu | word ‘cat’ in English 
and Greek, he says:11 
Translating the visual into meaning a feline mammal, is the result of acquired 
literacy. Write ‘cat’ in another language, such as Greek, and it becomes ‘Γάτα’. 
While visually beautiful, the Greek version of ‘cat’ holds no meaning for my 
English-trained eyes. But does that deem it meaningless? It simply illustrates that I 
am illiterate in Greek and thereby untrained to derive abstract meaning from the 
visual text, as I can in English. Text as a visual medium is learnt. Translating text 
into meaning requires literacy, which is also an acquired skill. 
Just as different written languages express ideas that can be read if one is sufficiently literate, 
other visual modes such as design, art, carving, tattooing, and object-making can also be read, 
with the requisite visual literacy. It is this kind of visual literacy that Chris Cunneen, a Professor 
of Criminology at University of New South Wales and specialist in Indigenous peoples and the 
law, is referring to when he says that it is “through the visual images and other artistic 
expressions created by Indigenous peoples that law and history are ‘written’”.12 First Nations 
peoples from Canada use “pictoglyphs, wampum belts, masks, totem poles, button blankets, 
culturally modified environments, birch bark scrolls, burial disturbances, songs, ceremonies 
and stories”.13 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders use “song, dance, body, rock and sand 
painting” to demonstrate their Indigenous law.14 I argue that in Aotearoa, Māori use whaikōrero 
| oration, tā moko | tattooing, pou whenua | land marker posts, raranga | weaving, pūrākau | 
 
10 At 522. 
11 Jeffery G Hewitt “Certain (Mis)conceptions Westphalian Origins, Portraiture and Wampum” in Shane Chalmers 
and Sundhya Pahuja (eds) Routledge Handbook of International Law and the Humanities (Routledge, London, 
2021) at 160. 
12 Cunneen, above n 1, at 382. 
13 At 382. 




stories, and waiata | songs. The modes of literacy for communicating law are culturally 
determined, not absent in so-called ‘oral cultures’. 
 
III. Visual Literacy  
 
Visual literacy is a communication mode that uses visuals for communication, thinking, 
learning, constructing meaning, creative expression, and for aesthetic enjoyment.15 It is a mode 
that communicates ideas, emotions, events: essentially, visual literacy enables the 
communication of culture. As people who have grown up in a literate written culture, we can 
understand very easily how writing, on which we are so dependent for communication, 
communicates culture. We place an extremely high value on the written kupu | word, and even 
love the written kupu for its communicative power and its ability to inform, entice, and 
inspire.16 While visual art is valued for its capacity to express ideas, to elicit emotions, and to 
open new ways for viewing ourselves and the world, state authorities have tended to treat the 
written kupu as superior and Indigenous creative expressions as inferior.17 This distinction is 
not necessarily true for Indigenous peoples, who, as Cunneen says, may record their law in 
creative works.18  
Sheryl Farrell-Racette is a Métis writer and artist specialising in Indigenous art and Canadian 
art history. She says that for many Indigenous peoples objects are a form of visual literacy. Her 
view is that visual literacy is about not only the symbols on the surface of an object but also 
the “words, prayers, tears and fervent hope thus spoken into them at the moment of their 
creation and over their lifetime”.19 Galarrwuy Yunupingu, a senior ceremonial and community 
leader of the Gumatj clan of the Yolngu people says simply, “Painting is our foundation. White 
man calls it art.”20 Cunneen describes how Indigenous art as a communication tool is often 
 
15 Maria Avgerinou and John Ericson “A Review of the Concept of Visual Literacy” (1997) 28 British Journal of 
Educational Technology 280 at 284. 
16 Hibbitts, above n 2, at 875. 
17 Cunneen, above n 1, at 382. 
18 At 378. 
19 Sheryl Farrell-Racette “Encoded Knowledge: Memory and Objects in Contemporary Native American Art” in 
Manifestations: New Native Art Criticism (Museum of Contemporary Native Arts, Santa Fe, NM, 2011) 40 at 52. 
20 Cunneen, above n 1, at 378. Galarrwuy Yunupingu (b 1948) holds an honorary Doctor of Laws by the University 
of Melbourne for his work on Indigenous rights and was the 1978 Australian of the Year. In 1985 he was made a 




misunderstood, and misread, by Western colonising societies. He says that Indigenous art is 
not just about the visual representation of social and political processes. Rather it sets out a 
way to understand more fundamental questions of “Indigenous law, ontology, and 
epistemology. Indigenous art plays a special role in understanding law in a society that did not 
rely on the written text.”21 Indigenous peoples’ use of visual documentation is not just to 
describe their societies but to demonstrate entirely unique perspectives of what the society 
values; how its members understand the connections between the material, the social and the 
spiritual worlds; and how their world view is structured and represented.  
Rangihīroa Panoho, Ngāpuhi and Ngāti Whātua, is an art historian with a research 
specialisation in whakairo Māori and its connection to te taiao | the environment. He is also a 
curator, painter and photographer. In his book Māori Art, History, Architecture, Landscape 
and Theory,22 Panoho looks at the relationship between Māori artists, their whakapapa, and the 
whenua | land. He uses the concept of the palimpsest when describing the integrated nature of 
Māori art forms, te ao Māori, te taiao | the environment and whakapapa.23 
A palimpsest is a manuscript used and reused for multiple markings over time, often but not 
always requiring the obscuration of the layers of marking that came before. Panoho suggests 
that by allowing several layers to be seen concurrently, the concept of the palimpsest is an 
approach that “offers the widest possible terms for considering Māori art, the kaupapa of its 
artists, the landscape and the history to which it belongs, and to its endless interpretations”.24 
He argues that the palimpsest is a useful conceptual tool for understanding how Māori use their 
creative works to communicate the full cultural context of the object, whether it is a painting, 
carving or other creative works. 
The palimpsest is also a useful analogy when considering how Māori law might be documented 
in whakairo Māori. If law is “something that people actually do”25 then I suggest an important 
part of ‘doing’ a legal process is its physical activation through both the performance of law 
and the visual documentation of law. If Māori intended to communicate our “law, ontology, 
and epistemology” in visual documentation, then that documentation is a kind of palimpsest 
 
21 Cunneen, above n 1, at 382. 
22 Rangihīroa Panoho Māori Art: History, Architecture, Landscape and Theory (David Bateman, Auckland, 2015). 
23 At 30.  
24 At 30. 
25 Val Napoleon “Thinking about Indigenous Legal Orders” (paper prepared for the National Centre for First 




layered with a visual language, cultural meaning and purpose. That visual documentation can 
then be used, and read, in different ways depending on the purpose and information encoded 
in it, and the knowledge and intent of the person reading it.  
By expanding our conception of the value and authority of non-written visual markings as 
containing layers of meaning, we can understand a much broader range of cultural concepts 
within the paradigm of the culture of the maker. I now consider two examples of Indigenous 
visual literacy from Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities. These examples 
illustrate how non-written visual works form legal documentation both in state law and in 
Indigenous law. Both of these examples have been the subject of legal analysis in Australia 
and elsewhere on the use of Indigenous visual art in state legal proceedings relating to 
ownership of land and natural resources.26 They represent two significant advances in state law 
recognition of non-written visual documentation of Indigenous law. Most importantly, 
however, these examples show how Indigenous peoples’ express their conception of their 
world and their law in a visual language. 
 
A. Saltwater Collection – Blue Mud Bay 
This water is saltwater. The waves called Rulyapa rise and crash on that rock 
Gilgilgilwa, Burruwawa. Hitting that rock; the water. And in that water lies our 
sacred Law.27 
The Yolgnu people belong to the northeast of Arnhem Land, now part of the Northern 
Territory, Australia. They are formed from nine clans interconnected through two moieties.28 
In 1980, the Arnhem Land Aboriginal Land Trust, who represented the Yolgnu in their native 
title legal cases, were awarded two grants of fee simple title under the Aboriginal Law Rights 
 
26 See generally Zia Akhtar “Aboriginal Oral Testimony, Hearsay Rule and the Reception Theory of 
Admissibility” (2016) 42 Commonw Law Bull 396; Kirsten Anker Declarations of Interdependence: A Legal 
Pluralist Approach to Indigenous Rights (Ashgate Publishing, England, 2014); Jenny Issacs and others Saltwater: 
Paintings of SeaCountry: The Recognition of Indigenous Sea Rights (2nd ed, Baku-Larrngay Mulka Centre, 
Yirrkala, 2014); Howard Morphy “The Blue Mud Bay Case: Refractions through Saltwater Country” (2009) 28 
Dialogue, Journal of the Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia 15; and Howard Morphy and Frances 
Morphy “Tasting the Waters: Discriminating Identities in the Waters of Blue Mud Bay” (2006) 11(1–2) Journal 
of Material Culture 67. 
27 Lanani Marika quoted in Issacs and others, above n 26, at 19. 
28 Morphy, above n 26, at 71. ‘Moiety’ is an anthropological term which the Oxford English Dictionary defines 
as “either of two primary social or ritual groups, usually exogamous, into which the society is divided”. In this 
case, Blue Mud Bay covers the area of two moieties. One moiety, Yirritja, includes five clans; the other, Dhuwa, 




(Northern Territory) Act 1976. The two grants included 90,000 square kilometres of mainland 
and island lands off the coast of the Northern Territory. The titles extended to the low water 
mark of an extensive coastline and included the intertidal zone and an area called Blue Mud 
Bay.29  
Despite the granting of native title into the intertidal zone, extensive non-Indigenous fishing 
continued on the Yolgnu coastline for some years without the tribe’s permission. In 1996 a 
kaitiaki | guardian, Waka Munungurr, found an illegal barramundi fishing camp in a tapu | 
sacred area called Garranali. Garranali is the home of Bäru, an atua | deity in human and 
crocodile form. The Madarrpa clan, who are kaitiaki of that area, whakapapa to that atua.30 At 
the illegal camp, Munungurr found a bag containing the severed head of a crocodile.31 This 
desecration of Bäru sparked a ground-breaking legal case on whether the Yolgnu people had 
the right to exclude fishers from the intertidal zones and waters within their title boundaries 
even where those people may be permitted to fish there by state fishing legislation. The Yolgnu 
eventually won their case in 2008.  
The first legal action, Northern Territory v Arnhem Land Aboriginal Land Trust, was lodged 
in 2002,32 and became known as the Blue Mud case. It was in this case that the kaitiaki used 
bark cloth paintings as documentary evidence of their law over the intertidal areas. In response 
to the breach of tapu at Garranali, the kaitiaki of the communities, who were already involved 
in producing fine art, decided to prepare a number of bark cloth canvases33 (Bul’manydji at 
Gurala, 1997) to inscribe the miny’tji (sacred designs) of the law that applies to the saltwater 
country.34 That visual evidence supported the oral evidence presented by the Yolgnu in the 
Blue Mud Bay case and was the first time visual art had been accepted as evidence in a native 
title case. Unfortunately, while the final orders upheld the native title in Blue Mud Bay, the 
court determined that the rights were “non-exclusive” and “non-commercial”.35  
 
29 “Northern Territory v Arnhem Land Aboriginal Land Trust [2008] HCA 29” 12(2) Aust Indig Law Rev 82 at 
82. See above n 26 for examples of scholarship on this case. 
30 Issacs and others, above n 26, at 6. 
31 At 6. 
32 Gawirrin Gumana v Northern Territory of Australia (No1) [2005] FCA 50; Gumana v Northern Territory of 
Australia (No2) [2005] FCA 1425. The first judge, Justice Selway, died before the final orders on the case could 
be made. Justice Mansfield made the final orders, following the reasoning of Justice Selway, hence the two cases.  
33 See Image 1 in the Appendix at page 140 of this thesis for one of 80 bark paintings created in 1997 by the 
kaitiaki of Blue Mud Bay. 
34 Issacs and others, above n 26, at 7. 




On appeal by the Garranali and Yolgnu, the Federal Court of Appeal determined that the rights 
of the landowners under the Aboriginal Law Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 did include 
the right to exclude recreational and commercial fishing from the tidal waters.36 A further 
appeal by the Northern Territory to the High Court of Australia in 200837 was dismissed. The 
High Court held that the land title under the 1976 Act includes the right to exclude commercial 
and recreational fishing from the intertidal zone and tidal rivers.38 The case has been considered 
a landmark for its use of Indigenous visual legal documentation39 and has encouraged other 
Aboriginal communities to do the same.  
The function of the creative works in this case was to produce documentation of the historical 
and contemporary knowledge of the area, its ecology, its use, and its spiritual and physical 
connection to the Garranali and Yolgnu people. This relationship between the people and the 
land and sea is deeply embedded into the structure of how Yolgnu understand their world. Their 
law and practices in respect of human relationships, whakapapa obligations, and access to 
resources follow the physical ancestral patterns that are literally laid out on the land and the 
sea.40 Those physical patterns of the landscape and seascape drive the obligations and 
responsibilities of and between clans.41 In addition, the Yolgnu understand the seascape to have 
as distinctive and varied features as the land does – it is a fully understood, complex 
environment with direct whakapapa links to the people. By way of example, Miniyawany 
Yunupinu, artist and senior ranger for the Dhumurru Land Management, says of his painting, 
Nanydjaka:42 
This snake is creating these clouds in a place called Nanydjaka. The ocean part of 
Nanydjaka is called Makuma Yurrurrma Gandariya Gapanbulu. These words that 
we say other scientific names for these waters. These words that we intone in a way 
of tradition are of the sea and so for us Yarrwidi Gumatj | group of Gumatj these 
seas and the associate land belong to us. This painting means like telling stories, the 
heritage, the value, the knowledge we have for the sea. These clouds we call 
 
36 Gumana v Northern Territory of Australia [2007] FCAFC 23. 
37 Northern Territory of Australia & Anor v Arnhem Land Aboriginal Land Trust & Ors [2008] HCA 29. 
38 Issacs and others, above n 26, at 115. 
39 The 80 paintings made for this purpose were purchased by the Australian National Maritime Museum. 
40 Morphy and Morphy, above n 26, at 68. 
41 At 78. 




Marratjula only form in a certain season. We call this time Warrkarriya ga 
Dhurrudhurruya – when the Wakarr | bush lily flowers. The diamonds represent 
these waterways of Nanydjaka which means Manybuyna or the gunbilk | calm sea. 
Bäru the Ancestral crocodile and Gawanalkmirri the stingray are totems for us and 
come from a particular island here called Wuynarra. 
The paintings become the clearest form of documentation of these complex connections of 
people (at all collective and individual levels) and the environment to which they whakapapa. 
Those connections form part of a legal tradition that creates binding obligations on the people 
to act on behalf of the ancestral patterns on the land and sea. Dula Njurruwuthun43 is a Dirrikay 
of the Munyuku clan with senior inherited rights to paint. He has described how the designs 
express those legal obligations: 44 
[t]ruthfully. That is it. The Yolgnu stand on their deeply embedded foundation. It is 
ancient and everlasting. Do not come and push the Yolgnu aside. We do not come 
from a long way away. This is our home. Our designs, embassies in homelands. It 
was for the Yolgnu that we paint. Do you know what we are doing? We are working 
on our Law. This is interpreting our wisdom, our foundation and the sinews of 
Yolgnu people. This is a true story, not lies. This hair are my head is true. The truth 
comes out of this hairbrush. 
Howard Morphy, a Profession of Anthropology at the Australian National University, has been 
working with the Yolgnu people since 1974 and has spent many years working with Yolgnu 
elders and artists. He is of the view that not only do Yolgnu art objects encode information 
about the past, but that they are themselves sacred manifestations of their ancestors:45 
To the uninitiated, and Yolngu are quite explicit about this, the art means nothing – 
it contains its secrets well. Initiates only acquire knowledge of its meaning by 
becoming part of the encoding process – being told how to interpret the painting. 
I understand from both Yolgnu descriptions of the purpose of their art and from analysis by 
Morphy and others that there is clearly a Yolgnu legal tradition that creates binding legal 
obligations on the Yolgnu people. Some of those obligations require them to do certain acts to 
 
43 Note that the underlined D is a form of macron in the spelling of some Yolgnu kupu. 
44 Jaimie Lyn Isaac “Decolonizing Curatorial Practice: Acknowledging Indigenous Curatorial Praxis, Mapping Its 
Agency, Recognizing Its Aesthetic within Contemporary Canadian Art” (MA Thesis, University of British 
Columbia, 2016) at 12. 
45 Howard Morphy “Encoding the Dreaming – A Theoretical Framework for the Analysis of Representational 




maintain relationships between each other, between themselves and their environment, and 
between themselves and their atua. Those acts and relationships are documented in the 
paintings that they create to communicate that law to themselves and to others. The paintings 
become both the documentation of their law and the activation of their law.  
I will now review a second example, the Ngurrara Canvas II, made by the Ngurrara people in 
desert Western Australia, approximately 1,000 kilometres west of Blue Mud Bay. 
 
B. The Ngurrara Canvas II 
The Ngurrara Canvas II46 (Ngurrara Canvas II, 1997) is a large painting made by the Ngurrara 
people and was used as visual evidence for a native title claim over an area of desert wetland 
in Western Australia. The claim, Neowarra v State of Western Australia,47 concerned an 
application for a determination of native title under the Native Title Act 1993. The Act is 
designed to recognise and protect native title and to provide a mechanism for its 
determination.48 The claimants had been forcibly removed from their land in the 19th century49 
but were nonetheless successful in establishing that they continued to exercise their traditional 
rights over the land, amounting to “possession, occupation, use and enjoyment to the exclusion 
of all others”.50 Tommy May, one of the Ngurrara Canvas II artists said:51 
I believe that [native title] is about black fella law. The painting is only for proof. 
When I go to court to tell my story, I must listen very carefully before I open my 
mouth. Maybe the Kartiya [white people] will say “We don’t believe you” That’s 
why we made this painting, for evidence. We have painted our story for native title 
people, as proof. We want them to understand, so that they know about our painting, 
our country, our ngurrara. They are all the same thing. 
The Ngurrara Canvas II painting was a collaboration of about 50 artist elders from the 
Jiwaliny, Mangala, Manyjilyjarra, Walmajarri, and Wangkajungka clans, who painted a 10-
 
46 See Image 2 in the Appendix at page 141 for a reproduction of the Ngurrara Canvas II. 
47 Neowarra v State of Western Australia [2004] FCA 1092. 
48 Section 3. 
49 Akhtar, above n 26, at 408. 
50 Lisa Strelein “Neowarra v State of Western Australia [2003] FCA 1402 (8 December 2003)” (2003) 4 Native 
Title Newsletter 4 at 6. 




metre-by-6-metre canvas over two weeks while on Country.52 The painting was a 
representation of the claimant Country, but it was not a map as much as a visual description of 
the use of areas, the migration of peoples through those areas and the connections between the 
different groups who use those areas.53 The painting was done in Pirnini, within the boundaries 
of the land subject to the claim. The claim led to a successful outcome with the Ngurrara people 
now exercising native title rights over some 75,000 square kilometres of land.54  
The canvas was used in the court as an appeal to the “senses through colour and rhythm, a 
sense of space and a smell of dust; and by referents in intercultural knowledge between 
Indigenous and colonial cultures”.55 Eleonor Wildburger argues that the acceptance of the 
canvas as “evidence confirms that the ‘stories’, implied in the artwork, are legal documents 
that proved and re-established land-ownership”.56 She believes that this means that Indigenous 
law is valid alongside state law.57  
Kirsten Anker, an Associate Professor at McGill University in Canada, analyses the Ngurrara 
Canvas II as map, as truth and as law in her book Declaration of Interdependence – A Legal 
Pluralist Approach.58 Her book focuses on legal pluralism as a means to establish a dialogue 
between the state legal system and Indigenous legal traditions. Anker says that in interpreting 
the visual documentation of Indigenous law, that documentation has to be decoded. The 
“grammar and idiom of this code have to be respected and followed”59 for it to be legible to a 
reader outside of the culture60 
Its norms have to be taken seriously. How else does a dot establish a title, than if 
the law binding that dot to a whole conceptual universe is followed as a principle of 
interpretation – as a law? 
She describes how the process of transferring the ‘design creation’ to designs on canvas 
becomes a means of meeting the kaitiakitanga | trusteeship obligations of the Ngurrara people 
 
52 At 141. 
53 Akhtar, above n 26, at 408. 
54 Yanunijarra Aboriginal Corporation <http://www.yanunijarra.com/>. 
55 Akhtar, above n 26, at 408. 
56 Eleonor Wildburger “Indigenous Australian Art in Practice and Theory” (2013) 10 Coolabah 202 at 205. 
57 At 205. 
58 Anker, above n 26. 
59 At 148. 




to their land. Because they understand that obligation as a law, the act of creating the canvas 
becomes a manifestation of both the law itself and the obligation to follow that law. Therefore, 
the creation of the canvas helps them to meet their kaitiaki | trustee obligations particularly in 
the circumstances where the people have become separated from the land.61 The designs 
created by the Ngurrara kaitiaki, through the dreaming, are the designs of the land, the rocks, 
trees, waters, people and animals as part of their whakapapa. In creating the designs for others 
to see, the whakapapa of the dreamer to the land is written and rewritten, quite literally, as the 
law of the land.  
 
IV. He Mutunga 
 
The two examples discussed in this chapter demonstrate how the Yolgnu and Ngurrara peoples 
have documented their law in their creative works. The examples in this chapter are compelling 
because the kaitiaki know how to ‘write’ and ‘read’ their visual law. They are teaching that 
visual language to younger people in order to maintain cultural connections and uphold their 
law and tikanga. That literacy still lives and is being passed on. The examples do raise a 
question about the impact of colonisation on the Indigenous mātanga ture | legal experts and 
the Indigenous readers of that visual law. Other clans of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders, 
and other Indigenous peoples who have survived colonisation, may not always have those 
mātanga ture to write, read and teach their legal visual language. It may be a skill in decline or 
on the rise, depending on the circumstances of those Indigenous peoples. However, despite the 
impacts of colonisation on Indigenous mātanga ture, this chapter has shown that there are 
examples where Indigenous peoples use non-written visual documentation to communicate 
their law to themselves and to those outside their culture.  
I find it satisfying to see that the Australian state legal system is recognising Indigenous legal 
traditions of visual documentation. It shows that the legal system is, albeit slowly, developing 
more nuanced native title legal frameworks that may cope better with Indigenous evidence 
relating to Indigenous legal concepts. I do think, however, that Wildburger has taken her 
analysis a step too far in saying that the acceptance of the Ngurrara Canvas II as evidence in a 
native title case means the Australian legal system accepts the validity of Indigenous law. As I 
 




discussed earlier,62 there a significant conceptual lacuna between Indigenous law as evidence 
weighed within a state legal framework and Indigenous law as an applied legal framework 
within which evidence is weighed. 
The concern of this thesis is not whether such visual works meet the state’s criteria for evidence 
or the state criteria for the validity of law. This thesis is concerned with whether the visual 
works are themselves documentation of Indigenous law, as understood within the Indigenous 
legal tradition. In this chapter I have shown how a different kind of visual language can be 
legal documentation by drawing on multimodal and visual literacy theory. I have considered 
how different forms of literacy can be combined, and I have demonstrated that cultures will 
place different values on different forms of literacy depending on the historical, social and 
political context of that culture. I have also shown how it is necessary to both understand the 
visual language of the communication and appreciate the cultural context in which it is made 
in order to effectively read that visual language. This chapter is important for this thesis because 
it demonstrates ways to read the visual language of law without an alphabet. The two examples 
of visual literacy discussed, the Saltwater Collection and the Ngurrara Canvas II, demonstrate 
that Indigenous peoples do have visual documentation by which they communicate their law. 
In the next chapter I consider in more detail how encoded objects are used as a form of 
Indigenous visual literacy.  
 
 






Te Wāhanga Tuawha – Encoded Objects 
The heritage is not pagan and primitive; nor is it the mere whittlings of cannibal 
savages. Rather when our art is freed from the white man’s burden, we can at last 
see it clearly as our heritage and our legacy.1 
 
In this chapter I describe the concept of the encoded object. Encoded objects should be 
understood in light of the cultural context of the maker and their intended purpose for the 
object.2 I then make the argument that some Indigenous art objects can, and ought to be, 
understood as objects encoded with law. I discuss examples of where encoded Indigenous 
objects have been subject to Western analyses that have failed to engage with the cultural 
context and therefore misinterpreted the object. This chapter is important for this thesis because 
it shows that there are multiple means of encoding law into objects that can then be read by 
others.  
 
I. Cultural Context of Encoded Objects 
 
Where a culture uses its artistic system to create objects whose primary, but not sole, purpose 
is to communicate information across time and place, those objects can be said to be “encoded 
objects”.3 The form, shape, materiality, surface design and construction of the object can all 
contribute to the meaning it holds, as can the nature and status of its maker and the time and 
place of its making.4 Both the Saltwater Collection and the Ngurrara Canvas II can be 
described as encoded objects, created within a cultural framework for communicating cultural 
information – in these cases, law. A rākau whakapapa | genealogy stick is an example of an 
encoded object, used as a mnemonic device to assist tohunga recite whakapapa.5 A wampum 
 
1 Hirini Moko Mead Magnificent Te Maori: Te Maori Whakahirahira (Heinemann Publishers (NZ), Auckland 
1986) at 12. 
2 Sherry Farrell-Racette “Encoded Knowledge: Memory and Objects in Contemporary Native American Art” in 
Nancy Marie Mithlo (ed) Manifestations: New Native Art Criticism (Museum of Contemporary Native Arts, Santa 
Fe, NM, 2011) 40 at 43. 
3 Howard Morphy “Encoding the Dreaming – A Theoretical Framework for the Analysis of Representational 
Processes in Australian Aboriginal Art” (1999) 49 Australian Archaeology 1 at 13. 
4 Farrell-Racette, above n 2, at 42.  





belt, used by First Nations peoples from North America to document treaties and agreements, 
is another form of encoded object.6 Encoded objects can take multiple forms including 
paintings, textiles, tattoos and carvings. 
An encoded object needs to be understood by its full cultural context, which includes why and 
for whom it was made. Morphy, writing about the encoded meaning of Aboriginal art, says that 
it is critical to ask not just “what does it mean” but to inquire as “to whom it means, and in 
what context, and what knowledge has to be brought to bear before it can be interpreted in the 
ways it is.”7 Morphy is clear that in respect of Aboriginal art, the art has language-like 
properties that encode and communicate meaning that not only has to be learnt but also requires 
knowledge of the context in with the art is created. He warns that the text may never be fully 
understood by an ‘interpreter’ because it requires deeper understanding from inside the 
culture.8  
It is important to look outside of our own assumptions of what law is and how it can be 
communicated if we want to fully engage with the legal legitimacy of Indigenous encoded 
objects.9 That means first understanding how Indigenous peoples construct their legal traditions 
from their cultural values and world view. This is the deliberation and reasoning process 
inherent in legal traditions that was described by Napoleon.10 We then need to listen to what 
Indigenous peoples say about how they have documented the law that stems from that legal 
tradition. And even if our understanding is incomplete, as Morphy has suggested it may have 
to be,11 we can still engage with that law and its encoded objects equitably and on its own 
terms.  
I suggest that this exercise is essential for lawyers and legal scholars who want state law to 
work more effectively for Indigenous peoples in colonised countries. This approach also assists 
Indigenous legal scholars who want to whakamana | empower our legal traditions. Encoded 
objects become a potential tool for communicating Indigenous law, and as I suggest in this 
 
6 Jeffery G Hewitt “Certain (Mis)conceptions Westphalian Origins, Portraiture and Wampum” in Shane Chalmers 
and Sundhya Pahuja (eds) Routledge Handbook of International Law and the Humanities (Routledge, London, 
2021) 159 at 171. 
7 Morphy, above n 3, at 21. 
8 At 21. 
9 Kirsten Anker Declarations of Interdependence: A Legal Pluralist Approach to Indigenous Rights (Ashgate 
Publishing, England, 2014) at 148. 
10 See page 40 of this thesis for a discussion on Napoleon's description of the deliberation and reasoning process. 





thesis, Māori law. The Saltwater Collection and the Ngurrara Canvas II examples I discussed 
in Chapter 3, show how Indigenous legal traditions can be recorded as legal documentation and 
therefore facilitate a more just outcome for Indigenous peoples in state legal disputes. But these 
outcomes have not been the norm in state legal systems. In fact, it is quite the opposite. Most 
often, I suggest, these Indigenous encoded objects and the law they contain have been 
undervalued, undermined and misinterpreted to deprive them of their legal validity.  
 
II. Misinterpretation of Encoded Objects 
 
Describing Indigenous objects as the tribal art of “primitive” societies12 is a historical 
colonisation tool used to undermined Indigenous political and legal sovereignty.13 The effect 
of that description of Indigenous object-making is to diminish the full cultural literacy of the 
object.14 The concept of ‘primitive’ Indigenous art and objects persisted all through the 20th 
century and mainly focused on the art of Africa, Oceania and Asia. It is a concept of Indigenous 
peoples as de-historicised cultures, that is without a historical context, and romanticised as 
simple, natural and mystical.15 Cunneen observes that the narrow Western classification of 
Indigenous art as primitive was a consequence of separating the art from its “broader 
cosmological and ontological meanings”.16 This is the process of separating and therefore 
undervaluing the cultural context of the object and its maker.  
 Laura Fisher explores the impact of this separation for the objects of Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander peoples, in her published critique The Art/Ethnography Binary: Post-Colonial 
Tensions within the Field of Australian Aboriginal Art.17 When Indigenous objects are 
displayed in natural history museums, they are often presented from an evolutionist 
perspective, suggesting the objects belong to a people who are primitive and near extinct. The 
 
12 Moshe Barasch “Introduction: Conditions of Modern Primitivism” in Modern Theories of Art 2: From 
Impressionism to Kandinsky (NYU Press, New York, 1998) 191 at 193. 
13 See page 29 ‘Some Historical Observations’ for the discussion on the historical colonisation process. 
14 At 194. 
15 Laura Fisher “The Art/Ethnography Binary: Post-Colonial Tensions within the Field of Australian Aboriginal 
Art” (2012) 6 Cultural Sociology 251 at 260. 
16 Chris Cunneen “Visual Power and Sovereignty: Indigenous Art and Colonialism” in Michelle Brown and 
Eamonn Carrabine (eds) The Routledge International Handbook of Visual Criminology (Routledge, New York, 
2017) at 379. 





artefacts are therefore viewed as one-dimensional examples of the property of ‘general 
community practice’ rather than as complex, creative and individually valued objects.18 This 
presentation assumes that tradition has “strictly determined the character of community 
members’ creative output”19 and if the tradition is primitive, so therefore are its creative works. 
This narrow presentation of the encoded objects obscures the complex relationship between 
Indigenous peoples, the objects they make, the specific purpose of their making and the cultural 
roles of the maker and the object.  
Indigenous peoples have said that their communities, language, culture, history, and objects 
are intrinsically linked.20 Contrary to the idea that Indigenous societies constrain the creative 
output of their members, Indigenous peoples value the individual and collective pursuit of 
creative expression and skill because the “objects ... embody their makers knowledge and the 
times of their creation. ... Their forms and materials are narrative accounts of struggle, 
innovation in continuity.”21 Indigenous peoples are describing a creative and cultural 
conversation that happens between the maker, the object and their community. In the process 
of that conversation, some of the objects begin to take on a greater cultural significance and 
authority. Shelley Niro, a Mohawk bead artist says of her work:22 
The ancient pieces pull me back to a time when the bead was a tool for people in 
our communities, who have the materials as if they were paint to create scenarios 
as in a play, even record the moment as a photograph would. These ancient and not 
so ancient documents call out for company. 
The perspective of the maker and their culture is crucial to understanding how encoded objects 
have a more complex relationship with the maker and the maker’s people than the colonial 
gaze might read. Encoded objects contain artistic innovation, social, political, and legal 
 
18 At 255. 
19 At 255. 
20 See Grace L Dillon Walking the Clouds: An Anthology of Indigenous Science Fiction (University of Arizona 
Press, Tucson, 2012); Hirini Moko Mead Te Maori: Maori Art from New Zealand Collections (Heinemann 
Publishers (NZ) Ltd, Auckland, 1984); Rangihīroa Panoho Māori Art: History, Architecture, Landscape and 
Theory (David Bateman, Auckland, 2015); RedDot Fine Art Gallery Spinifex People Spinifex Lands A Collection 
of Fine Spinifex Indigenous Art (RedDot Fine Art Gallery, Singapore, 2018); David Simmons The Carved Pare: 
A Māori Mirror of the Universe (Huia Publishers, Wellington, 2001); Damian Skinner The Carver and the Artist: 
Māori Art in the Twentieth Century (Auckland University Press, Auckland, 2008); and Awhina Tamarapa Whatu 
Kākāhu: Māori Cloaks (Te Papa Press, Wellington, 2019). 
21 Farrell-Racette, above n 2, at 41. 






documentation, as well having functional relevance, “enfold[ing] memory and words [to] move 
knowledge forward to another generation”.23 Terms such as ‘primitive’, or the similar terms 
‘artefact’ or ‘cultural property’ undermine this complexity as Tā Mead has noted in this 
comment from the opening of this chapter:24 
The heritage is not pagan and primitive; nor is it the mere whittlings of cannibal 
savages. Rather when our art is freed from the white man’s burden we can at last 
see it clearly as our heritage and our legacy. 
I have described how encoded objects have been misinterpreted by colonial systems by being 
treated as primitive, simplistic and separated from their cultural context. I will now discuss two 
examples where a narrow Western view of Indigenous legal documentation has undermined 
the Indigenous law encoded into objects. These examples show how Indigenous legal 
documentation has been treated as ‘cultural property’ or ’material object’ by institutions such 
as museums, rather than as objects encoded with law. The legal force of these encoded objects 
is diminished by such misapplied terms. These two specific examples come from First Nations 
Indigenous communities in Canada – Gwinu crest blankets as leadership documentation and 
wampum belts as international treaties.  
 
A. House Gwinu Ayuks – crest blankets 
In The Law is Opened: The Constitutional Role of Tangible and Intangible Property in 
Gitanyow,25 the authors described the results of a series of interviews with members of the 
House of Luuxhon about the misuse of Gitxsan artefacts. The interviews, conducted in 2002, 
concerned Indigenous laws on the ownership, protection and control of Indigenous cultural 
heritage, cultural objects, sacred sites and intellectual property. The interviews focused on one 
house of the Gitxsan legal order, House of Luuxhon.26 The Gitxsan are made up of a number 
of family lineages, by matrilineal line, formed over time into a number of House groups. The 
House groups occupy traditional lands in what is now the northwest of British Columbia. Each 
 
23 Farrell-Racete, above n 2, at 43. 
24 Mead, above n 1, at 12. 
25 Richard Overstall, Val Napoleon and Katie Ludwig “The Law Is Opened: The Constitutional Role of Tangible 
and Intangible Property in Gitanyow” in Val Napoleon and Catherine Bell (eds) First Nations Cultural Heritage 
and Law Case Studies, Voices, and Perspectives (UBC Press, Vancouver, 2008) 92 at 93. 





Gitxsan House group belongs to one of four clans Frog, Eagle, Wolf, and Fire weed.27 The 
House groups interact according to their own specific legal order and each is independent of 
the other; there is no overarching ruling process for the four clans as a single entity. The 
property and possessions of each clan is governed by their own laws.28  
The authors of the article were inquiring into why the term ‘cultural property’, which is rarely 
if ever used to describe Western property, is widely used in state law to describe Indigenous 
property. The authors set out to understand the diminished value implied by the term ‘cultural 
property’. The elders of House of Luuxhon considered that many of the objects described as 
cultural property contain “images, words, and music [and] have a critical constitutional role in 
[I]ndigenous law.”29 The authors suggest that validity of Gitxsan law is obscured because there 
is no state recognition of Indigenous terms to describe the legal and political value of the objects 
to their owners. The state assumes that Indigenous property does not have a political or legal 
impact on the state. Therefore, the state devalues that property by the terms it uses to describe 
it.  
Of significance to this thesis is the discussion in the article with Godfrey Goode, the chief of 
House Gwinu, of the Frog clan, about the clan property that holds leadership authority for the 
House of Gwinu. That property included Goode’s chiefly name, a set of ayuks | crests (no 
image available) and a set of songs. Goode was given his Chief name at about 35 years old, 
and was instructed by the matriarch to look after and honour that name, to make sure he was 
visible and to uphold its status, such as through the provision of feast. Normally as part of his 
acquisition of the name he would also receive two specific crest blankets with the Gwinu ayuks 
| crest image stitched onto it and a xwts’an | crest pole that accompanies the crest blankets. It 
is against Gwinu law to take the crests that belong to chief if you are not entitled to them.30 
Only the family who holds the authority for those crests is entitled to use and wear them.  
It seemed that these crest blankets had been sold to the K’san Historical Village and Museum 
by a previous holder of the chiefly name, during a difficult time for the clan. The tribe had 
suffered a significant theft in advance of a state raid some years earlier. With depopulation 
caused by the colonisation process, the community did not have the numbers to defend their 
 
27 At 94. 
28 At 94.  
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property against the theft and subsequently, that Chief, whose clan was decimated by war and 
colonial disease and whose clan property was taken, could not fulfil his feasting obligations. 
He reportedly gave away the remaining property, including the crest blankets, in despair. 
A previous Chief had ordered a replica of one of the crest blankets to be made but the museum 
charged $7,000 for the replica. That was unaffordable so it was left with the original at the 
museum. Goode also tried to get the replica from the museum for his ceremonial use, but the 
museum still wanted $7,000 for it.31 When Goode asked to simply borrow the replica for a pole 
raising ceremony, the museum refused even to lend it unless he paid the $7000. Goode said in 
the interview that he was less concerned about the possession of the crest blankets than he was 
about the ability to wear the crest blanket for the pole raising ceremony as part of his leadership 
authority. He eventually had a replica of the replica made for $2000 but even retrieving that 
one was a long and difficult process.  
The purpose of these extraordinary efforts just to obtain copies of the Gwinu crest blankets was 
to activate the legal authority of the crest blankets by the appropriate legal authority figure at 
the appropriate legal event. These encoded objects had value to the tribe for their use as the 
legal documentation of chiefly authority. Their possession as objects was meaningless unless 
in the hands of the leadership to which they belonged. Goode could not grasp how the museum 
could value the mere possession of the crest blankets as opposed to their use:32 
I don’t know if this white person that took these things is aware of the laws of our 
people – how important these are to us. Our law does not allow other people to wear 
what belongs to another. The law is still the same today; it is none of their business 
... I just told them that other people cannot wear this blanket and its crest; it does 
not belong to anyone else. They should know the laws of our people. They have 
many of our things there. 
 Clearly the museum valued the crest blankets for preservation purposes as cultural artefacts. 
The legal content of the Gwinu crest blankets was not valued at all by the museum. But under 
Gwinu law, the value lay in their status as encoded objects identifying legal authority of 
chieftainship. The crest blankets, the crests themselves and the crest poles held legal authority 
that identified the current legal legitimacy of the Chief and his or her actions and decisions on 
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behalf of the tribe. The museum failed to understand the full meaning and purpose of the Gwinu 
crest blankets except as a material artefact for its display. 
B. Wampum as International Treaty 
Wampum have been used as legal documentation by First Nations peoples for over a thousand 
years.33 Wampum are belts made of tubular beads from quahog clam shells (white and 
purple/black) strung together on hemp or sinew 34 (replica, Two Row Wampum,1613). 
Wampum were and are still used in political and ceremonial events to record those events and 
document agreements such as treaties, marriages and wars.35 Haas, in comparing the 
technologies of hypertext36 and wampum as both “associative system[s] for indexing, storing, 
retrieving, and delivering of memories” describes wampum as ‘multimodal’ where the 
technologies:37 
woven into the belt have communicative agency, as with the colors of the shells and 
the design patterns. The cultural context and community where the wampum resides 
is yet another source of meaning that gets encoded into the wampum. Thus wampum 
is a hypertext of communicative modes—all of which contribute to cultural 
knowledge production and preservation. 
Wampum were regularly read and re-read as descriptions of the events that they recorded. In 
this way, wampum can be said to be encoded objects that embody “memory, as it extends 
human memories of inherited knowledges via interconnected, nonlinear designs with 
associative message storage and retrieval methods.”38 
Wampum are a legal documentation technology that makes Indigenous international 
agreements physically real and readable. Western legal systems also use legal documentation 
technologies for this purpose. In analysing the use of the typewriter in recording the “Western 
Treaty 8” between the Cree, Beaver and Chipewyan tribes, and the English Crown in 1899, 
 
33 Angela Haas “Wampum as Hypertext: An American Indian Intellectual Tradition of Multimedia Theory and 
Practice” (2007) 19 Studies in American Indian Literatures 77 at 78. 
34 See Image 3 in the Appendix at page 142 of this thesis for reproduction of a two row wampum.  
35 Hewitt, above n 6, at 160. 
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Hohmann uses the recording object – the typewriter – to show how objects are used to mediate 
international law. She suggests that if a treaty’s terms are to become law in a concrete way, 
those terms must become real in a material way – through the production of objects.39 In this 
case one such object was the typewriter used to produce another object – the written paper 
treaty. Hohmann notes that wampum are the equivalent Indigenous material object that 
concretises such treaties between these tribes and other states.40  
However, that is not the common understanding of wampum.41 Hewitt has discussed wampum 
in more detail as records of extant international law and is critical of how they are treated as 
curios and artefacts in museums as opposed to material records of international law.42 He says 
the wampum, such as the Two Row Wampum of Niagara 1764, are disregarded as records of 
law by the colonial state and instead considered material objects divorced from their current 
and historical political and legal authority under Indigenous law.43 
The Two Row Wampum Treaty of Niagara 1764 was the Indigenous documentation of the 
treaty negotiations that developed between the First Nations and the British in relation to the 
Royal Proclamation of 1763.44 The Royal Proclamation, promoted by the British, essentially 
affirmed the principle of continuity,45 guaranteeing to the First Nations peoples that Indigenous 
lands would not be taken without their consent.46 The Proclamation also claimed sovereignty 
and dominion over First Nations land, but the First Nations people were not told that.47 In 1764 
the Proclamation formed the basis of a Treaty through a major gathering of some 2000 First 
Nations people at Niagara to confirm and formalise the international treaty with the British.48 
The British were aware from previous First Nations treaty negotiations that wampum were an 
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40 At 374. 
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Indigenous legal form of documentation of treaties. Sir William Johnson, the then 
Superintendent of Indian Affairs and the British officer responsible for the Treaty development, 
had planned to confirm, with the exchange of wampum, the exchange of promises within the 
Treaty:49 
Johnson further proposed, on behalf of the British, that “at this treaty... We should 
tie them down (in the Peace) according to their own forms of which they take the 
most notice, for example by exchanging a very large belt with some remarkable and 
intelligible figures there on.” 
Hewitt says that the Crown fully understood and engaged in “international law-making utilising 
an Indigenous form” because they had been involved with these kinds of negotiations from the 
early 17th century.50 During the final negotiations of the 1764 Treaty, the Crown provided the 
wampum to the First Nations diplomats as evidence of the agreement, demonstrating that “the 
Crown recognised, understood and acknowledged that Indigenous nations were engaged with 
international law in a different way from the Crown’s European-based practices.”51  
Hewitt describes wampum as a “human made, written set of rules negotiated and agreed upon 
by the relevant parties, including sovereign states”.52 And he is scathing of the subsequent 
treatment of wampum, including the Two Row Wampum of Niagara as museum objects 
because:53 
in spite of subsequently placing wampum in museums as cultural objects, in the 
eighteenth century the English Crown was well aware that wampum is international 
law. The English were also literate enough in wampum diplomacy to know how to 
use it. 
In the case of wampum, the colonial state was fully aware of the cultural context, purpose and 
value of wampum as Indigenous legal documentation of international treaties. The Two Row 
Wampum of Niagara 1764 was just one of several wampum treaties with European foreign 
powers that had been negotiated over the previous century. The subsequent treatment of 
wampum as museum artefacts rather than legal treaties could be considered a deliberate attempt 
 
49 At 162. 
50 Hewitt, above n 6, at 170. 
51 At 170. 
52 At 171. 





to erase the law contained within them in order to maintain a Crown legal narrative “framing… 
Indigenous peoples as savages to be tamed”.54 However, Hewitt argues this treatment of 
wampum does not erase its law:55  
[o]ne must be able to read the language in which the law is written to fully engage 
with its meaning. Failure to derive meaning from wampum is not a failing of 
Indigenous legal orders, it is demonstrative of illiteracy, however widespread. 
This example of wampum differs from that of the Gwinu crest blanket because in the case of 
the crest blanket, the museum appeared wilfully ignorant of the law encoded into the crest 
blankets they displayed. That ignorance meant that the legal authority of the crest blankets was 
ignored, despite the assertions from the clan Chiefs that they were encoded with their law. The 
law was encoded into these objects whether other people were able to or chose to read that law 
or not. 
 
III. He Mutunga 
 
Understanding the cultural context can help to determine what sort of information, if any, is 
encoded into an object, how that object might be read, and by who. These examples of the 
Gwinu crest blankets and wampum international treaties help to demonstrate the importance of 
understanding encoded objects within the cultural context of their making, on the assumption 
that understanding is the first step towards respect for the object’s purpose. In the case of the 
Gwinu crest blankets, the purpose of their making and their use was directly related to the law 
governing leadership and its responsibilities. The failure of the K’san Historical Village and 
Museum to understand the purpose and content of the object caused both significant distress 
and undue financial cost to the Gwinu clan and leadership, whether deliberate or unintended.  
In the case of wampum, there is evidence that colonial and state authorities have, in the past, 
fully understood the legal authority embedded in wampum belts. Those authorities used 
wampum to document international treaties because they did understand them as 
documentation. In the end it becomes a political decision as to whether the Indigenous legal 
authority in Indigenous documentation will be recognised. It is not a question of whether the 
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legal authority exists, and neither is it a question of interpretation or literacy. Indigenous 
peoples, as we saw with the Saltwater Collection, Ngurrara Canvas II, and the wampum 
international treaties, remain subject to Crown or state largesse on whether their legal traditions 
and their legal instruments will be acknowledged as valid. It is not a question of whether the 
law is encoded into those objects – it clearly is. I suggest therefore that a key question of this 
thesis, whether Indigenous peoples encode Indigenous law into at least some objects, is 
answered in the affirmative, in this chapter. In the following chapter I will return to detail how 






Te Wāhanga Tuarima Māori Law 
[T]he value system on which Tikanga Māori is based, is aspirational, setting 
desirable standards to be achieved. Thus, where our state law sets bottom lines, or 
minimum standards of conduct below which a penalty may be imposed, Tikanga 
Māori sets top-lines, describing outstanding performance where virtue is its own 
reward.1 
 
In this chapter I explore the scholarship on tikanga Māori as the cultural framework from which 
Māori have derived our legal tradition. I describe the values of tikanga Māori and how they 
operate as legal principles of the Māori legal tradition. I set out how the legal principles govern 
complex personal, social, environmental and spiritual relationships within te ao Māori. I will 
discuss seven of those principles in detail and how they create the practice of Māori law. This 
chapter is important to this thesis because it describes the law that may be encoded into 
whakairo Māori. 
 
I. Tikanga Māori 
 
Tikanga Māori is the set of values, principles, understandings, practices, norms and 
mechanisms from which a person or community can determine the correct action in te ao 
Māori.2 Tikanga Māori is kinship-based with:3  
the ethical and common law issues that underpin the behaviour of members of 
whānau, hapū and iwi as they go about their lives and especially when they engage 
in the cultural, social, ritual and economic ceremonies of their society. 
Tikanga comes from the kupu | word ‘tika’ meaning that which is right or just,4 and identifies 
how “correctness, rightness or justice is maintained”.5 Tikanga Māori is a values-based system 
 
1 Edward Taihākurei Durie and others “Ngā Wai o te Māori Ngā Tikanga me Ngā Ture Roia” (paper prepared for 
the New Zealand Māori Council, 2017) at 8. 
2 ET Durie “Will the Settlers Settle? Cultural Conciliation and Law” (1996) 8 OLR 449 at 452. 
3 Hirini Moko Mead Tikanga Māori: Living by Māori Values (Huia Publishers, Wellington, 2016) at 15. 
4 ET Durie “Custom Law” (paper prepared for the New Zealand Law Commission, Wellington, 1994) at 27. 
5 Joseph Williams “Lex Aotearoa: An Heroic Attempt to Map the Māori Dimension in Modern New Zealand 





where values govern relationships between people, between people and the natural 
environment, and between people and the spiritual world. Those values can be understood as 
the ‘ways of being Māori’ just as the principles derived from these values create legal binding 
rights and responsibilities on a person or a community.  
Jones6 clarifies that tikanga Māori is a wide concept of te ao Māori which includes but is not 
limited to law. Tā Williams has also said that “tikanga and law are not co-extensive ideas”7 but 
that tikanga contains law. Coates has described tikanga as being a “sphere of law”:8  
a self-contained functional legal order that has rules, values, principles and 
processes dictating how customary practices are identified, how disputes are 
resolved, and how rules and protocols can change or be developed over time. 
It is not necessary to determine a strict line between what is law and what is not within tikanga 
Māori. I suggest that such an exercise is unnecessary in a values-derived de-centralised kinship 
social structure where principles rather than rules govern the behaviour of a community of 
people. It is adherence to principles set, as Tā Durie has described, as a high standard to meet, 
that informs individual and community behaviour and drives the processes that determine 
whether a legal principle has been broken (at the risk of serious social disadvantage) and how 
restoration for the harm caused can be achieved. I focus primarily on the Māori legal tradition 
in the following discussion and draw on existing scholarship to detail the principles of the 
Māori legal tradition and the binding rights and obligations that can be derived from them.  
 
II.  Māori Legal Tradition – Principles 
 
The concept of the “Māori legal tradition” defined by Jones encompasses Māori legal practice, 
principles, processes, procedures, and Māori legal knowledge. When we describe the Māori 
legal tradition, we can begin with a discussion of principles, from which law flows. I 
understand these principles are derived from the values of tikanga and developed through 
Māori social, political and spiritual institutions. Jones has described five such principles 
 
6 See pages 42-43 of this thesis on Jone’s analysis of the difference between tikanga Māori and the Māori legal 
tradition.  
7 Williams, above n 5, at 3. 





considered foundational by Māori scholars, including Tā Hirini Moko Mead, Tā Joseph 
Williams, and Tā Edward Taihākurei Durie.9 The principles are also described in a New 
Zealand Law Commission Study Paper.10 Those foundational principles are:11  
Whanaungatanga – The centrality of relationships to Māori life.  
Manaakitanga – nurturing relationships, looking after people, and being very careful 
how others are treated.  
Mana – the importance of spiritually sanctioned authority and the limits on Māori 
leadership.  
Tapu – respect for the spiritual character of all things.  
Utu – the principle of balance and reciprocity.  
Tā Mead includes noa and ea in his assessment of the foundational principles.12 Noa and ea are 
two principles that focus on the restoration of balance from circumstances of danger or tapu. 
Interestingly, Tā Durie includes arohatanga in his analysis, describing arohatanga as the “basis 
for peaceful co-existence”.13 Both Tā Mead and Tā Durie are suggesting that a core principle 
of the Māori legal tradition is one that explicitly requires resolution and balance, beyond the 
principle of utu. Tā Williams includes kaitiakitanga as an express legal principle, because, he 
says, it concerns the reciprocal obligation to care for others, human and natural.14 Jones links 
tapu with noa in his analysis and describes kaitiakitanga and rangatiratanga as “associated 
concepts” to his restatement of the foundational principles.15  
Following Jones and Williams, I too have added kaitiakitanga to the list of foundation 
principles of the Māori legal tradition. Kaitiakitanga is the obligation to care for one’s own, a 
subset of whanaungatanga.16 Kaitiakitanga has been described as derived from 
 
9 Carwyn Jones New Treaty, New Tradition: Reconciling New Zealand and Māori Law (University of British 
Columbia Pres, Vancouver, 2016) at 38. 
10 New Zealand Law Commission Māori Custom and Values in New Zealand Law (SP9 New Zealand Law 
Commission, Wellington, 2001) at 28. 
11 Jones, above n 9, at 38. 
12 Mead, above n 3, at 35.  
13 Durie, above n 2, at 455. 
14 Williams, above n 5, at 3. 
15 Jones, above n 9, at 85.  





whanaungatanga17 as it is the expression of responsibility and obligation to the natural 
environment to which Māori have a whakapapa relationship. This will be discussed in more 
detail in the following sections; suffice to say for the moment that kaitiakitanga is a relatively 
modern term as a legal principle.18 It is now commonly understood as identifying legal rights 
and obligations to natural resources within the state legal system, for example as defined in 
section 2 of the Resource Management Act 1991.19 I consider that it is therefore useful to 
understand it as a principle belonging to the Māori legal tradition in its own right because of 
its explicit and frequent use as a legal principle.  
I have also added rangatiratanga to the list of core principles of the Māori legal tradition. This 
kupu has also come into regular use in determining specific forms or attributes of authority and 
leadership, separately from the principle of mana.20 Rangatiratanga can be understood as a 
derivative of mana, and has come to denote the activity of leadership21 or political authority22 
by a person or a group in a different way from the spiritually sanctioned mana of an individual. 
Jones identifies rangatiratanga as a term to express authority and leadership and one that is 
used frequently in treaty settlement legislation.23  
For the purposes of this thesis, these seven principles form the core of the Māori legal tradition 
which I will discuss in more detail. It is important to understand the legal application of the 
principles when analysing how encoded objects, such as pou whenua, can hold that legal 
information and be a form of legal authority within the Māori legal tradition.  
 
 
17 At 4.  
18 New Zealand Law Commission, above n 10, at 40. See also Merata Kawharu “Kaitiakitanga: A Maori 
Anthropological Perspective of The Maori Socio-environmental Ethic Of Resource Management” (2000) 109 
Journal of the Polynesian Society 349. 
19 Jones, above n 9, at 72.  
20 Richard Benton, Alex Frame and Paul Meredith Te Mātāpunenga A Compendium of References to the Concepts 
and Institutions of Māori Customary Law (Victoria University Press, Wellington, NZ, 2013) at 331. 
21 New Zealand Law Commission, above n 10, at 80. 
22 Jones, above n 9, at 103. 
23 Treaty settlements are the result of direct negotiations between the New Zealand Government and iwi | Māori 
tribes over redress for the settlement of historical claims of state failures to uphold the principles of Te Tiriti o 
Waitangi | The Treaty of Waitangi. The settlements are confirmed in legislation, the first in 1995. See for example 
the Waikato Raupatu Claims Settlement Act 1995, Rangitāne Tū Mai Rā (Wairarapa Tamaki nui-ā-Rua) Claims 





III. Māori Legal Tradition – Law 
 
By drawing on the work of other Māori scholars and for the purposes of this thesis, I am 
defining the Māori legal tradition as containing seven core principles whose legal aspects 
confer binding legal rights and responsibilities. Those principles are: 
1. Whanaungatanga – the centrality of relationships to Māori life.  
2. Kaitiakitanga – the care and responsibility for natural resources.  
3. Manaakitanga – nurturing relationships, looking after people, and being very careful how 
others are treated.  
4. Mana – the importance of spiritually sanctioned authority and the limits on Māori leadership  
5. Rangatiratanga – the exercise of governance and leadership of Māori.  
6. Utu – the principle of balance and reciprocity.  
7. Tapu – respect for the spiritual character of all things.  
 
I will describe and discuss each of these principles in more detail, and note the legal aspects 
that confer binding legal rights and responsibilities. For this I rely to a very great extent on 
Māori writing generally, and these three publications specifically: Te Mātāpunenga,24 the Law 
Commission’s Māori Custom and Values,25 Jones’s New Treaty New Tradition26 and Tā 
Mead’s Tikanga Māori.27 I do not include all possible legal rights and responsibilities – that is 
literally an epic undertaking. I have instead selected those legal rights and responsibilities that 
best demonstrate how the principles apply in Māori law. My analysis is intended as a starting 
point, not a comprehensive summary of a deep and complex legal tradition. These concepts are 
identified in the literature so that we can discuss and debate them, contest their use and envision 
how they might be used in the future.28  
 
 
24 Benton, Frame and Meredith, above n 20. 
25 New Zealand Law Commission, above n 10. 
26 Jones, above n 9. 
27 Mead, above n 3. 
28 For more discussion and scholarship Māori legal concepts, see Mamari Stephens and Mary Boyce (eds) He 
Papakupu Reo Ture: A Dictionary of Māori Legal Terms (1st ed, LexisNexis, Wellinton, 2013); and the Maori 





A. Whanaungatanga  
Whanaungatanga is a fundamental principle at the “core of the [Māori] socio-political 
system.”29 It is derived from whakapapa | the kinship system within te ao Māori and is the 
organising principle of tikanga Māori.30 The Ko Aotearoa Tēnei Waitangi Tribunal report 
described the connection between whanaungatanga and whakapapa, saying that 
whanaungatanga:31  
…describes relationships between people, between people and natural resources, 
even between related bodies of knowledge. In fact, all relationships of importance 
in mātauranga Māori are explained through kinship. That is why whakapapa 
(genealogy) is so important, it is the practical manifestation of the kinship principle.  
The relationship between whanaungatanga and whakapapa is critical in te ao Māori. 
Whakapapa can be understood as the “structural sequencing of the universe by tying all things 
into a genealogical order”32 across both space and time. Whakapapa is cosmological, 
describing the genealogy from Te Kore | the void of space and time, through Te Pō | the long 
darkness to Te Ao Mārama | the dawn of time from which the atua  | deities Ranginui | the Sky 
and Papatūānuku | the Earth are descended.33 Whakapapa is also divine, describing the descent 
of the atua from Ranginui and Papatūānuku including their children such as Tangaroa | god of 
seas, Tāwhirimātea | god of winds, Rongomatane | god of cultivated food and Tāne Mahuta | 
god of forests. And whakapapa is ancestral, describing the descent of all living things from 
those atua, including humans descended from Hine Titama, the first born human child of Tāne 
Mahuta and Hine-Ahu-One.  
As I understand it, whakapapa is the genealogical, physical blood/kin connection that all things 
have with each other. Whanaungatanga is the relationships and obligations that arise from that 
physical, blood/kin connection. One common example of the expression of the link between 
whakapapa and whanaungatanga is when Māori people gather together for the first time or for 
 
29 Maharaia Winiata “Leadership in Pre-European Society” (1956) 65 Journal of the Polynesian Society 212 at 
221. 
30 Benton, Frame and Meredith, above n 20, at 524. 
31 Waitangi Tribunal Ko Aotearoa Tēnei A Report into Claims concerning New Zealand Law and Policy Affecting 
Māori Culture and Identity: Te Taumata Tuatahi (Wai 262, 2011) at 105. 
32 Paul Tapsell “The Flight Of Pareraututu: An Investigation Of Taonga From A Tribal Perspective” (1997) 106 
Journal of the Polynesian Society 323 at 327. 
33 Te Rangi Hiroa The Coming of the Māori (Māori Purposes Fund Board, Wellington, 1949) at 433. Hiroa 
describes the three genealogical sequences as cosmogony – the creation of the cosmos and world; theogony – the 





the first time in a while, we will often do “whakawhanaungatanga”, where we will, one after 
another, introduce ourselves, identifying our kin connections to maunga | mountains, awa | 
rivers, moana | ocean, waka | origin canoe, tūpuna | ancestors well as our marae and where we 
live. This pepeha | formalised recitation describes the whakapapa of a person. For example, 
here is part of my pepeha:34  
Ko Tararua me Ruapehu ōku maunga. Tararua and Ruapehu are my mountains.  
Ko Ruamahanga me Whanganui ōku awa. Ruamahanga and Whanganui are my 
rivers.  
Ko Takitimu me Aotea ōku waka. Takitimu and Aotea are my origin canoes.  
No Rangitāne, Ngāti Kahungunu ki Wairarapa me Ati-Hau-nui-a-Pāpārangi. I 
belong to the tribes of Rangitāne, Kahungunu in Wairarapa and Ati-Hau-nui-a-
Pāpārangi. 
No Ngāti Moe me Wainuiarua ōku hapū. Ngāti Moe and Wainuiarua are my hapū. 
Ko Papawai me Upokotauaki ōku marae. Papawai and Upokotauaki are my marae.  
Ko Teoti Rangitekaiwaho Turei me Piupiu Taputoro ōku matua tipuna. Teoti 
Rangitekaiwaho Turei and Piupiu Taputoro are my grandparents.  
Ko Richard Ropata Eruera Turei me Janice Turei ōku mātua. Richard Ropata 
Eruera and Janice Turei are my parents. 
The pepeha is recited in order to create and restate whakapapa and whanaungatanga 
connections to the others in the room, clarifying familial relationships and tribal connections 
between the individuals. The practice of whakawhanaungatanga demonstrates the importance 
of the whakapapa/whanaungatanga connection to them and how easily Māori reflect that 
connection in our daily lives. 
Whanaungatanga therefore “embraces whakapapa and focuses upon relationships”35 that 
extend beyond the familial into relationships with the natural world and the spiritual world. It 
is the broad organising principle that sets out “rights, responsibilities and expected modes of 
behaviour”.36 It has been described as “the glue that held, and still holds, the system together: 
 
34 My pepeha, describing my kin relationships and descent lines. 
35 Mead, above n 3, at 32. 





the idea that makes the whole system make sense – including legal sense.”37 Tā Williams38 and 
Tā Durie39 have both described whanaungatanga as giving rise to legal obligations within 
Māori law.  
Whanaungatanga is not a legal principle that operates as a rule that can be broken. It is a 
desirable standard of responsibility that should be meet and actively maintained. I suggest that 
whanaungatanga plays a role in the Māori legal tradition similar to the role that justice plays in 
the Pākehā state legal system. It is a broad encompassing term that expresses the ultimate value 
held by the community about what the law should achieve, or repair if required. 
Whanaungatanga has multiple layers of meaning so it cannot be easily defined but the broad 
roles of this principle can be identified and applied.  
One role of whanaungatanga is to structure the decision-making process for how the principles 
of the Māori legal tradition should be applied. Whanaungatanga, along with mana and 
rangatiratanga, determines the status and roles of individuals within a whānau, hapū or iwi. 
People participate in Māori decision-making bodies to resolve breaches of Māori law 
depending on their status and roles. These decision-making bodies include rūnanga | council of 
decision makers40 to engage in a whakawā | adjudication process41 to decide whether a breach 
of a principle has occurred and what action should be taken to achieve ea | resolution. 
Whanaungatanga is also the organising principle for who would attend hui | gatherings42 of the 
broader whānau, hapū or iwi to discuss the adjudication of the breach. These two assemblies, 
rūnanga and hui, help the whānau, hapū or iwi to understand how, in any given case, a legal 
obligation may apply; to confirm whether an obligation is breached; and if breached, how utu 
| balance can restore the whanaungatanga between the parties. The legitimacy of the outcomes 
from these hui | gatherings and hui is dependent on the mana of the participants. That does not 
mean a process or decision is recognised as just by everyone present – it may lead to further 
acts of retribution or appeals or any number of consequences. But all those processes would be 
managed with reference to whanaungatanga as both a principle of Māori law and a process for 
managing Māori legal issues.  
 
37 Williams, above n 5, at 4. 
38 At 4. 
39 Durie, above n 2, at 455. 
40 Benton, Frame and Meredith, above n 20, at 343. 
41 At 520. 





Another role of whanaungatanga is determining how a person’s status, mana or rangatiratanga 
is understood.43 Whanaungatanga can identify a person’s right to use natural resources by 
confirming their take tūpuna | ancestral rights and connections.44 Those rights include the right 
of the person and their whānau to access those resources, and what rights they have to exploit, 
distribute, and share those resources.  
Identifying these rights and obligations is important because natural resources have always 
been a core source of the wealth of whānau and hapū. Their ability to share that wealth, through 
manaakitanga, is critical to their mana.45 If resources were taken through take raupatu | 
conquest by the war club or tuku | transfer, balance was restored by intermarriage to create the 
whakapapa line to legitimise future access to the resource for that whānau or hapū.46 Non-blood 
related relationships could be turned into close kin ties that created reciprocal whanaungatanga 
responsibilities such as kaitiakitanga.47 Whanaungatanga operates to confirm contractual 
agreements and resource allocations into the future. It is a principle that performs a complex 
multidimensional role across social, spiritual and economic relationships within te ao Māori. 
 
B. Kaitiakitanga  
Kaitiakitanga is commonly understood as the ethic of guardianship or trusteeship of natural 
and other physical resources.48 The kupu itself is constructed from kai | person or agent, tiaki | 
care, guard or watch over and tanga | time, place or circumstance.49 The kupu has become 
widely used in Aotearoa New Zealand’s political and legal discourse because of its inclusion 
in section 7 of the Resource Management Act 1991 and its definition in section 2 of that Act:50 
Kaitiakitanga means the exercise of guardianship by the tangata whenua of an area 
in accordance with tikanga Maori in relation to natural and physical resources; and 
includes the ethic of stewardship. 
 
43 At 455. 
44 Williams, above n 5, at 4.  
45 Durie, above n 2, at 455. 
46 Williams, above n 5, at 5. 
47 Durie, above n 2, at 454. 
48 Benton, Frame and Meredith, above n 20, at 105. 
49 At 105. 





However, kaitiakitanga is a much deeper principle than the care and protection of natural 
resources. It is a principle that stems directly from whakapapa and concerns both tangible and 
intangible whānau relationships across time and generations. Kawharu says that kaitiakitanga 
is an ethic not only found in the “biophysical environment”.51 The concept of sustainability 
incorporated in kaitiakitanga is an activation of the kaitiaki | trustee responsibilities to people 
individually and collectively, to the natural environment and its creatures, to the atua | deities 
and to the ancestors.52  
Kawharu says there are three spheres of kaitiaki responsibility that need to be kept in balance 
with each other – mana whenua | territorial responsibility, mana tangata | human realm of 
responsibility and mana atua | spiritual realm of responsibility.53 Kaitaiki have a range of tools 
and authorities to draw on to meet this responsibility for balance. One of those tools is the 
exercise of rangatiratanga, the authority for identifying and protecting land and waters, and 
political boundaries between groups.54 This can include identifying and protecting waahi tapu 
| sacred sites and imposing rāhui | ritual prohibition over land, rivers, the ocean and other 
natural resources to protect them from depletion. Rāhui can also be used by kaitiaki to protect 
the living from the dead, for health and spiritual reasons.55  
The spiritual dimension of kaitiakitanga also means that is not a human-bound concept. 
Different species can be kaitiaki over a place providing spiritual shelter, issuing warnings of 
dangers and generally caring for the community.56 Kaitiakitanga extends to the protection and 
care of taonga | sacred objects where those objects have become tapu.57 Kaitiaki may also be 
responsible for acts of manaaki | hospitality, particularly where that involves using natural 
resources, such as use, access to or gifting of land, food or taonga.  
As we have seen in the discussion on whanaungatanga, the Māori kinship system utilises the 
concept of reciprocity as a core tool to maintain the political and legal relationships between 
people, people and the atua, and people and the natural environment.58 Kaitiakitanga can be 
 
51 Kawharu, above n 18, at 352. 
52 At 352. 
53 At 355. These categories of mana will be discussed in more detail under the “Mana” heading on page 87. 
54 At 353. 
55 Benton, Frame and Meredith, above n 20, at 311. 
56 Waitangi Tribunal, above n 31, at 23. 
57 At 105. 





considered an exercise of whanaungatanga because of the intergenerational caring obligation 
created by whakapapa.59 Kaitiakitanga is an application of kinship reciprocity across both time 
and place.60 This, I suggest, is what makes kaitiakitanga an important legal principle. 
Kawharu says that kaitiakitanga is:61  
a fundamental means by which survival is ensured—survival in spiritual, economic 
and political terms. Since Maori society is a tribal society with respect to 
relationships with environmental resources, their actual management is itself a 
constituent element in the tribal kinship system. 
The management of natural resources by the kaitiaki includes restricting access, using rāhui to 
prevent overuse or misuse of food, and the distribution of resources through manaaki and tuku 
| gifting. These are legal obligations that the kaitiaki has towards and exercises on behalf of the 
responsible collective. Tuku is a useful example, as it is a kaitiakitanga responsibility related 
to the gifting of land. The gifting of land (or other natural resources) can be temporary or 
permanent but comes with reciprocal obligations on the giftee.62 That reciprocal obligation 
could be paid by later generations, as its purpose is to create the relationship of obligation 
between the parties while also ensuring natural resources are used carefully and wisely.63 The 
giftee would acquire the kaitiakitanga responsibilities but the donor would retain the mana over 
the land.64 I suggest that these reciprocity tools operate as legal agreements within Māori law 
for the use, sharing and return of land and resources. There would be spiritual and practical 
consequences for breaching the agreements, such as muru (discussed below) or breaches of 
tapu.  
 
C. Manaakitanga  
Manaakitanga is a process that builds the authority or status of a person, whānau or collective 
through giving.65 Manaakitanga is often discussed in relation to hosting manuhiri | guests as an 
 
59 Waitangi Tribunal, above n 31, at 105. 
60 Kawharu, above n 18, at 353. 
61 At 351. 
62 At 361. 
63 Benton, Frame and Meredith, above n 20, at 444. 
64 At 361. 





act of kindness and generosity that reflect well on the host group.66 Tā Mead describes how a 
host group may take months to prepare for an event or visitors, to satisfy themselves that they 
have meet their manaaki obligations.67 Manaakitanga is both a demonstration and an 
affirmation of kinship across the levels of whanaungatanga. Tā Durie describes manaakitanga 
as the “reciprocal enhancement of each other” in the management of relationships, that is the 
enhancement of the “mana of others” by “words and by demonstrative acts showing love, 
generosity and care.”68 
Manaakitanga is a concept that extends beyond hosting, feeding and caring for manuhiri, 
however. It is a two-way kinship relationship that uses generosity and hospitality to exercise 
the economic and political power of the giver though the careful attention to the needs and 
requirements of others. Te Mātāpunenga recounts this extract from J Prytz Johansen’s The 
Maori and his Religion in its Non-Ritualistic Aspects which describes how manaaki was used 
in this case for political kinship purposes:69 
During the Maoris’ fight with the aborigines a young woman among these was taken 
prisoner by Toikairakau. When the girl’s father, Pohokura, heard this, he went to 
Toikairakau and asked that she might be released so that she might return with him. 
Toikairakau answered, “She has my leave. When you take her to your home, let her 
be named Kairakau” (thus part of his own name, Toi-kairakau). Pohokura said, “It 
is well! But now you have mentioned yourself as a name for her take her; for your 
wife as well; for I understand that my child is honoured (manaakitia) by you.”  
When giving his name, he gives something of himself; he creates mana, exactly 
what is called manaaki, to honour. At the same time, he becomes greater himself, 
as the girl gets part of his life. Therefore it is quite natural that the father should 
offer her as Toikairakau’s wife. Indeed, she did get married, although not to 
Toikairakau, as the latter intended her for his grandson. 
In this example, Toikairakau demonstrated manaaki towards Pohokura, in agreeing to 
Pohokura’s request for the return of his daughter. As Johansen has described, in renaming the 
girl a gift of a name was given and accepted, enhancing the mana of all parties. In addition the 
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gift created a future whanaunga | relation obligation between the two whānau, leading to the 
girl being married into Toikairakau’s whānau at some later time. The whanaungatanga 
connection connects the resources that come both from the mixed lineages as well as 
obligations such as coming to each other’s aid during conflicts. This act of manaakitanga is as 
much an economic and political act as it is one of personal generosity.  
Manaakitanga is also a process that enables some of the more difficult legal processes, such as 
muru | compensation, to occur in an acceptable and orderly fashion. A muru is the ritual 
redistribution of wealth or property in compensation or as a punishment for an offence.70 A 
hapū subject to a muru would be required by the principle of manaakitanga to host the muru 
party even as the compensation was being extracted.71 This is can be understood within the 
context of whanaungatanga, because the purpose of utu or muru is to restore the whānau 
relationships and connections injured by the hara | wrong committed in the first instance. The 
act of manaakitanga, even as the consequence is exacted, is a contribution to the restoration of 
mana of the host and of the whanaunga relationships between the host and the muru party. 
I suggest the examples above demonstrate an important, if underrated, legal understanding of 
manaakitanga, as an economic and political tool which creates binding rights and obligations. 
The act of giving creates concomitant obligations on the receiver, similar in nature to a contract 
in state law. There is a process of exchange, an understanding of the relative value of the first 
gift of exchange and therefore the value of the return obligation. There are implied and possibly 
explicit understandings of the consequences of a failure to reciprocate appropriately. 
Manaakitanga can be understood as a legal process as well as a social and familial one.  
 
D. Mana  
Mana is a concept with a wide application. It is a personal quality of the individual and includes 
the power or charisma of a person. Mana refers to the place of the individual within the 
collective and is one of the two core principles that are focused on the individual – the other is 
tapu.72 Mana is the exercise of power or authority over features of the whakapapa, including 
land, water, resources and property. It is used to describe the political power and therefore the 
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legal authority, wielded by high-status individuals such as chiefs and tohunga in making 
determinations and declarations over and for the whānau, hapū or iwi.73  
Tā Mead says that everyone is born with mana and inherits mana from the status of their 
whānau and parents. It is derived from and signals the inherent status of a person. However Tā 
Mead also says that mana is “much more open to extension than any other attribute”74 because 
it can be enhanced or diminished by the actions and achievements of that person. It is dynamic 
and creative and rewards personal excellence.75 The mana achieved by excellence can also then 
be inherited or ascribed to the descendants or the whānau of that person. It is a means to value 
personal strengths within a world view deeply focused on the wellbeing of the group. 
Mana is a complex principle, expressed through the whakapapa relationships that individual 
and whānau Māori have with the spiritual and physical world. It also has specific and 
comprehensive use across a number of legal areas. Benton, Frame and Meredith identify mana 
kōrero, mana moana, mana motuhake, mana tangata, and mana whenua.76 Tā Mead includes 
mana atua, mana moana, mana tangata, mana tipuna, and mana whenua.77 Barlow describes 
mana atua, mana tūpuna, mana whenua and mana moana.78 For the purposes of this thesis, I 
will not describe these aspects in detail but rather provide a general overview grouped 
according to Tā Rangi Hiroa’s classification of te ao Māori as theogony – the creation of the 
gods; anthropogeny – the creation of human beings; and cosmogony – the creation of the 
cosmos and world.79 
1. Theogony – mana atua, mana tūpuna 
Mana atua is the spiritual authority descended directly from the atua and to which every child 
is heir.80 Mana atua can describe a “bundle of attributes” of a child or a person that require 
others to take particular care to nurture and protect.81 While mana is innate due to the 
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whakapapa between the person and the atua, mana can be personally acquired or diminished, 
interfering with or enhancing their whakapapa relationships with the spiritual world.  
2. Anthropogeny – mana tangata, mana kōrero, mana mohutake  
Mana tangata is a description of the legal authority to govern people. A person with sufficient 
mana will hold decision making authority over different aspects of Māori community life and 
people. It is an authority that can be whakapapa based or achieved by leadership excellence.82 
Mana kōrero is a similar authority, the right to speak on behalf of others. The term recognises 
the oratory skills of the person to articulate the views and needs of their whānau, hapū and 
iwi.83 Mana motuhake is concerned with the right to autonomy. It has become more of a 
political term often used in relation to Māori assertions of tino rangatiratanga at an iwi or 
national level and so is more commonly applied to collectives rather than individuals. 
3. Cosmogeny – mana moana, mana whenua 
Mana moana and mana whenua are descriptions of Māori legal authority from and over water 
and land. There is divergence among scholars as to the traditional legitimacy of these concepts. 
For example, Tā Mead refers to Meredith’s 2010 analysis of mana moana as a creation of the 
Māori Land Court rather than an original conception of authority over water,84 suggesting in 
effect that a claim of mana moana is only necessary for dealing with state attempts to take land 
covered by water. However, the concept of mana moana is considered an origin concept by Tā 
Durie and others, who write that, for Māori “their water bodies, … the open seas and the hot-
water rivers and springs, are integral, defining parts of their personal and tribal identity, security 
and prosperity.”85 The exercise of that tribal identity has come to be better understood as the 
exercise of mana or decision-making power of the water and the land and is closely connected 
to the exercise of kaitiakitanga. In the Waitangi Tribunal Mohaka River report, Canon Huata 
described the two-way mana relationship between Ngāti Pahauwera and the river:86 
We always talk about our river, the control of it, and its spirituality. These are the 
waters of sustenance. 
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Even though administration of the river and the land has passed into pakeha hands, 
we retain the control. It is these treasures (i.e. the land and the river) that rests the 
mana. This is what we are fighting for. We know that this is where our salvation is. 
The control of the river has been our mana from way back. It came from our 
ancestors and down through the generations. Even though these things have been 
taken, we stand firm (in our belief). Tawhirirangi is the mountain, Mohaka is the 
river, etc, etc. 
Our ancestors discovered the mana. They found the mana in the hills, in the rivers, 
and that is why we battle for their return.  
Mana whenua is a complex concept of decision-making authority over land. It conveys a 
reciprocal relationship with land that includes rangatiratanga | political responsibilities, 
kaitiakitanga, ahikā | descent rights to occupy87 and wealth creation through the use and 
protection of natural resources such as food and fresh water. Angela Ballara, in her book Iwi, 
describes mana as resting or lying over the land, such that the rangatira:88 
did not own everything in his territory, but while he was accepted by his people as 
the proper bearer of the mana he had the right to make decisions about both the land 
and the various hapū living under his mana or authority. 
Tā Mead lists a comprehensive set of requirements for the establishment of mana whenua when 
needing to test land or Treaty of Waitangi claims in a court or for settlement with the Crown.89 
He says that mana whenua can be acquired through many legal means including take raupatu | 
conquest, by discovery, by gifting, or by whānau distribution. These initial forms of taking or 
acquiring land are often confirmed through take moe whenua | marriage confirmation, as the 
“hau (spiritual essence) of the land rests with the women of the land”.90 The retention of mana 
whenua relies heavily on ahikāroa | title by occupation. The land needs to be settled, lived on 
and cared for by the whānau, hapū or iwi for several generations to claim ahikāroa. Mana is 
core to the Māori legal tradition because it is one of the principles that confers authority over 
resources and people.  
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E. Rangatiratanga  
Where mana can be said to be the inherent authority held by a person, from whatever source, 
rangatiratanga is the exercise of acquired or attributed leadership authority. Tā Mead notes that 
it is more natural to talk about the mana of the individual than the ‘rangatiratanga’ of a person 
unless that person holds an identified leadership, nobility or chiefly role.91 The kupu 
‘rangatiratanga’ refers to the process of ranga i te tira – binding people together92 indicating 
that the exercise of this leadership is about caring for the collective as opposed to self-
promotion. It is a fundamentally political principle, indicating the political authority of a person 
or group to act with their “sovereignty, chieftainship, leadership, self-determination, [and] self-
management”.93 Rangatiratanga sits at the heart of Te Tiriti o Waitangi. ‘Tino rangatiratanga’ 
is the term used in Article 1 of Te Tiriti o Waitangi and is understood by Māori to mean that 
the rangatira who signed te Tiriti would retain ‘full chiefly authority’ within te ao Māori, 
including over their people and their land. The kupu has subsequently become a politically 
contentious term in the negotiations and settlements between iwi Māori and the state.  
Rangatiratanga is a kupu that is used more frequently by the state in iwi settlement legislation 
to denote the authority, autonomy and sovereignty of Māori.94 Jones notes that the use of this 
kupu is not consistent in these settlements, sometimes used in conjunction with mana or 
motuhake | independence, other times not.95 But presumably iwi Māori are intending or at least 
accepting the use of this kupu in their settlements to denote their political authority. 
Barlow takes a contrary view about the use of the kupu ‘rangatiratanga’ as meaning Māori 
political authority. He says that ‘tino rangatiratanga’ is not a kupu that has a source in the whare 
wananga and therefore should not be used to mean Māori political authority.96 He considers 
the right kupu is ‘ārikitanga’ as it directly connects the authority of the individual to their 
whakapapa derived from the atua:97  
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The ariki is the supreme authority and power of the tribe or group, by virtue of his 
or her direct lineage to the gods in accordance with human genealogies. The ariki is 
also the intermediary of the gods on earth. 
In my view, Barlow’s opinion that ‘ārikitanga’ is the best kupu to describe Māori political 
authority is compelling because of its basis in the theogeny of te ao Māori. However, it is not 
the kupu that is routinely used to describe political power in te ao Māori in contemporary times. 
I will continue to use the kupu ‘rangatiratanga’ because it is commonly understood by New 
Zealand legal audiences, including Māori, and I recognise its limited interpretation. In doing 
so I defer to the position of Tā Durie:98 
As noted tino rangatiratanga subsumes the ideas underlying proprietary rights in 
that the Māori concept envelopes both a political conception of authority as well as 
rights attached to resources, including rights to exclusive possession and use. In 
short, tino rangatiratanga encompasses both political authority and proprietary 
rights.  
This interpretation does not confine the exercise of rangatiratanga to those circumstances that 
involve the state government or some state intervention, such as co-ownership or co-
governance. It acknowledges Māori-determined political intent as well as legal decision-
making authority over property. In Chapter 2, I described how the colonisation process 
undermined Māori political authority and therefore the operation of Māori law and the 
intellectual and cultural tradition that maintained that law. It is possible that the improved 
recognition of rangatiratanga and its assertion by iwi in Treaty of Waitangi claim settlements, 
is contributing to an improved recognition of the Māori legal tradition that would naturally 
follow from Māori political autonomy. This is not a question that this thesis is designed to 
answer but it is an interesting question that arises from it. 
 
F. Utu  
Utu, described as one of the “most important ordering principles” in te ao Māori99 means to 
make a response, to balance or provide reciprocity in some form. It can include compensation, 
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payments, and answers as well as revenge or ransom or reward.100 Despite a common 
understanding of utu as revenge, it is more closely associated with the concept of ea, which is 
the resolution and restoration of relationships – demonstrating a purpose directly linked to 
whanaungatanga. Utu then is a core means by which whanaungatanga is restored where a hara 
| harm or breach of Māori law has occurred.  
Tā Mead uses an analytical framework of ‘take-utu-ea’ to describe the use of utu in te ao 
Māori.101 The breach of tikanga is the take – the issue or harm which requires addressing. In a 
process of whakawā | determination, it is expected that the wronged and wrongdoing parties 
agree to the nature of the take. Then utu, the appropriate recompense or restoration, is agreed. 
Once the utu is completed, the relationships between the parties is in a state of ea or resolution. 
This ‘take-utu-ea’ framework is a legal framework, like an investigation, determination, and 
restitution process one might understand in a state legal system. It is an example of how people 
will work together to create a conflict management system to help regulate and manage 
relationships – as law is designed to do.102  
Frame and Benton also understand utu in this more complex, multi-layered way. Utu 
incorporates dowries, revenge, compensation, consequences, and importantly gift giving and 
reciprocity.103 Piri Sciascia described utu in a similar way, reflecting on utu as a commentary 
on the way in which Māori artists see and comment on their world around them:104 
Central to the work of the creative artist is a human quality which has been highly 
valued in Māori society. This value is utu, at turn which is generally understood to 
mean “revenge”, but an equally important part of its meaning is “to respond” or “to 
make response”. It is a value central to Māori life and a Māori way of living. It is a 
spiritual course which when fully valued leads to an expression of life that is 
demanding, engaging, open, spontaneous, and above all personal.  
One of the legal practices that can be used to achieve utu, is muru. It closely connected to 
manaakitanga as described earlier in this thesis.105 It is a means to redress a harm or correct an 
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action without the use of violence.106 Muru can be a spiritual consequence but is more 
commonly understood as the transfer of property in compensation or damages.107 Muru could 
also be used to dissolve a marriage, presumably as a means to compensate for the ending of a 
marriage contract.108 Muru is a social institution, in that for its successful resolution, the parties 
must participate and recognise that it has occurred in a just manner.109 Just as with 
manaakitanga, the purpose of utu and its mechanisms, such as muru, is to restore 
whanaungatanga. Therefore, participation by those affected is essential for its success.110 Who 
participates in the muru process is determined by seriousness of the offence and who the 
offence is committed against. The more serious the offence or the more chiefly the person 
injured by the offence, the more likely the wider hapū or iwi will be involved.111 Tā Mead also 
recognises that muru operates as an economic tool, circulating property through whānau and 
hapū as well as operating as a social control against unwise or unacceptable behaviours.112 The 
principle of utu as a legal tool in restoring whanaungatanga is very important and is 
encapsulated in its complex meaning and use. In a society where whanaungatanga is essential 
to the wellbeing and economy of whānau, hapū and iwi, a system of reciprocity that reduces 
conflict and damage (such as violence against a person, group or property) is very wise.113  
 
G. Tapu 
Tapu first and foremost is a spiritual power that is imposed on people, places and things. It was 
described by Donald McClean in the 1860s as an ‘institution that has had the force of law’ with 
rangatira exercising a spiritual power to both place and lift tapu as they considered necessary.114 
Cleve Barlow describes tapu as most critically the ‘power and influence of the gods’115 while 
Tā Mead describes it as “everywhere in our world”, in people, places, things, buildings, kupu 
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and ‘in all tikanga’. It is the inherent quality of value and integrity in all things and in all ways 
of being Māori. Tā Mead says for example how the tangihanga | funeral cannot be understood 
unless tapu is understood.116 As such it forms a core part of how Māori society understands and 
values the spirituality of all things. 
For some early commentators the spiritual aspects of tapu were seen to be more negative and 
superstitious,117 where others understood it not just for its spiritual aspects but also for its 
practicality:118 
Compared with some of our modern practices – legal, social and hygienic – it seems 
to have been constructed upon the keystone of common sense and expediency. Four 
single instances indicate that there was always good reason underlying the tapu. The 
Maori tapu of dead bodies was the precursor of our modern law against sacrilege 
and defilement of dead bodies. The Maori tapu of sick persons was the forerunner 
of our current law of quarantine and isolation of infected persons. The Maori tapu 
of woman to man was merely an early law of the sanctity of matrimony. The Maori 
tapu of seed was a primitive form of protecting property.  
Tapu can be understood as a principle conferring binding obligations to respect the inherent 
value and dignity of all things and their relationships within te ao Māori. Tā Williams describes 
it as both a social control on behaviour and evidence of the indivisibility of divine and 
profane.119 Maori Marsden has said the concept of tapu has both legal and religious aspects.120 
He considers that when tapu is attached to a person, it expresses a relationship between that 
person and a deity such that it constitutes a legal contract. This is a contract in the sense that 
the person “dedicates himself or an object to the service of a deity in return for protection 
against malevolent forces”121 This leads to a set of rights and responsibilities in the ways in 
which that person, whānau, hapū and iwi give weight to their relationships of tapu.  
For example, following Tā Mead, we can consider how the Māori law of tapu might apply to 
the rights of a person to be free from violence, harm and coercion. Tapu can be understood as 
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the inherent dignity of a person, their social, spiritual, physical, and intellectual integrity, right 
to self-determination, to be free of abuse or interference and to have an inherent right to 
belonging and connection to whānau, hapū and iwi.122 Incursions on a person’s tapu would be 
subject to a Māori legal process to determine the extent of the incursion and its consequences, 
what form of utu was appropriate, and how ea could be achieved.  
The law of tapu creates binding rights and responsibilities on Māori people in their dealings 
with every aspect of te ao Maori. The law regulates their relationships with the atua | deities, 
which includes steps they need to take, such as karakia | ritual chant, that bind the person and 
the atua together in a spiritual contract. Tapu protects the integrity of the person against 
incursions by other people. This creates an obligation on others to not hurt or injure another 
person and to be prepared to face practical and spiritual consequences if they do. 
 
IV. He Mutunga 
 
In this chapter I have sought to more deeply understand the values of tikanga Māori and how 
they are used as foundational principles of the Māori legal tradition. I have considered, in detail, 
seven principles – Whanaungatanga, Kaitiakitanga, Manaakitanga, Mana, Rangatiratanga, Utu 
and Tapu. These principles contain norms understood by Māori to set standards of behaviour 
and that, if contravened, can lead to a form of “serious social disadvantage”123 to themselves 
and others. They can therefore be understood as legal principles that form the foundation of the 
Māori legal tradition.  
This legal tradition implements political, social and spiritual institutions or regularised 
practices such as ahikāroa, muru, rāhui, hui and rūnanga that establish the processes and 
procedures of law. It is a dynamic and complex legal tradition. It is, as Durie has said in the 
opening quote to this chapter, aspirational, setting standards of outstanding performance, 
rewarded by the mana that comes with meeting and then exceeding the whanaungatanga 
obligations a person has to their whānau, hapū, iwi, tūpuna and atua.124 
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It is with this understanding, that I move to consider in the next chapter how whakairo Māori 





Te Wāhanga Tuaono – Whakairo Māori  
“A lump of wood of little or no great significance is transformed through the art 
process, by building words (kōrero) into it and by contact with people, into a thing 
Maoris class as taonga, he taonga tuku iho…. a highly prized object that has been 
handed down from the ancestors… Implied is the notion of he kupu kei runga, – 
there are words attached to it.”1 
 
In this chapter I bring together the previous analyses on visual literacy, encoded objects and 
Māori law to consider whether the visual language of Māori law can be encoded into whakairo 
Māori. I consider how the principles of the Māori legal tradition may be read in tā moko | 
tattooing, pou whenua | land marker posts and raranga | weaving and how each might be 
encoded with law. This chapter thus forms the crux of my thesis inquiry.  
 
I. The Role of Whakairo Māori  
 
As explained in Chapter 1, I have used the phrase ‘whakairo Māori’ throughout this thesis as a 
general term for Māori visual art. Whakairo means to ornament with a pattern, and it is most 
often used in relation to carving but not strictly so.2 The phrase “Whakairo Māori” can be used 
to refer to carving, tattooing, weaving, painting and other art forms. Tā Mead says that 
whakairo Māori “refers to something more than the shape and form of an object”.3 These 
objects have an added wairua or purpose than more simple decorative or functional uses:4 
Whakairo is quality, the difference between crudity and elegance, animal and 
human, nature as opposed to culture. It is uplifting, taking the human spirit close to 
the rarefied and beautiful world of the gods and rising above the mundane affairs of 
existence in mere survival. It is closer to Rangi, e tu nei (Rangi [Sky God], standing 
above) than to Papa, e takoto nei (Papa [the Earth Mother], lying here). Whakairo 
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represents the triumph of mana Maori [power] over the environment and represents 
a gift from the ancestors to their descendants born and yet unborn.  
Tā Mead says the purpose of a culture’s art system is to provide a ‘cultural grid’ that mediates 
the relationships between the person, the atua and the whānau, hapū and iwi:5 
As Rudolph Arnheim suggested (1961:205), art “helps men to understand the world 
and himself and presents to his eyes what he is understood and believed to be true. 
Some very fundamental truths are reflected in art, truth to do with religion, 
philosophy, in mythology. Forge (1979:285) indicated that the sorts of truth 
conveyed in art “are fundamental assumptions about the bases of the society, the 
real nature of men and women, the nature of power, the place of man in the universe 
of nature which surrounds him.” 
Whakairo Māori are not merely descriptions of the natural world, but are often purposeful non-
written visual communications between people, between people and their atua | deities and the 
environment. Whakairo Māori can be encoded objects, made to kōrero | speak with us so we 
can move knowledge forward through the generations.6 Panoho’s description of the 
relationship between the Māori artist, their whakapapa and the whenua | land as a palimpsest 
encourages a multi-layered reading of the objects and their relationships.7 Panoho’s work is an 
exploration of how Māori artists navigate their relationships with Papatūānuku, describing tatai 
| links that are integral to an understanding of their art:8 
Land, along with tātai connecting ancestors to land, help make people belong. The 
reason this is of interest to the broader discussion of Māori art as a palimpsest is that 
in a number of key sites throughout Aotearoa many different groups can and do 
claim ngā piringa ‘associations’ with different layers in the same land. Outdoor 
sculpture, meeting houses and references by artists to the landscape, natural 
environment, culture, taonga and to the histories of these sites helps illustrate the 
complexity ēnei whakapapa ‘these layers’ of connection.  
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These layers of connection are not just about the environment in which Māori artists are 
working and from which they draw inspiration. They also include the materials and tools the 
artists use which, Panoho says, have a whakapapa basis:9 
the whakapapa of paint [as the] toto ‘blood’ that comes out of the wehenga 
‘separation’ of Rangi and Papatūānuku. With the kōkōwai ‘red ochre’ you still see 
the veins of Papatūānuku. If they have carved out roads [i.e. scarp cut] you can see 
the veins running.  
Panoho recounts a conversation with the late Hirini Melbourne about the stone, bone and wood 
instruments that Melbourne found in museums. In that conversation, Melbourne described 
those instruments as mokemoke | lonely and lacking the activation of breath and warmth that 
comes from their use. Panaho reflects that:10  
the tone of [the object’s] speech is inherent; it comes out of the material and cavity-
contained shape lovingly crafted by maker. My impression of the revival Melbourne 
(and Richard Nuns (b.1945) who worked with him) was undertaking was actually a 
form of whakawhanaungatanga ‘process of establishing relationships’. He was 
deliberately attempting to adopt and reintegrate the instrument back into its musical 
family. 
All things in te ao Māori are kin-related including creative works. The creative process derives 
from, and serves the people and the atua | deities:11 
We the living ... are the Whatu-ora, the living, seeing eyes of our sleeping ancestors 
... We the living are the tukutuku ngā iho “those that follow on”. 
Whakairo Māori has whakapapa to the tūpuna | ancestors and atua | deities. There is also a 
whakapapa connection between whakairo Māori and the people who that whakairo serves. It 
is part of a ‘cultural grid’ that enables a conversation between Māori people, our atua and our 
environment. The creation of whakairo Māori can be a ‘taonga tuku iho’, a treasure from the 
ancestors, able to be read and to speak about the values of tikanga Māori. It is a multi-layered 
communication tool that can be used to navigate layers of relationships. Māori scholars clearly 
connect whakairo Māori to the principle of whanaungatanga. As a communication tool, 
whakairo Māori could be also used to communicate other principles of the Māori legal 
 
9 At 65. 
10 At 278. 




tradition. I will now look more closely at tā moko | tattooing, pou whenua | land marker posts 
and raranga | weaving, to see whether other legal principles might also be encoded in some 
form. This process will test my theory that Māori law can be documented in whakairo Māori. 
 
II. Tā Moko as Encoded Law  
 
Tā moko is the art of tattooing marks into the body, particularly the face but also the legs, body 
and arms. Tā moko is and continues to be used by Māori as a statement of whānau, hapū and 
iwi identity.12 It is a critical visual tool in te ao Māori, “part of the whole fabric of Maori 
culture” in signifying status and commitment to a Māori way of being.13 The kupu | word moko 
is said to derive from Rūaumoko, god of earthquakes, who resides in Rarohenga | underworld. 
The most common origin story for how tā moko came from Rarohenga to Te Ao Turoa | world 
of light is that of Mataora and Niwareka. I summarise this origin story below as described by 
Rawinia Higgins.14 
Mataora was a rangatira | chief who lived in Te Ao Tūroa | the world of light. One night, 
Mataora was wakened by a group of tūrehu | fairy from Rarohenga who had gathered around 
Mataora thinking that he might be a supernatural being. Mataora and the tūrehu performed 
songs for each other. When a tall, fair-haired woman of the tūrehu was dancing, the tūrehu 
began chanting her name “Niwareka, Niwareka”. Mataora fell in love with Niwareka and they 
eventually married. One day Mataora struck Niwareka across the face in a rage. Niwareka fled 
back to her homeland in Rarohenga and Mataora, overcome by guilt and love for Niwareka, 
set off to find her.  
On his journey to the underworld, Mataora encountered tīwaiwaka | fantails who said they 
knew why his wife had returned to Rarohenga. Mataora was full of whakamā | shame for his 
 
12 Ngārino Ellis “Ki tō ringa ki ngā rākau ā te Pākehā? Drawings and Signatures of Moko by Māori in the Early 
19th Century” (2014) 123 Journal of the Polynesian Society 29 at 30. 
13 At 30. 
14 Rawinia Higgins “He tanga ngutu, he Tuhoetanga te mana motuhake o te tā moko wahine: The Identity Politics 
of Moko Kauae” (PhD Thesis, University of Otago, 2004) at 33. In her account of the Mataora and Niwareka 
history of tā moko, Higgins references Anthony Alpers The World of the Polynesians – Seen through Their Myths 
and Legends, Poetry and Art (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1987); Elsdon Best The Maori (Vol 1, Memoirs 
of the Polynesian Society, Wellington, 1924); Percy S Smith The Lore of the Whare-wananga or Teachings of the 
Maori College: On Religion, Cosmogony, and History, Part 1, Te Kauwae-runga or ‘Things Celestial’ (Vol 3, 
Memoirs of the Polynesian Society, New Plymouth, 1913); and John White The Ancient History of the Maori 




actions. When he eventually found his wife’s people, he saw that someone was undergoing tā 
moko. Uetonga, Niwareka’s father, a descendant of Hine Nui te Pō and Rūaumoko, specialised 
in tā moko. Mataora was intrigued because where he was from, moko was a temporary marking 
on the face that could be removed.  
Mataora asked Uetonga about the differences in permanent and temporary tā moko. Uetonga 
explained that because their process of tā moko was permanent, it had more mana. Uetonga 
wiped the temporary tā moko from his son-in-law's face to show the worthlessness of a 
temporary tattoo. The people laughed at Mataora and he felt whakamā again. Mataora decided 
that he wanted to have a permanent moko and asked if Uetonga would to this for him and 
Uetonga agreed. The pain of the process was almost unbearable so Mataora began to chant to 
Niwareka to soothe himself. 
On hearing this chant, Niwareka’s sister told her about the stranger who was being tattooed by 
their father. They went to see who this man was, but blinded by the swelling from the tattoo, 
Niwareka did not recognise her husband at first. However, she did recognise his cloak because 
she had woven for him. Niwareka felt for his suffering and wept for him. When the moko 
eventually healed, Mataora asked Niwareka to return with him to Te Ao Tūroa. She was 
reluctant because that was an evil place where husbands beat their wives. She told him that she 
would need to consult with her whānau | family about it first. Uetonga was not happy and 
wanted Mataora to leave Niwareka in Rarohenga. He did not want his child hit again. Mataora 
was still ashamed of his actions. Mataora said to Uetonga that his commitment to never hitting 
Niwareka again was as permanent as “the moko I am wearing now will not rub off”. Mataora 
and Niwareka prepared for their journey back to Te Ao Tūroa. Mataora was presented with 
some gifts, the knowledge of tā moko, but also a cloak called Te Rangihaupapa. Mataora was 
a person transformed by his renewed commitment to non-violence and creativity, a new 
identity in te Ao Turoa etched by tā moko deep into his skin.  
 
A. Identity Documented in Tā Moko  
Tā moko is specific to the person who wears it and has therefore been described as a personal 
identifier or signature. Ngarino Ellis has written a significant analysis of Māori use of moko as 
a signature.15 She is Ngāpuhi and Ngāti Porou, and an Associate Professor at the University of 
 




Auckland. She specialises in Māori art history and mātauranga Māori. In her article, she 
describes moko as the primary identity marker for Māori in the 18th and 19th century and the 
“visible expression of iwi, hapū and whānau ‘family’ identity.”16  
Ellis recounts the first known example of moko use as a signature from 1815 in Rangihoua in 
the Bay of Islands. The Rev. Samuel Marsden had bought more than 200 acres of land in the 
north for 12 axes. The moko of two chiefs, Te Uri o Kanae and Wharemokaikai, were copied 
on to the land deed to authorise the transaction. From that point on, Māori began to use moko, 
drawn on paper contracts, as a common form of signature when one was needed. Sarah 
Gallagher tells the story of Ngāti Toa Rangatira chief, Te Peehi17 (Portrait of Te Pehi Kupe, 
1826) who met with King Edward, and reportedly stated, while pointing to his own forehead 
“Europee man write with pen his name, Te Peehi’s is here.”18 There is extensive evidence of 
rangatira using their own moko as a signature or statement of their personal identity. This 
includes signatures from eight rangatira on the 1840 Wentworth Indenture, a document which 
purported to purchase the entire the South Island and Rakiura totalling 20 million acres19 and 
44 examples of moko as signature from the Treaty of Waitangi.20 
Ellis extends her analysis beyond the use of moko as a signature. She also considers that tā 
moko are used as portraits or self-portraits.21 I will not detail that part of her analysis in my 
thesis, suffice to say that these analyses of tā moko as signature and portrait are important as 
“sites of cross-cultural exchange” and as mnemonic devices in contemporary times.22 Ellis’s 
analyses are about Māori interactions with settlers and Crown agents during the first century 
of colonisation. As such, she is considering how Māori are utilising their moko as ‘written’ 
legal proof of identity in their legal and political dealings with colonial and settler authorities. 
I suggest that in the Ellis analyses, the rangatira are using their tā moko as a legal instrument 
within the framework of the colonial legal system and not as the activation of the Māori legal 
tradition. I have not found evidence to show that rangatira routinely ‘wrote’ or copied their tā 
 
16 At 30. 
17 See Image 4 in the Appendix at page 143 for a reproduction of the Portrait of Te Peehi. 
18 Sarah Gallagher “‘A Curious Document’: Ta Moko as Evidence of Pre-European Textual Culture in New 
Zealand” (2003) 27 Bibliographical Society of Australia and New Zealand Bulletin 39 at 41. Sarah Gallagher is 
a Heritage Assessment Advisor at Heritage New Zealand Pouhere Taonga, author and publisher based in Dunedin. 
19 Ellis, above n 12, at 38. The sale was later nullified. 
20 At 58. 
21 At 30. 




moko onto a surface (carved or otherwise) as proof of their identity in their political or legal 
interactions with each other. It doesn’t appear then that tā moko were replicated or written as a 
signature for Māori legal purposes. The act of copying their own tā moko seems related to 
dealing with state law not Māori law. 
 
B. Tā Moko as a Living Embodiment of Māori Law 
Tā moko, as an expression of mana, goes much further in the Māori legal tradition than as a 
signature. I consider tā moko to be the living embodiment of Māori law. Māori law is literally 
written into the skin. The origin history of tā moko is not just about Mataora’s identity. The 
history associates tā moko directly with the legal principle of mana.  
Mana is intrinsic to the person but also flexible enough that it can be acquired and lost. Mana 
is associated not only with a person’s inherent dignity and achievements, but it also impacts 
and is impacted by the person’s whakapapa. In the origin story Mataora’s shame at having his 
temporary tattoo wiped from his face by Uetonga was an injury to his mana. But although mana 
was lost at that time, Mataora was able to restore it by subjecting himself to the pain of a 
permanent tā moko. He also restored his mana by committing to non-violence in his marriage, 
a commitment he stated was as permanent as “the moko I am wearing now”. Therefore, tā 
moko contains a visual language that describes the mana of the wearer, a legal principle 
carrying legal rights and responsibilities. 
Sarah Gallagher writes about tā moko as text, suggesting that tā moko might be considered 
evidence of a “pre-European textual culture”.23 She argues that tā moko is “a sign system, a 
living document represented by meaningful marks on the human body” that was written and 
read.24 She also argues that the individual designs themselves were well known and readable 
by others:25 
There is also evidence that people could identify others by their Moko without 
having met them: Polack reported that on several occasions he showed likenesses 
of chiefs, resplendent with Moko, to Maori living as far as 400 miles distant. These 
 
23 Gallagher, above n 18, at 39. 
24 At 41. 




Maori were able to identify the men by name from reading their likeness, having 
never met them previously.  
Tā moko were understood to represent the rank and accomplishments of a person, although 
reportedly only for those born into a high rank or who had made significant achievements.26 
The placing of specific tā moko designs on specified places on the face conveyed accurate 
information to the reader where “each design was named and they were related to each other, 
resulting in a complex composition which could be read by others.”27 Tā moko designs could 
also be inherited by whakapapa.28 Gallagher likened that process to typography where the 
placing of tā moko designs on the face and body was like the placement of letters in a document, 
making the tā moko designs readable.29  
In Dan Simmons’ seminal Ta Moko30 he has recorded and illustrated many examples of tā 
moko. These examples all contain descriptions with information about the whakapapa and 
mana of the person. Simmons refers to Michael King in this regard:31 
King correctly characterises male moko as a badge in that it was widely believed to 
designate membership of a particular group and an individual’s standing within that 
group. It could be evidence of his tribe, his rank and his masculinity.  
It is acknowledged that tā moko can identify whakapapa and mana, as King describes, but it 
has not previously been described as documentation of the legal rights and responsibilities that 
are contained within the person’s whakapapa and mana. I now suggest that there are examples 
where tā moko document a variety of legal statements about a person that have legal 
consequences. I will refer to two examples from Simmons to show how he described the 
information that could be read in the moko.  
 
 
26 Ellis, above n 12, at 31. 
27 At 31. 
28 At 31. 
29 Gallagher, above n 18, at 44. 
30 DR Simmons Ta Moko: The Art of Maori Tattoo (Reed Books, Auckland, 1986). 




1. Te Morenga 
Simmons describes how, in 1815, Te Morenga of Te Uri-Kapana, Taiamai, Kaikohe, had used 
a pen to copy his tā moko32 (Te Morenga, 1815) onboard the Active. J L Nicholas that had 
reproduced it in his book Narrative of a Voyage33 in 1817:34 
“Te Morenga’s own tattoo drawn for Nicholas in 1817 on board the rig Active. Te 
Morenga belonged to the Te Urikapana hapu of Ngati Hine, part of the Ngapuhi 
federation and lived at Taiamai near Kaikohe. The forehead design indicates that 
his mother was of a high ranking lineage but this did not apply to his father. The 
designs by the ear and chin would suggest that his mother belonged to a senior line 
connected with the East Coast and more particularly Hawkes Bay, though he 
himself belonged to Ngapuhi, as the style essentially belongs to that area when 
compared with earlier records.” 
This example of Te Morenga’s tā moko contains a number of potential legal statements. His 
mother was of a senior rank within the East Coast in general and the Hawkes Bay in particular. 
By right of whakapapa and mana, this could give Te Morenga standing to use natural resources 
from the Hawkes Bay area to improve his and his whānau’s wellbeing. That status would also 
enable him to use those resources to manaaki others, in effect providing him with an economic 
tool to engage in trade and creating reciprocal obligations for the benefit of his and his Hawkes 
Bay whānau. He would likely have equivalent obligations back to his Hawkes Bay whānau if 
he was to use those resources, as the legal principles of utu and kaitiakitanga would require 
him to manaaki the needs of his whānau there. That may include leadership authority rights to 
participate in rūnanga | council, hui | gatherings or other decision-making processes.  
The set of rights due to him by his rank on his mother’s side might also be counterbalanced by 
his apparently closer connection to Ngāpuhi on his father’s side, evidenced from the general 
design of his moko. Simmons suggests Te Morenga’s status on his father side would be of a 
lesser rank than his mothers. It is also possible that the Māori law relating to ahikā | occupation 
which affirms mana whenua by permanent occupation of an area,35 could constrain his access 
 
32 See Image 5 in the Appendix at page 144 for a repoduction of the sketch of the tā moko of Te Morenga). 
33 JL Nicholas Narrative of a Voyage to New Zealand Performed in the Years 1814 and 1815 in Company with 
the Rev. Samuel Marsden, Principal Chaplain of New South Wales (Vol II, James Black, London, 1817) at 217, 
in D R Simmons, above n 30, at 51. 
34 Figure 27, Simmons, above n 30, at 51. 




to the Hawkes Bay resources, but perhaps provide him better access to resources in the North. 
If he is closer to his Ngāpuhi side because that is where he most commonly resides, his access 
to the Ngāpuhi resources might be greater if he maintains ahikā there. 
 
2. Drawing by HG Robley  
In one of three drawings of a tā moko by HG Robley of an unnamed man (no image available), 
Simmons records highly detailed information based on the design and placement of the tā 
moko:36 
1. Kohere, protector of the land and people.  
2. Rank granted by the father, who has blessed him.  
3. He was second in command of the gardens  
4. In the boundary of Kohuiarau.  
5. He is under the command of the Koroiti ko Tama.  
6. Tribal chief under the age of twenty-five.  
7. Mother of third lineage to taiopuru.  
8. Rongowhakaata tribe of mother, father of Aitanga a Mahaki tribe.  
9. His tribe is Rongowhakaata (Gisborne).  
10. Protected by his mother’s lineage.  
11. Succession by birth but the children do not have the right to succeed. 
 
In this example, there are similar potential legal rights and obligations inscribed in the tā moko 
as in the first example, but in more detail. This inscription identifies the mana | status of his 
parents which would identify his legal entitlements and obligations through whakapapa, mana 
whenua, ahikā, kaitiakitanga and manaakitanga. The tā moko also records his specific role 
within his hapū – second in command of gardens; the name of a person or whānau he works 
with and the area he works in. This could indicate his rangatiratanga authority, if any, to 
 




participate in decision making within the whānau and hapū. It may also indicate the matters in 
which he could exert that rangatiratanga. If his primary responsibility is to the māra | gardens 
then he may also have kaitiaki responsibilities in respect of manaakitanga. He may also have 
kaitiaki authority to impose rāhui in relation to the māra. In addition the last entry records that 
he has whakapapa entitlements to succeed but his children do not. I cannot identify from this 
description what he may be entitled to succeed to, it may be land, or mana, or taonga or a mix 
of the three. I also cannot identify why his children will not have the same succession rights as 
he does, but I do consider that this is a clear statement of the whanaungatanga legal entitlements 
of him and his children.  
More detailed analyses on the potential for Māori law to be written into tā moko needs to be 
done to confirm whether tā moko are a living embodiment of Māori law, as I suggest. There 
appears to be agreement that tā moko, at least in early contact times, documents the whakapapa 
and mana of the person. Simmons says that a “tradition persists…that moko can be read or 
understood to give information.”37 Ellis, who lists 50 separate examples of tā moko written as 
signature, says tā moko “were made as strong political statements about the mana of the men 
who drew them.”38 In contemporary times, it is difficult to tell whether those obtaining a 
mataora | full face moko or moko kauae | female chin moko are intentionally recording 
whakapapa information and if so, whether those people conceptualise that information as 
identity or law or something else. It is also unknown whether tā moko artists are routinely 
trained in the ‘typography’ of tā moko or trained in the individual designs that build the legal 
language of tā moko. Many of these artists may well be a new generation of mātanga | experts, 
even if they understand their visual language as communicating the values of tikanga Māori 
rather than the principles of the Māori legal tradition. It is not too great a step to understand the 
connection between the values of tikanga Māori and the legal principles derived from them, 
once that connection is articulated. Higgins, in her research reflects on the revitalisation of tā 
moko:39 
The revitalisation of ta moko among the younger generation of Maori encompasses 
a political dimension within a traditional Indigenous art form of beautification. As 
 
37 At 126. 
38 Ellis, above n 12, at 55. 
39 Tania M. Ka‘ai, John C. Moorfield, Michael P. J. Reilly, Sharon Mosely (eds) “Te mana o te tangata whenua- 
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well as enjoying a reviving tradition, many Māori are wearing ta moko as a political 
statement of cultural integrity.  
Whatever the many reasons people may now get a tā moko, it is demonstrated in this thesis is 
that information about whakapapa, mana, and other Māori legal rights and responsibilities can 
be written into the skin through tā moko. 
 
III. Pou Whenua as Encoded Law  
 
I will now look at pou whenua as whakairo Māori that can be encoded with law. Pou whenua 
are a form of whakairo | carving. They are tall upright carvings, placed in or on the ground. 
They are used to identify whakapapa | kinship, turangawaewae | place to stand and belong, 
rangatiratanga | sovereignty, and both the mana whenua and mana moana of whānau, hapū and 
iwi. They indicate responsibilities and obligations in relation to the use of important physical 
locations. They can be used to mark wāhi tapu | sacred places, to commemorate special events 
or people, to advise of mana whenua or mana moana authority, and to warn of potential dangers 
and hazards, both physical and spiritual.  
Tā Mead says that carving was always intended to ‘speak’ or to be ‘read’.40 This intent is made 
clear in the origin story of carving. In Tā Mead’s retelling of the origin story,41 Manuruhi, the 
son of Ruatepupuke, who was himself a descendant of Tangaroa, asked his father to help him 
carve a powerful new fish hook so he could feed his whānau. His children were voracious 
eaters of kaimoana. Ruatepupuke did make the hook but advised his son that he was not to use 
the hook until Ruatepupuke could come with him and perform all the necessary karakia. When 
a new hook is made, the right karakia must be recited and the first fish caught with the hook 
must always be returned to Tangaroa.  
But Manuruhi was impatient and he went out fishing without his father. The hook was powerful 
and Manuruhi caught many fish. But this magnificent new, powerful hook alarmed Tangaroa, 
who worried about the impact on his moko, the creatures of the ocean. Tangaroa was also 
insulted because first, Ruatepupuke had made the hook in Tangaroa’s name without 
 
40 Mead, above n 1, at 21. 
41 Hirini Moko Mead Te Toi Whakairo The Art of Maori Carving (5th ed, Oratia Media Ltd, Auckland, 2015) at 




acknowledgement and second, that Manuruhi failed to meet his obligations by returning the 
first catch from the hook. In utu | response, Tangaroa changed Manuruhi into a tui and then 
took him into the sea.  
Ruatepupuke, realising his son had disappeared, hunted everywhere for him and finally swam 
out into the ocean to look for him. He dived deep into the sea and saw a whole village of people 
under the sea and a spectacular whare, Hui-Te-Ana-Nui. Ruatepupuke could hear talking and 
so he went into the whare. He saw that the poupou on one side of the whare were talking to the 
poupou on the other side of the whare. The back wall was talking to the front wall but he 
realised the porch remained silent. Ruatepupuke looked up at the porch of the whare and saw 
that his son had become a tekoteko at the apex of the whare. His son though was on the outside 
and so could not speak to him. The poupou inside told Ruatepupuke why his son was now a 
tekoteko and Ruatepupuke was also now offended. Ruatepupuke waited until evening when all 
the village people had come back to sleep at the pa and then he set fire to the whare. He had 
taken down his son first and when all was destroyed inside, Ruatepupuke took the four pou 
from the porch outside and he and his son fled back home. Those pou and the tekoteko were 
considered the great prize and became the prototype for carving.  
Tā Mead describes the significance of Ruatepupuke taking the silent pou instead of the 
speaking pou. He says that in creating speaking pou, Tangaroa showed that the purpose of 
poupou is to communicate. But Ruatepupuke was in a hurry to leave and left the talking pou 
behind. That means we have a design model for carving as movement, of ‘speech’ in a silent 
form that expert carvers understand in their work:42  
… good creators could make their poupou “talk” in a different way, in a silent 
language that could be understood by those observant people who understood the 
artistic code of communication. It could be said that the moment in the myths when 
Ruatepupuke looked up and saw his son Manuruhi trying desperately to speak to 
him is remembered in all carvings that show in open mouth “struggling to speak.”  
This whakapapa of carving shows that it was always intended that whakairo Māori would 
communicate important information. Māori understood that the pou would contain kupu that 
could be read and kōrero that could be spoken.  
 
 




A. Kaitiakitanga Documented in Pou Whenua 
This section will describe how pou whenua can be used to make legal claims to a place – to 
exercise or claim kaitiakitanga responsibilities, through mana whenua rights. Pou are regularly 
used to demonstrate iwi authority over natural resources, as described by Lisa Tumahai, 
Kaiwhakahaere of Te Rūnanga o Ngai Tahu:43  
Pou whenua have always been important to our people. They establish a footprint 
and provide a tangible sense of Ngāi Tahu mana in our takiwā. Ngāi Tahu are the 
kaitiaki of this land; we must ensure it is protected for us, and our children after us. 
Pou are physical reminders of that responsibility. They will still be here in a hundred 
years, and their stories will continue being told from generation to generation – mō 
tātou, ā, mō kā uri ā muri ake nei.  
Tumahai was responding to the placement of two six-foot tall pou whenua representing the 
tīpuna Tarapuhi and Mati Nohi Nohi near the Mokīhinui River in Kahurangi National Park. 
These pou are designed to activate the mana whenua and be the ‘embodiment’ of the 
whakapapa of Ngai Tahu and Ngāti Waewae in that area.  
In another example within the Ngai Tahu takiwā | district, the pou Tangaroa44 (2016) was 
erected at the entrance to the fishing grounds at Warrington Beach in 2016. Tangaroa was 
placed there by the kaitiaki of Puketeraki Marae on behalf of Kāti Huirapa, to warn of the 
consequences of overfishing. Brendan Flack, the then East Otago Taiapure management 
committee chairperson, was reported as saying45  
He stands there as a guardian, to make people think about their actions. Rather than 
a sign with a lot of words on it, this is another form of communication… In days 
gone by, everyone knew not to take seafood from sites where they saw pou. 
From a kaitiaki perspective, the pou Tangaroa asserts mana whenua and mana moana. He 
specifically activates the authority of the kaitiaki. The pou is intended to describe the risks to 
the fish resources of over-fishing as well as prescribe what behaviour is tika | correct to prevent 
the hara | harm. The pou also contains warnings of the spiritual consequences of breaches of 
 
43 James Harding “Pou Whenua, Establishing a Footprint” in 83 Te Karaka: The Ngai Tahu Magazine 22 at 23. 
The carving was led by Mahana Coulson. 
44 See Image 6 in the Appendix at page 145 for a photograph of Tangaroa carved by Alex Whitaker. 





the correct actions. It is a legal statement from Kāti Huirapa about authority, resources and 
consequences. 
 
B. Mana Whenua Documented in Pou Whenua 
The authority of pou whenua as statements of mana whenua was a key question in the High 
Court decision in Ngāti Maru Trust v Ngāti Whātua Ōrākei.46 Panuku Development Auckland 
was granted resource consent from the Auckland City Council to undertake development at the 
Westhaven marina. Ngāti Whātua did not oppose the development consent but made an 
application to the Environment Court opposing certain conditions of the consent, one of which 
was a condition requiring the placement of 19 pou whenua in the development area.47 These 
pou whenua were to represent the 19 iwi authorities who have land interests in Tamaki 
Makaurau. Panuku Development had developed a Kaitiaki Engagement Plan with all 19 iwi 
authorities to assist the mana whenua to “express their tikanga and fulfil their role as kaitiaki”.48  
Ngāti Whātua argued at the Environment Court that the resource consent hearing panel was 
wrong for, among other things, failing to provide guidance as to which iwi had ‘primacy’ and 
for declaring that mana whenua had to decide primacy issues for themselves if such a decision 
was needed. Ngāti Whātua applied for a declaration from the Environment Court that the 
Environment Court had the:49 
 “jurisdiction to determine which iwi holds primary mana whenua (customary 
authority) where relevant to the wording of the resource consent conditions and that 
“mana whenua” in the Auckland Unitary Plan (the AUP) is neutral and non-
determinative as to the issues of primacy of customary authority.”  
The Environment Court declined to make the declaration and the issue was appealed to the 
High Court where Justice Whata determined that yes:50  
when addressing the s 6(e) RMA requirement to recognise and provide for the 
relationship of Māori and their culture and traditions with their ancestral lands, 
 
46 Ngāti Maru Trust v Ngāti Whātua Ōrākei Whaia Maia Limted [2020] NZHC 2768. 
47 Ngāti Whātua Ōrākei Whaia Maia Limited v Auckland City Council [2019] NZEnvC 184. 
48 Ngāti Maru Trust v Ngāti Whātua Ōrākei Whaia Maia Limted, above n 46, at [9]. 
49 At [12]. 




water, sites, waahi tapu and other taonga, a consent authority, including the 
Environment Court, does have jurisdiction to determine the relative strengths of the 
hapū/iwi relationships in an area affected by a proposal, where relevant to claimed 
cultural effects of the application and wording of the resource consent conditions.  
While the larger issue in this case was how primary mana whenua status was to be determined 
in consent hearing matters involving multiple iwi authority interests in an area, the trigger was 
the resource consent condition that required 19 pou whenua to be erected. Ngāti Whātua 
considered those pou whenua to be Māori legal statements of mana whenua and as such the 
erection of pou by other iwi contravened Ngāti Whātua rangatiratanga.  
Ngarimu Blair, Deputy Chair of the Ngāti Whātua Ōrākei Trust, gave evidence in the High 
Court hearing describing their importance:51 
Pou Whenua, or carved posts in their purist form, are statements of mana and 
authority akin to flag posts being stood and being flown in colonial history to claim 
rights to land. Pou Whenua can also be used to define tribal boundaries and to mark 
places of cultural significance. Placing Pou Whenua in this context would in cultural 
terms assign tribal mana and authority and be a signal of legitimate rights of an iwi 
to that particular place.  
Given the proposal was for 19 Pou Whenua, which reflects the wider Iwi, Ngāti 
Whātua Ōrākei took this as another example of the erosion of our customary rights 
and the elevation of status of many other iwi who cannot claim any customary rights 
to the land in the Auckland CBD to the same extent as Ngāti Whātua Ōrākei. We 
had no choice but to object to the proposals in the strongest possible terms.  
Blair considered the placement of pou was a statement of the turangawaewae | place to stand 
for Ngāti Whātua. The turangawaewae of iwi is where their specific tikanga and their world 
view is paramount. Pou describes who holds mana on that turangawaewae and therefore whose 
rangatiratanga would apply by the assignment of “tribal mana and authority”. This case 
illustrates the argument in this thesis because it demonstrates the legal value that Māori place 
on pou, within the Māori legal tradition. The court’s view of pou is of interest because it 
triggered a contemporary iwi debate over the nature and validity of the encoded objects of 
Māori law. The court’s view of pou does not, in and of itself, contribute to the questions this 
thesis considers.  
 




I suggest a pou is even more than a flagpole. It is an unequivocal visual declaration of 
rangatiratanga akin to a legal title or political territorial authority. The pou may describe the 
whakapapa of that iwi or hapū to the land and include representations of the upoko | leader who 
exercises rangatiratanga. The pou may warn of the spiritual or physical consequences of any 
breach of the mana whenua or a tapu | sacred or rāhui placed on the area. I believe the pou is a 
legal statement of mana and rangatiratanga, presented in an encoded object. It is able to be, and 
expected to be, read as such by others who understand Māori law and have the required visual 
literacy.  
 
IV. Raranga as Encoded Law 
 
Raranga or weaving is an art practice that ranges from the most simple and functional of 
domestic goods such as nets, kete | bags and rain capes to the most elaborate and beautiful, 
large, full-coloured korowai | cloaks of fur, flax and feathers that can take thousands of hours 
and exceptional skill to complete. It is an art form traditionally associated with women although 
not exclusively.52 I am a weaver, particularly of taniko | embroidery and I learnt how to weave 
from my mother. It is an art form of both infinite practicality, flexibility and prestige:53 
... kākahu are imbued with the mana of the weaver’s tipuna, or ancestors, as well as 
her own and that of the wearer, and the ceremonies and occasions at which the cloak 
is later worn will further increase its prestige. These ancestral connects are an 
integral part of the garment and give kākahu their immense value. 
There are a number of origin histories for raranga. One is described earlier,54 where Mataora 
was given the korowai, Te Rangihaupapa, as a gift from his wife, Niwareka’s people and 
brought it back from Rarohenga into te Ao Turoa. A similar origin story has been described 
where Mataora returned from Rarohenga with two gifts of raranga. One was the korowai called 
Te Rangi-haupapa and the other was a taniko belt called Te Ruruku-o-te-rangi.55 It was this 
belt that provided the blueprint for taniko embroidery. Another origin history is described by 
 
52 Hirini Moko Mead Tikanga Māori: Living by Māori Values (Huia Publishers, Wellington, 2016) at 273. 
53 Awhina Tamarapa (ed) Whatu Kākāhu: Māori Cloaks (Te Papa Press, Wellington, 2019) at 12. 
54 See page 100 on the role of Mataora in the orgin of tā moko. 
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Gloria Taituha. She tells the story of the whakapapa of Hine te Iwaiwa, the daughter of Tāne. 
Hine te Iwaiwa is the primary atua | deity for raranga:56  
From the creation of light and the separation of Ranginui and Papa-tū-ā-nuku, 
[Tāne] began to yearn and seek for more space to grow and wedged his parents 
apart, thus creating the world of light. From the creation of light and the separation 
of Ranginui and Papa-tū-ā-nuku, he found Hinerauāmoa, the smallest and most 
fragile star in the heavens, who became the female element Tāne had been searching 
to create humankind. From their union came Hine-te-iwaiwa, the guardian of 
raranga and whatu, childbirth and also the cycles of the moon.  
Hine te Iwaiwa is also acknowledged in Whatū Kakahu as the origin ancestor for raranga:57  
Hine-te-iwaiwa, who is also the personification of childbirth and the cycles of the 
moon, reflects the powerful life rhythms of women as nurturers and sustainers 
descended from the original female elements of Papatūānuku. 
The recognition of Hine te Iwaiwa as the atua responsible for raranga, childbirth and the 
movement of the moon places raranga firmly in the realm of mana wahine. Tā Mead describes 
the ‘whare pora’ which, he says, is not a house as such but a collective of experienced weavers 
who together find and mentor young women to teach them the skills and the kawa | protocols 
of weaving.58 The results of this extraordinary skill include taonga such as korowai, kaitaka | 
highly prized cloak, kakahu | clothing, piupiu | flax garment that swings, kete | basket, and 
whariki | mat. While these can all be domestic textile items used on a daily basis, they can also 
become extremely highly valued taonga.  
Tā Mead describes ‘hākari taonga’ which are special feasts for displaying and exchanging 
taonga | treasures as part of a manaakitanga process.59 The hākari taonga often used tahuaroa, 
large wooden frames erected in the open area in front of a marae or meeting area,60 to hang 
“cloaks, blankets, floor mats and baskets” to which the guests would add theirs for later 
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redistribution.61 I note here that all of those taonga listed by Tā Mead are textiles, the products 
of raranga. Tapsell also describes how these taonga exchange hui were arranged for very 
significant iwi events such as peace-making, marriages or when land was acquired or 
relinquished.62 There is no doubt that the art form of raranga was highly valued as taonga within 
te ao Māori. This was particularly so where the raranga was worn by or exchanged between 
high status individuals. In these cases, the korowai or kākahu could become highly tapu 
because of its bodily contact with a highly tapu person. When this happens, the raranga can 
take on unique and powerful qualities of prestige and meaning. 
 
A. Te Kahumamae o Pareraututu 
The history of Te Kahumanae of Pareraututu, the cloak of pain of Pareraututu is one such 
example (no image available). Paul Tapsell of Ngāti Whakaue and Ngāti Raukawa, is the 
Professor of Indigenous Studies at Melbourne University. He has written extensively about the 
kahumamae, as a descendant of Te Arawa and as participant in the process of returning her63 
from her owners, the Auckland War Memorial Museum, to Rotorua. The taonga history that I 
recount here is her story. I have set it out in full because it is a compelling story that will not 
be properly respected by a summary. It is recounted here as told by her great grand moko Hari 
Semmens directly to Paul Tapsell:64 
Until 1982 I had only heard of my Kuia dogskin cloak and I thought it no longer 
existed. But that year a cloak exhibition came to Rotorua. I visited the exhibition 
out of curiosity and that's when I saw her and put her on. People got upset, but they 
didn't understand, this was my kuia! The cloak felt right, she was warm and fitted 
exactly.  
My eyes were filled with tears as I remembered my old people talking about this 
great cloak and the maker, Pareraututu. She made it to honour the deaths of our 
people killed by Tuhoe in the battle of Pukaikahu. Pareraututu was part Tuhoe 
herself and on learning that her Urewera relatives had killed many of her Rangitihi 
menfolk, she became grief stricken. So my kuia collected all the dogs that had once 
 
61 Mead, above n 52, at 198. 
62 Paul Tapsell “The Flight of Pareraututu: An Investigation of Taonga from a Tribal Perspective” (1997) 106 
Journal of the Polynesian Society 323 at 338. 
63 I refer to the kahumamae as ‘her’ in this thesis as a mark of respect. 




belonged to the fallen Chiefs and wove their skins into our cloak of pain she did 
made a journey to the Waikato to plead with the renowned Ngati Maniapoto fighting 
leader, Tukorehu, to avenge the Tuhoe. Her method of persuasion used no words. 
Instead she sat silently upon Tukorehu’s marae for days on end wrapped in the 
kahumamae and refusing to eat. Eventually Tukorehu’s heart was so moved that he 
accepted Pareraututu’s request by lifting the cloak from his shoulders and placing it 
on his own. I do not know if Tukorehu revenged the Tuhoe or not. 
Many years later when my Kuia died her bones were placed upon our mountain 
peak of Tarawera called Wahanga. I had always thought that our kahumamae, 
Pareraututu, was no more. The old people had no further knowledge than what I 
have just told you. After being passed to Tukorehu the cloak became his to look 
after and we never heard what happened. In our eyes she was gone, and most likely 
buried with someone of importance. 
Those were my thoughts up to the time I was reunited with my Kuia in 1982. I was 
so glad to embrace her and I thought Pareraututu had returned home for good. But 
then I learned she was going back to Auckland. I tried to talk to the museum to leave 
her here at home in Rotorua, to gift her back to us, the descendants. But no, they 
said that the Auckland Museum owned her. I was greatly saddened when she was 
taken away and I knew it was up to me her great grandson, to bring her back home. 
Every time I went to Auckland, I would visit Pareraututu, but I could not convince 
the museum people to let her go. No one wished to understand me. Perhaps 
Pareraututu will come home yet? If this was to happen, I shall die happy.  
Tapsell was able to trace the journey of the kahumamae because the last individual to hold her, 
Captain Gilbert Mair, left her whakapapa details with the museum.65 Mair was a New Zealand-
born Englishman, and fluent te reo Māori speaker. He fought for the Crown in many of the 
most well-known battles including the Invasion of Waikato, against Te Kooti and against 
Tuhoe. However, he developed respectful and long-lasting relationships with many rangatira 
and was entrusted with the care of some 247 taonga during his lifetime. All of these taonga 
were gifted to the Auckland Museum at his death. And that include Te Kahumamae o 
Pareraututu. She had passed from Tukorehu to his grandson, Rewi Maniapoto, who sent it to 
Ihakara Tukumaru (from Foxton), who gave it to Poihipi Tukairangi, the “principal chief of 
Taupo” who gave it to Mair.  
 




Tapsell was eventually able, over a two-year period, negotiate the loan of Pareraututu to the 
Rotorua Museum so that she could be reunited with her people on her ancestral land. However, 
she remains the legal property of the Auckland Museum. Tapsell describes the difficulty he 
encountered with arranging the transfer because of the de-personalisation of the taonga:66 
Apart from the physical barriers up distance in glass cases, visiting descendants also have been 
confronted with perhaps strange labels and a museum bureaucracy. These not only separate 
Taonga from the descendant and ancestral lands, but also depersonalised them as western art-
objects that are institutionally redefined in terms of legal possession and insurance premiums.  
Tapsell who has a deep knowledge of the kahumamae and her place in her iwi says:67 
Taonga are poignant reminders of the past, represented by the concepts of mana, 
tapu, and kōrero, which, when performed by elders on the marae, become symbolic 
illustrations of the kin groups ancestral identity to surrounding lands. Pareraututu 
demonstrates how taonga, if they still maintain their mana, tapu and kōrero can 
ritually re-enter today's tribal society and thereafter assist in the amelioration of life 
crises. 
The history of Te Kahumamae o Pareraututu is very much an example of the palimpsest that 
Panoho describes, an object encoded with layers of history and, I suggest, law. She is estimated 
to be over 200 years old, made sometime around 1800.68 She was given in iwi exchanges 
between various chiefs until being finally gifted to Mair, as a highly prized taonga, in 1889.69 
Her experience to that point was as a ‘taonga tuku iho’ that Tā Mead and Tapsell described.  
Te Kahumamae o Pareraututu is first, and most importantly tūpuna – the physical embodiment 
of Pareraututu whose presence is quite literally felt by her descendants. This was the view taken 
by Ellis who has written about the kahumamae as biography.70 This means that her mana would 
continue to grow because, as Tapsell suggests, mana does not necessarily diminish at death. 
Pareraututu has the characteristics of a person, containing mana, tapu and kōrero.71  
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Her making is another layer of the legal kōrero that she carries. I would suggest her making 
was for the purpose of a petition for utu, and ea. Pareraututu spent three days wrapped in her, 
not eating, waiting for her petition for utu to be agreed and her entitlement to ea to accepted by 
Tokurehu. At her making she was encoded with law, a whanaungatanga request for a ‘take-
utu-ea’ process. We do not know if she found the resolution she desired.  
We can add to her that purpose the value of the kōrero, presumably now lost, that would have 
added to her mana each time she was part of a taonga exchange. As Ellis describes, taonga can 
be considered living beings, integrated into the whakapapa and history of the land and the 
people that they have an association with:72 
[i]n doing so, a taonga might have a number of tribal affiliations and associations, 
none more important than the other, and the tribes all fulfill the role of kaitiaki. 
Maori do not consider taonga able to be owned, but rather, as with the whenua, we 
are here to look after them until we can pass them on to the next generation. 
Pareraututu was layered with the content of those histories, and she would have been expected 
to communicate those histories in her physical form to demonstrate her value for each chief 
she was presented to. In this way she both holds and gains mana:73 
Since then, Pareraututu has continued to accumulate ancestral power, adding to the 
mana, tapu and kōrero collected over the generations. Like the comet’s tail, the 
blaze of this taonga’s mana has grown far greater that the item itself and, because 
of its powerful identity-maintaining qualities to ancestral lands, it is not perceived 
by Pareraututu’s descendants as inalienable. 
She has also suffered the indignity and mistreatment that many Indigenous taonga suffer, 
during her years at the museum. The museum did identify her making as a kahumamae but it 
is unclear whether they provided much more information. The mana of the kahumamae was 
lost on the museum, because they understood her only as a piece of material culture for 
historical preservation. They knew her story in a superficial sense but without any respect for 
the legal purpose of her creation or for her ancestral role with her descendants. They did not 
demonstrate any understanding of her role in her whakapapa and were, at first instance 
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dismissive of the mana and whanaungatanga that she maintained with her descendants, 
particularly Hari Semmens. 
And finally, she may now have a role in Te Arawa as a restatement and commitment of their 
rangatiratanga, of their nationhood. Tapsell describes her role in contemporary Te Arawa life:74 
Like the comets tail, the blaze of this taonga’s mana has grown far greater than the 
item itself and because of its powerful identity-maintaining qualities to ancestral 
lands, it is now perceived by Pareraututu’s descendants as inalienable. 
Te Kahumamae o Pareraututu has become, in Tapsell’s description, the embodiment of 
whanaungatanga for Te Arawa. She incorporates the cosmological, the ancestral and the divine 
as a taonga tuku iho, a ‘gift from the ancestors to their descendants born and yet unborn’. She 
is a physical representation of whakapapa and therefore binds Te Arawa into a whanaungatanga 
relationship with her, and through her, with the land and with the atua.  
 
V. He Mutunga 
 
This chapter has brought together the educational theory of visual literacy, the art theory of 
encoded objects and the jurisprudence of Māori law and applied them to whakairo Māori to see 
if whakairo Māori could be said to document law. The research shows that designs tattooed 
onto the skin, in specific areas of the face, inscribe legal information about an individual. That 
information includes the law that is derived from the legal principles of mana, whakapapa, 
ahikāroa | title by occupation, manaakitanga, and rangatiratanga. These legal principles come 
with legal rights and obligations that are both identifiable by the individual and by others. This 
is Māori law encoded in the skin. 
In the case of pou whenua, it is also clear from the examples that Māori intend that pou whenua 
communicate mana whenua, mana moana, rangatiratanga and kaitiakitanga. These are the legal 
principles for the assertion of whānau, hapū or iwi political and territorial dominance over a 
space. That political and territorial dominance includes the exercise of legal authority over that 
area. These principles of mana whenua, mana moana, rangatiratanga and kaitiakitanga create 
the legal tools that enable Māori to identify and protect natural resources and to use those 
 




resources for political, economic and legal purposes, such as manaakitanga and utu. This legal 
power is encoded into pou whenua. 
With raranga, given the breadth of uses of raranga and with only one example, I am not as 
easily able to argue that Māori law is encoded in raranga except in exceptional cases. There is 
no doubt that raranga has been used by Māori as taonga, such as the kahumamae. Pareraututu 
was a petition, the physical embodiment of encoded law and an agreement between Pareraututu 
and Tukorehu for the exercise of utu. She was a taonga exchanged in manaakitanga or similar 
Māori legal processes, from chief to chief. She is now a constitutional document recording the 
mana of Te Arawa. At each point she has been encoded with kōrero, a document able to be 
read for her value and her histories. More raranga examples might help demonstrate the extent 
to which they have also been used to document contracts or agreements, as Pareraututu was. It 
may be that raranga, particularly exceptional korowai, are a common legal documentation tool 
for manaakitanga, utu or muru. They may also have a role in documenting mana and 
rangatiratanga. And of course, they may have much broader rangatiratanga roles as Pareraututu 
has, over time. 
More research is needed to understand better the depth and breadth of the possible non-written 
visual documentation of Māori law in whakairo Māori. However, I am confident that whakairo 






He Kupu Whakamutunga | Concluding Remarks 
 
This thesis has set out a pathway by which we can consider whether Māori law is documented 
in whakairo Māori | Māori visual art. In the Introduction, I presented my thesis question, which 
I have addressed in two parts: 
Is Māori law documented in whakairo Māori? 
a. What are the non-written visual means of communicating Māori law? 
b. Can these non-written visual means help to communicate Māori law? 
 
Chapter 2 began this inquiry by asking: Can we open our understanding of what law is? It 
presented an overview of the historical debate concerning Indigenous law, concluding that 
Indigenous de-centralised legal traditions occupy a footing as equally authoritative as that of 
Western, positivist legal systems. The chapter confirmed that Māori do have a legal tradition 
and that the character of Māori law is capable of description and analysis. After considering 
what Indigenous law is, I concluded that Māori are not constrained by the culturally bound 
ideas or definitions of Western jurisprudence. Indigenous legal scholars are researching and 
publishing more and more jurisprudence showing how Indigenous peoples conceptualise their 
legal traditions, their conflict resolution processes, and the values and principles on which those 
traditions and processes are based. Building on the foundations laid by Chapter 2, Chapter 5 
discussed the principles of the Māori legal tradition in just this way. As more of this work 
makes its way into the legal and public domains, we can, with both respect and intellectual 
rigour, interrogate, contest, and extend those ideas, developing more Indigenous and Māori 
jurisprudence in response. This process of legal reasoning and inquiry is simply adhering to 
many centuries of a vigorous Indigenous intellectual tradition. This tradition is evident in the 
impact of tikanga Māori and Māori law in Aotearoa New Zealand’s contemporary 
jurisprudence. 
This thesis has also demonstrated that we can draw on theories from other disciplines to test 
and interrogate legal thinking to broaden our concept of law, and therefore the instruments of 
law. In Chapter 3, drawing on the concept of visual literacy, I showed how it was possible for 
Indigenous peoples to visually ‘write’ and read law without an alphabet, documenting their law 
in non-written visual forms. These non-written visual forms are culturally determined and 




including their legal relationships to each other, with their atua | deities, and with the natural 
world. To understand those non-written visual forms, it is necessary to understand the cultural 
context in which the visual mark- and object-marking is made. That can then lead to 
understanding how legal concepts might be encoded by those marks and objects. The two 
examples of visual literacy discussed in Chapter 3, the Saltwater Collection and the Ngurrara 
Canvas II, demonstrated that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders have non-written visual 
documentation by which they communicate their law to themselves and to those outside their 
culture. The chapter on visual literacy provided a necessary theoretical insight into how Māori 
law might be encoded into whakairo Māori as a type of visual literacy. 
In Chapter 4 I looked at how Indigenous law might be encoded into objects and demonstrated 
that objects have been encoded with legal information. The two examples of the Gwinu crest 
blankets and wampum belts from the First Nations peoples of Canada showed how those First 
Nations peoples made objects with the very clear intention that those objects would hold and 
communicate legal authority. In the case of the crest blankets, the K’san Historical Village and 
Museum entirely disregarded the legal quality inherent in the blanket, demonstrating how 
critical it is to understand the culture in which both the law and the object is being made.  
In the wampum belt example, its legal authority was understood and even used by Crown 
agents to record legal agreements. This suggests that colonising nations during the 18th and 
19th century were aware of the existence and force of both Indigenous law and the encoded 
objects of Indigenous law. Legally encoded objects can be found in Aotearoa New Zealand’s 
state legal system as well. Earlier in the thesis I referred to the ‘bar’ as an encoded object.1 
Wigs and gowns, insofar as they are still used, are also encoded objects as costumes which 
signify status and denote the special powers of the wearers – for judges that includes the 
extraordinary power to imprison a person. Encoded objects of the law come with stories and 
histories that communicate social, political, and legal information. If we can understand that 
about the law that we live within every day, we may be able understand that better about 
Indigenous and Māori law as well.  
In addressing the first subpart of my thesis question – What are the non-written visual means 
of communicating Māori law? – I established that, like state law does, Māori have encoded our 
visual language into objects to communicate our law. That visual language is evident in the 
complex and detailed meanings of tā moko | tattooing, etched directly in the skin as a living 
 




law. That visual language is also evident in pou whenua | land marker posts, prized encoded 
objects that announce the law to those who view them. And, in rarer cases, it is evident in 
raranga | weaving, which communicates social, political and legal information for a potentially 
more personal and constitutional purpose. 
And finally, to the second subpart of my thesis question: Can these non-written visual means 
help to communicate Māori law? Speaking as a lawyer, I would suggest the answer established 
by this thesis is ‘yes, but’. I believe that we can use whakairo Māori as a form of documentation 
to communicate Māori law, subject to three conditions. 
First, we must be confident about the authority of Māori law. I have discussed the principles 
of the Māori legal tradition that operate as an integrated whanaungatanga legal framework. 
That framework includes legal practices such as whakawā, rūnanga and hui, and tools, such as 
tuku, muru and rāhui that give effect to those principles. The principles contain norms 
understood by Māori to set high standards of behaviour. Where a person fails to meet those 
standards, there are very real consequences of “serious social disadvantage” that they, and their 
whānau, hapū or iwi may suffer as a result. We need a broader discussion and more research 
on what the difference between tikanga Māori and Māori law is, how that difference, if it exists, 
is articulated, and what Māori law is and how we might communicate. In short, we need more 
Māori jurisprudence. And we need more research to clarify what law whakairo Māori is 
communicating, particularly with a view to iwi-specific legal orders and iwi-specific whakairo 
Māori. Understanding Māori law and whakairo Māori as a rich and layered palimpsest can only 
improve our understanding of them both and illuminate the fascinating relationship between 
the two. These are the kinds of matters we need to be thinking about as we consider how Māori 
law can be integrated into the LLB degree in Aotearoa New Zealand. 
The second condition is closely connected to the first, which is the need to value and privilege 
mātanga ture | legal experts, those who have the knowledge of how to encode our law in non-
written visual means, and to read it. This is a critical literacy skill in te ao Māori. I suspect that 
there is less emphasis on how whakairo Māori can operate as legal documentation in 
contemporary times because we have not had sufficient kōrero on our own legal tradition – 
what it is, how it works, and how it can be communicated. We have such a rich intellectual 
tradition, and we can apply it to our own forms of documentation and literacy. To do that we 




The third condition is more unsettling, particularly as I have tried to avoid centring colonisation 
in this thesis. However, there remains a lingering political question raised by the thesis. 
However well-articulated our jurisprudence and however well we assert our political and 
therefore legal autonomy, the authority of Māori law as extant and operational is dependent, to 
at least some degree, on its recognition as such by the Aotearoa New Zealand state political 
and legal system. The history of the recognition of Māori law demonstrates just how fraught 
and variable it can be, and how quickly it can change. There is an increasing crossover of the 
two legal traditions in the contemporary practice of law and in theory of law. How the interface 
between the two legal traditions is managed over the next decade is critical to how we 
whakamana | empower our own legal tradition, its principles, its practices, and its 
documentation.  
Māori are in the best position to lead this work on the interface, and they are doing so. The 
Māori intellectual tradition thrives in Aotearoa. Tikanga Māori and Māori law are practised 
every day, despite having suffered terrible blows in the past. However long the restoration of 
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Appendix – Reproductions of the Artworks Discussed 
 





















Image 3 Two Row Wampum (unknown date). Replica of the Two Row wampum of the Tawagonshi Agreement of 1613, 
















Image 5 Te Morenga (unknown date). Self-portrait recorded in John Nicholas Narrative of a Voyage to New Zealand, 









Image 6 Tangaroa 2016. Kāti Huirapa. Alex Whitaker, Warrington Beach, Dunedin. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
